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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse porte sur l'interconnexion , trop souvent négligée, entre les histoires de la 
science économique, des mathématiques, des statistiques, des sciences naturelles et 
sociales aux États-Unis, entre les années 1900 et 1940. La thèse étudie deux 
personnages scientifiques américains, Paul A. Samuelson (1915-2009) et Edwin B. 
Wilson (1879-1964), ce dernier étant le professeur d ' économie mathématique et 
statistique avancées de Samuelson, à l' Université de Harvard au milieu des années 
1930. Sur la base de recherches d ' archives, cette thèse reconstruit, la carrière 
professionnelle de Wilson et étudie le travail en économie mathématique de 
Samuelson au début de sa carrière. De cette façon, les histoires de plusieurs 
disciplines scientifiques entre 1900 et 1940 sont reconstruites et les racines, 
profondément américaines, des idées au sujet des mathématiques et des sciences de 
Samuelson sont identifiées. 
Wilson était un mathématicien formé autour des années 1900 à ! 'Université de 
Harvard, à l ' Université de Yale, où il reçut son doctorat, et à !' École Normale 
Supérieure de Paris. Wilson se développa en tant que mathématicien en s ' engageant 
avec une tradition mathématique américaine établie par Josiah Willard Gibbs, son 
mentor à Yale, et en rejetant le type de mathématiques proposées par l' allemand 
David Hilbert, dont l' influence au sein de la communauté de recherche des 
mathématiciens américains modernes était remarquable. Aux débuts de sa carrière, 
Wilson appartenait à cette communauté, étant même parmi l' un de ses membres les 
plus actifs. Cependant, au cours de sa carrière, graduellement et progressivement, 
Wilson se marginalisa de la communauté américaine des mathématiciens, comme 
conséquence de son rejet de Hilbert et son engagement avec Gibbs. De façon 
concomitante, Wilson entra en contact avec d ' autres communautés scientifiques et 
d ' autres champs de recherche, notamment les statistiques et l' économie. 
Après avoir suivi les cours de Wilson en économie mathématique, pendant lesquels il 
enseignait la théorie du consommateur da façon analogique à la thermodynamique de 
Gibbs, et en statistiques mathématiques pendant son doctorat à Harvard, Samuelson 
s ' engagea et adopta l' attitude Gibbsienne envers les mathématiques de Wilson. 
Trois chapitres composent cette thèse. Tout d ' abord, les efforts de Wil son pour 
connecter les sciences américaines avec les mathématiques entre les 1900 et 1940 
ainsi que sa définition de la rationalité mathématique et scientifique sont discutés. 
Deuxièmement, l' influence de Wilson sur la montée de l' économie mathématique 
aux États-Unis entre les années 1920 et 1930 est étudiée. Finalement, l' influence 
significative de Wilson sur les Foundatfons of Economie Analysis de Samuelson est 
détaillée. 
Mots clés: E. B . Wilson , P. Samuelson, histoire de la science économique moderne, 
histoire des mathématiques et des sciences, biographie intellectuelle. 
ABSTRACT 
This is a thesis in the interwoven, yet often presented as separated, histories of 
economics, mathematics, statistics, social and natural sciences in the United States of 
America between 1900 and the 1940s. 
The focus is placed on two American scientific figures , Paul A. Samuelson (1915-
2009) and Edwin B. Wilson (1879-1964), Samuelson ' s professor of advanced 
mathematical and statistical economics at Harvard University in the mid-1930s. 
Based on documents found in Samuelson's and Wilson ' s archives, Wilson ' s 
professional career is reconstructed and Samuelson ' s early work in mathematical 
economics is studied. ln this way, the histories of various scientific disciplines in 
America between 1900 and the 1940s are reconstructed, and the deeply American 
roots of Samuelson ' s ideas about mathematics and science are identified. 
Wilson was a mathematician trained around 1900 at Harvard University where he 
attended college, Yale University were he received his Ph.D. , and at the École 
Normale Supérieure in Paris where he spent one postdoctoral year. Wilson developed 
as a mathematician, committing to an American mathematical tradition established by 
Josiah Willard Gibbs, Wilson ' s mentor at Yale, and in clear contrast with David 
Hilbert' s kind of mathematics, which played a significant role in the development of 
the American mathematical research community. At the beginning of his career, 
Wilson belonged to that community. He was even one of its most active members. 
However, because of his rejection of Hilbert and his commitment to Gibbs, over his 
career, Wilson gradually and progressively marginalized himself from the American 
community of mathematicians. Concomitantly , he made incursions into other 
scientific fields and communities, in particular statistics and economics. 
Having attended Wilson ' s courses in economics in which Wilson taught consumer 
theory analogically to Gibbs thermodynamics and mathematical statistics having in 
mind spectral analysis for the study of business cycles during bis doctoral years at 
Harvard, Samuelson full y engaged with Wilson ' s Gibbsian kind of mathematics. 
Three different essays compose the thesis. Firstly, Wilson ' s efforts to connect 
American sciences with mathematics between 1900 and the 1940s and his definition 
of mathematical and scientific rationality are discussed. Secondly, Wilson ' s influence 
on the rise of mathematical economics in America between the 1920s and 1930s is 
studied. Thirdly and finally , Wilson ' s catalytic influence for Samuelson ' s 
Foundations of Economie Analysis is examined. 
Key words: E. B. Wilson , P. Samuelson, history of modern economics, history of 
mathematics and science, intellectual biography. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the opening page of his doctoral thesis, defended in 1940, and of his Foundations 
of Economie Analysis (1947), an expansion of his thesis, Paul A. Samuelson (1915-
2009) wrote : "Mathematics is a language." He also attributed this motto to Josiah 
Willard Gibbs, and suggested at the same time that he had adopted the Gibbsian 
mathematical style in his work in mathematical economics. 
The present thesis in the history of economics, composed of three distinct but 
interconnected essays, 1 aims at historically reconstructing the discourse that shaped 
Samuelson ' s mathematical thinking and led him to regard mathematics as a language. 
With this in mind, in the following pages we will endeavor to bridge the 
interconnected yet often presented as separate histories of economics, mathematics, 
statistics, social and natural sciences in the United States of America between 1900 
and the 1940s. The focus is placed on Edwin B. Wilson (1879-1964), Samuelson ' s 
professor of advanced mathematical economics and mathematical statistics at 
Harvard University in the mid-1930s, and on the great but yet understudied influence 
that Wilson had upon Samuelson ' s attitude towards mathematical and statistical 
economics, which eventually framed and limited Samuelson ' s mathematical thinking, 
and which therefore shaped Samuelson ' s thesis and Foundations. 
Wilson was an American polymath who was educated around 1900 at Harvard 
University where he attended college, at Yale University where he obtained his Ph.D. 
in mathematics and where he met his mentor Josiah Willard Gibbs, and at the École 
Normale Supérieure in Paris where he met ail the luminaries of the French 
1 The three essays were written for different audiences. The format of references of each was adapted 
accordingly and kept unchanged in this thesis. As the three essays are directly connected to Wilson, 
but from different angles, the reader will find , here and there, certain repetitions . 
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mathematical community. Wilson played an important yet unexplored role in the 
history of American mathematics and its interconnections with various sciences-
physics, statistics, economics, sociology-and their development. 
Key to understanding Wilson ' s intellectual legacy is knowing his suspicion regarding 
what he saw as the excessive abstraction of German structural ist mathematics. Wilson 
believed that mathematics, following Gibbs ' kind of mathematics, should be 
immediately useful for operational purposes, where the operational implied the 
practical. Regarding mathematics and science, Wilson ' s ideas about the operational 
and the practical embodied a sequence of two elements. Firstly, they implied 
establishing and adopting a specific discipline in the practice of mathematics, which 
should consist of restraining pure mathematical abstractions, as mathematical 
structures, by the prevailing working hypotheses and the data of the subject matter to 
which mathematics was applied . Only in this regard , for Wilson, was operational 
mathematics relevant for the practice of science as truly scientific. Secondly, in his 
view, once practitioners of the subject matter eventually adopted the " right" kind of 
Wilson ' s Gibbsian discipline of mathematics, mathematics and science would 
become useful for practical purposes of individual life (how to choose and select 
among various alternatives) and collective life (enhancing national security, public 
health, prosperity, etc.) in a sound scientific way. 
Samuelson was an American economist who received his undergraduate training at 
the University of Chicago and his graduate training from Harvard University. He 
spent his career as professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MJT), 
receiving the Nobel Prize in Economies in 1970. Samuelson was an architect of the 
modern economics discipline (Arrow 1983 ; Hahn 1983; Brown and Solow 1983). 
Various generations of economists have been trained with some of his books. It is 
significant that Samuelson declared himself a disciple of Wilson (Samuelson 1998), 
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who taught him the tools of continuous and numerical mathematics related to 
Gibbsian thermodynamics. 
In the literature of history of economics, it has been argued that Samuelson was 
influential in establishing the identity of economists as being scientists (Mirowski 
1989). Although some accounts have expounded on how economics became a 
mathematical discipline at large (Düppe and Weintraub 2014; Leonard 2010; Giocoli 
2003; Weintraub 2002; Mirowski 2002; Ingrao and Israel 1990), sometimes claiming 
a formalist revolution (Blaug 2003; Landreth and Colander 2004) and how, in 
America, economics was transformed during the interwar period (Morgan and 
Rutherford 1998; Johnson 1977), and further how certain American mathematical 
economists, uncritically inspired by a physical metaphor, participated in the 
mathematical transformation of the discipline (Hands and Mirowski 1998; Mirowski 
and Hands 1998), the figure of Wilson has been relegated to footnotes. Neither 
Wilson ' s imprint on the history of economics as intertwined with the history of other 
disciplines in America, nor his influence on Samuelson ' s attitude towards 
mathematics, statistics and science, have yet been the subject of detailed historical 
analyses. 
In a similar way, Wilson has been relatively disregarded by the history of 
mathematics, science, statistics and social science. 
If Wilson played such an important role in the development of American science, and 
if he was so relevant for the shaping of Samuelson ' s ideas about mathematical and 
statistical economics, and therefore for the history of economics, one may naturally 
wonder: why has he been neglected by the literatures of history of mathematics, 
science, statistics and economics? 
A possible reason for this historical oversight emerges from the fact that, 
traditionally, the history of specific scientific disciplines has been concerned with 
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internai questions. Although Wilson actively participated in the process of 
specialization of various scientific fields by offering contributions in mathematics 
during the 1900s, mathematical physics and relativity during the 191 Os, statistics 
during the 1920s and 1930s, as well as economics and social science during 1930s, he 
was not necessarily the most original at the creative front. Consequently, his legacy in 
the subsequent and separated development of each one of these fields was not 
necessarily central. In this way, it seems normal that Wilson has remained relatively 
unnoticed by the internally concerned history of each one of the fields to which he 
contributed. 
A possible reason explaining the relative neglect of Wilson and his influence on 
Samuelson by the history of economics is related to the fact that his main influence 
on the discipline was at the organizational and educational fronts. Wilson ' s influence 
on Samuelson ' s mathematical and statistical economics took shape precisely during 
Wilson ' s graduate courses at Harvard. Historians of economics who have studied 
Samuelson ' s work and who potentially could have explored Wilson ' s relevance in 
economics more in detail , have focused their attention on specific theoretical 
concerns on which Samuelson ' s ideas played an important role for subsequent 
developments of the discipline. 2 From the perspective of these forward-looking 
historical narratives, it seems al so normal that Wilson bas been relegated to passing 
comments, as his relevance for economics, if merely regarded through Samuelson ' s 
work, would have required a backward-looking perspective. 
Samuelson passed away in 2009; only since 2011 have historians of economics been 
able to fully consult his persona! archives, which contain inestimable evidence of his 
commitment to Wilson ' s ideas about mathematics, statistics and science. Of 
particular relevance for this project, Roger Backhouse is currently writing an 
2 Such as Samuelson' s dynamics (Weintraub 199 1) or his consumer theory (Hands 2014; 2014; 201 3; 
2006; Mirowski and Hands 2006; Wong 1978). 
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intellectual biography of Samuelson (Forthcoming). His historical study is 
comprehensive and traces a great number of significant influences for Samuelson's 
intellectual development. Backhouse also emphasizes Wilson ' s relevance for 
Samuelson's career and work, opening the door for the present thesis at the same 
time, which focuses exclusively on Wilson and on the Wilson-Samuelson connection . 
Historians of economics who studied Samuelson's work before 2011 did not have 
access to this archivai material. After having visited Samuelson ' s archives, located at 
the David M. Rubenstein Rare Books & Manuscripts Library at Duke University, we 
decided to dive into Wilson ' s archives, located at Harvard University Library. 
On the basis of the material consulted in these archives, it became evident that 
Wilson's legacy was significant in establishing interconnections between American 
scientific fields and the development of interdisciplinarity. Illustrative of such 
influence, since the first publication of the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science in 1915, and until he passed away in 1964, Wilson served as its managing 
editor. Wilson ' s organizational and educational efforts embodied a specific project to 
connect mathematics to other fields in order to make them " really" scientific, and , at 
the same time, to provide mathematics with its operational intelligibility . He worked 
willing to establish the right kind of practices of present and future American 
mathematicians and scientists. Wilson ' s activism clearly aimed at reforming 
Arnerican academia, following ideas that he himself developed about the foundations 
of mathematics and science, which were unique and original as well as based on his 
understanding of Gibbs ' mathematical style. 
The history of science has only relatively recently been concerned with the 
interconnected histories of different scientific fields ; Wilson became relevant for 
historical accounts only from that perspective. His career and work underlay a story 
of disciplinary migration from mathematics to other fields , especially to statistics and 
econom1cs. 
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The approach that we adopted consists precisely of historically exploring and 
reconstructing Wilson ' s career and work in order to study the Wilson-Samuelson 
connection as well as Samuelson ' s early work. 3 What did Samuelson mean by 
"mathematics is language"? What was the influence that Wilson exerted on 
Samuelson ' s early (mathematical and statistical) thinking? How did this influence 
corne to be? What did he thought about the foundations of mathematics and science? 
Were his foundational ideas original? Did he define mathematics as a Janguage? How 
did he corne to be involved with mathematical and statistical economics? And how 
did he corne to teach these fields to graduate students in economics at Harvard 
University where he met Samuelson? These will be the questions that will guide our 
thinking in this dissertation. 
ln this spirit, by following Wilson through his academic professional life, the 
emphasis on interconnections between the histories of various fields in America 
simply emerged as evident. In the same vein , by following Wilson until he met 
Samuelson, and by following their close intellectual relationship, the focus on 
Samuelson ' s commitment to Wilson ' s ideas about mathematics and science also 
emerged as evident. As Wilson himself committed to mathematics of the Gibbsian 
kind, by studying the intellectual lives of Wilson (extensively) and Samuelson (early 
professional years) , the present work reconstructs a very American story of the 
Gibbs-Wilson-Samuelson intellectual genealogy. 
Eventually, this research sheds new light on Samuelson ' s Foundations, connecting it 
with Wilsonian concerns about the foundations of economics, mathematics and 
statistics. lt contributes to our understanding of how economics became the modern 
3 On biography as a historiographical category in the history of economics, and of science, see 
(Weintraub and Forget 2007). Robert Leonard ' s Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Crealion of 
Game Theo,y : From Chess to Social Science, 1900-1960 (2010) as well as Till Düppe ' s and Roy 
Weintraub ' s Finding Equi!ibrium: Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie and the Prob!em of Scientific Credit 
(2014) are significant contributions to the history of economics that adopt such biographical 
framework. 
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mathematical and statistical scientific discipline that it turned to be in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. 
Tn the first chapter, Wilson ' s efforts in connecting sciences in America between 1900 
and the 1940s will be discussed ; it will be emphasized that even though he 
professionally engaged with various fields , such as mathematics, physics, statistics 
and economics, his ideas about mathematical and scientific rationality, which he 
developed as he embarked on foundational discussions of mathematics and science 
(which will be explained) constituted the common thread connecting the different and 
distinct stages of his career. (Mathematical) rationality, he claimed, was the only 
valid invariant in science, in a strict sense, as eve,y body could learn its techniques 
and think with it, as everybody could learn a language. 
In the second chapter, Wilson ' s influence on the rise of mathematical economics in 
America between the 1920s and 1930s will be explored ; the focus will be laid on 
showing how, on the grounds of his foundational ideas and his definition of scientific 
rationality, Wilson worked at the organizational and educational levels to modernize 
economics. The chapter will thus discuss the ways in which he was key in the 
constitution of the first organized community of American mathematical economists; 
his crucial role in the origins of the Econometric Society, which bears new lights on 
the constitution of the econometric movement; and his leadership in promoting and 
establishing the first program in advanced mathematical and statistical economics at 
Harvard as well as his two courses to economists, Mathematical Economies and 
Mathematical Statistics. 
Finally, Wilson ' s catalytic influence on Samuelson ' s Foundaüons of Economie 
Analysis will be explained. The accent will be laid on exploring the various ways 
through which Wilson framed and limited Samuelson ' s mathematical and statistical 
thinking during his doctoral years at Harvard. The analysis will consist of studying 
Samuelson's thesis, which constituted the body of Foundations itself, as well as 
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Foundations , while detailing the ways in which these works were done in a Gibbs-
Wilsonian spirit. In this way, Wilson's influence on Samuelson ' s general ideas about 
mathematics and science, as well as his influence regarding certain Samuelson 's 
theoretical concerns in economics will be explored. 
By historically reconstructing the intellectual experiences of Wilson and Samuelson, 
and drawing from the Gibbs-Wilson-Samuelson connection developed in our thesis, 
this project connects Samuelson ' s "Mathematics is a language" to a deep, 
sophisticated and complex discourse about the foundations of mathematics and 
science, which was far from a naïve statement about the nature of mathematics and 
science. This discourse was embodied in Wilson ' s Gibbsian style of mathematical 
and scientific thinking, in the spirit of which Samuelson developed his thesis and 
Foundations. 
CHA PTERI 
EDWIN B. WILSON AND SCIENTIFIC RA TIONALITY: CONNECTING 
AMERICAN SCIENCES, 1900-1 945 
1.1. Introduction 1 
On January the 18t\ 1920, E. B. Wil son was invited to deliver a ta lk on re lativ ity to 
the Royce C lub, w hich was an info rma i interdisciplinary gro up of scho lars from 
Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts. He opened hi s talk as fo llows: 
"There is [ ... ], to-day, in the physica l world a genera l unrest, [ . .. ]. This, 
unrest leads physicists to a lternate, according to their temper, between a 
despair of ever settling the phys ical bases of the many new facts which 
experiment is thrusting upon them and a desperate grasping at any 
theoretical straw that offe rs even a fee ble chance of support in the flood . 
1 E- mail : carvaj a5@gmai l. com. l am gratefu l to Roger Backhouse, Leo Cony , T ill Düppe, Robert 
Leonard , Karen Parsha ll , Ted Porter and Roy Weintraub fo r the ir comments on thi s chapter. The usua l 
caveat applies. I am also th ankful to archi vists at the Harvard U ni versity Archives (HUA) and at the 
Li brary of Congress (LC) in Washington, DC. Papers of Edw in Bidwell W il son (PEB W) were 
consul ted at HUA , HUG4878.203 (ind icated if di ffe rent) and Oswald Veblen Papers (OVP) at the LC, 
oc. 
ln this general ly febrile condition of our science it is particularly unsafe to 
draw philosophical conclusions."2 
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E. B. Wilson (1879-1964) was an American polymath trained in mathematics around 
1900 at Harvard University, Yale University and the École Normale Supérieure m 
Paris. He taught and conducted research in mathematics at Yale ( 1903-1907), m 
mathematical physics at the Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology (1907-1922), m 
statistics at the Harvard School of Public Health (1922 and thereafter) and in social 
science and econom ics at Harvard ( 1932 -1945). 
Wilson ' s diagnosis of physics in 1920 was similar to the diagnosis that he had offered 
for mathematics around 1900, and to the diagnosis that he would later make for 
statistics, social science and economics: he believed that the scientific foundations of 
ail these fields were missing. Consequently , he felt that his scientific era was one of 
unrest. Facing this Jack of sound foundations , and confronted by the difficult choice 
regarding the kind of attitude that they should adopt in their creative practices, 
Wi !son bel ieved, mathematicians, physicists, statisticians, social scientists and 
economists, perplexed, tended to commit to wrong methodological approaches. 
Noticing such unrest, early in his career as a mathematician, Wilson offered , in a 
unique and original way in regard to his mathematicians colleagues, his own 
foundations of mathematics and science. Such effot1s led him to define in his terms 
mathematical and scientific rationality and to explain how it interacted with scientific 
methodology in natural and social sciences. 
ln Wilson ' s definition of mathematical and scientific rationality , intuition and 
persona! judgment, indeed meaning, were as relevant as rigor and logic. Invariably 
using his ideas about mathematical and scientific rationality as a guideline and the 
2 Edwin Wilson , "Space, Time, and Gravitation ," The Scient/fic Monthly 10, no. 3 ( 1920): 217. 
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bridge connecting sciences, Wilson played a significant role in the development of 
interdisciplinarity in American sciences between 1900 and 1945. 
This influence emerged as Wilson left and entered different scientific communities 
and fields. In this process, over time, as he was confronted with different questions 
and different contexts, his foundational ideas were subject to modifications. Theses 
changes took place as Wilson rejected certain European intellectual traditions, such as 
the David Hilbert structuraltist mathematics and Karl Pearson ' s statistics, and as he 
engaged (partially) with Henri Poincaré' s conventionalism and Charles S. Peirce' s 
pragmatic notion of probable inference, (fully) with the American mathematical and 
scientific attitude of Josiah Willard Gibbs, his mentor at Yale, as well as with the 
work of those who, he thought, worked in a Gibbsian spirit, such as the physiologist 
Lawrence Henderson, Wilson ' s colleague at Harvard. At the same time, ideas relating 
to the American nation in the context of the First World War, as well as ideas about 
society and culture in the context of the American social unrest of the 1930s will 
appear in his foundational discussions. Such elements did not only provide a 
historical context; they gradually entered in his epistemology as entities shaping (his) 
intuition : they provided meaning and determined soundness of scientific statements, 
often even in more significant ways than formai consistency. 
Wilson ' s epistemology was also intrinsically connected with pedagogy. Through 
(reforms of) high education, he thought that his mathematical and scientific 
rationality could help mold, indeed discipline, the behavior of scientists, and 
eventually of citizens. After situating the context of Wilson ' s education as a 
mathematician , this chapter will then discuss Wilson ' s definition of scientific 
rationality. Subsequently, his nationalistic pleas for reforms of education of 
mathematics, his work in mathematical physics, his statistical turn, his work in social 
science and economics-made hand in hand with Henderson-, and his 1945-1946 
Stevenson Lectures in Citizenship in Glasgow will be successively discussed . 
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1.2. A doubly difficult situation 
E. Wilson grew up in Middletown, Connecticut. His father, Horace, a Yale alumnus, 
was the Principal of schools at Middletown, before establishing his own private 
secondary school. E. Wilson was educated at his father ' s school. When E. Wilson 
was sixteen years old , the Wilsons moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts. The same 
year, E . Wilson entered Harvard College. Horace' s two other sons would also study 
at Harvard, and would become doctors. E. Wilson concentrated on mathematics.3 In 
1899, he moved to New Haven, where he obtained a Ph.D. in 1901 in mathematics at 
Yale. 
At Harvard and at Yale, Wilson was instructed by mathernaticians of two contrasting 
generations: an American traditional generation of applied mathernaticians and a 
young European-educated generation of modern mathematicians.4 This generational 
contrast marked a transitional period during which the rneaning of mathematical rigor 
was changing: for the traditional American applied rnathematicians the criterion of 
rigor for valid generalizations involved qualitative deductive reasoning and 
quantitative rneasurements, which constantly constrained each other, giving rise to 
the term of constrained mathematics, and for modern mathernaticians the rigor 
criterion consisted of unconstrained chains of deductive reasoning based on clearly 
specified assumptions. 5 
3 See Jerome Hunsaker and Saunders Mac Lane, "Edwin Bidwell Wilson, 1879-1964, A Biographical 
Memoir," National Academy of Sciences (US), 1973, 283- 320; Edwin Wilson, Interview with Dr. 
Edwin Wilson , interview by Bruce Lindsay and James King, 1962, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, 
American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD USA, http ://www.aip .org/history/ohilist/5065 .html. 
4 The contrast between these two traditions was not bold. See Karen Parshall and David Rowe, The 
Emergence of the American Mathematical Research Community , 1876-1900: J.J. Sylvester, Felix 
Klein, and E. H. Moore (United States of America: American Mathematical Society, 1994). ln 
Wilson ' s thinking, however, already around 1905, the idea ofa sharp contrast started to emerge. 
5 See Giorgio Israel , "Rigor and Axiomatics in Modern Mathematics," Fundamental Scientiae 2, no. 2 
(1981): 205- 19. 
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Around 1900, Wil son simultaneously engaged w ith both kinds of mathematics. At 
Harvard he wrote hi s Master' s di ssertation on geometry; at Yale, in 1901 , he obtained 
his Ph.D., offi c ially, with a paper on geometry.6 This work was made under the 
superv ision of young mathematic ians, Maxime Bâcher (1867-1 9 18) at Harvard and 
of Percy Smith (1 867-1957) at Yale. At the same time, in New Haven, having 
attended almost ail the courses in mathematical physics g iven by Gibbs (1839-1 903), 
the organiz ing committee of the Yale Bicentennial commemorations taking place in 
1901 asked Wil son to write a book on vectors based on Gibbs ' course materials. 
G ibbs was too busy wri ting another book and told the committee that Wil son was the 
person best suited to do the job. 7 Wilson succeeded in hav ing a textbook just in time 
fo r the Yale fest iv ities.8 Through thi s effort, Wil son became profic ient in G ibbs' 
mathemat ics and was able to offer a comprehensive and even deeper account of hi s 
master' s notati on of vectors.9 
Thi s simultaneous engagement with two contrasting attitudes toward mathematics put 
Wil son in a doubly di fficult situati on. 
His choice of engag ing with Gibbs's traditional mathematics contrasted with the 
orientation toward (pure) mathematics of young modern mathemati c ians. At th e same 
time, Wil son ' s work on geometry, vector analys is and multiple algebra helped him to 
be accepted as a peer among leaders in the communi ty of American modern 
mathematical research. During the fir st decade of the 201h century, Wil son was indeed 
6 Edwin Wil son, "The Decompos ition of the General Collineation of Space into T hree Skew 
Refl ections," Transactions of the American Mathematica/ Society 1, no. 2 (1900): 193- 96. 
7 See Jos iah G ibbs, Elementary Princip/es in Statistica/ Mechanics (New York: Dover Publication, 
Inc., 1902). 
8 Edwin Wil son, Vector Analysis: A Text-Bookfor the Use of Students of Mathematics and Physics 
(U nited States of America: Ya le Univers ity Press, 1901 ). 
9 M ichael Crowe, A Histo,y of Vector Analysis: The Evolution of the ldea of a Vectoria/ System (New 
York: Dover, 1985). 
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one of the " most active" 10 members of that communi ty, w ith numerous orig ina l 
publications and reviews. In August 1904, he popularized Gibbs ' vector analys is at 
the third International Congress of Mathematics in He idelberg. 11 That same year, and 
until 1916, he cooperated in the publication of the Transactions of the American 
Mathematical Society (T AM S). 
In return, thi s engagement with mathematics put him in a di ffi cult situation vis a v is 
the rest of the A merican scientific community. Indeed, w hile A meri can 
mathematicians ga ined institutional autonomy focusing on pu re mathematics, 
American scienti sts tended to make the ir marks in terms of observation, 
experimentati on and laboratory-based-work, w here measurement was centra l, rather 
than in mathematical terms. 12 
1.3. Defi ning scienti fic rationali ty 
1.3. 1. A pedagogical question 
Wil son had written hi s Vector Analysis w ith pedagogical purposes in mind , 
presenting it as a textbook fo r students of mathematics and physics; after the thesis, 
while he was instructing himself in mathematical physics, he fe lt: 
10 Della Dumbaugh Fenster and Karen Parsha ll , " A Profil e of the American Mathematical Research 
Community: 189 1-1 906," in The Histo,y of Modern Mathematics: images, Jdeas, and Communities , 
ed. Eberhard Knob loch and David Rowe, vo l. 3 (Boston: Academic Press, 1994), 179- 227. 
11 D uring the same sess ion, Hilbert ta lked about the fou ndations of arithmetic. 
12 See John Servos, "Mathematics and the Phys ical Sc iences in America, 1880-1 930," !sis 77, no. 4 
(1986): 6 11 - 29. 
"What the type of our instruction in theoretica l mechanics shall be, 
whether we shall lean toward the English, the German or the F rench, is a 
questi on which is not yet settled ." 13 
15 
Starting from thi s pedagogica l question, Wil son embarked on fo undational 
di scussions developing a unique and original position in regard to hi s A merican 
mathematic ians colleagues. His di agnosis consisted of remarking that because 
foundations of physics were m1 ss ing, phys icists tended to adopt wrong 
methodolog ical attitudes. On one s ide, he wrote, Engli sh authors tended to use naïve 
intuition and a priorÏ innate concepts with no mathematical refin ements. On the other 
side, authors of the Germ an-ri gori st kind tended to build on strict geometri cal logic 
by employing abstract mathematical ideas. The latter, Wil son stressed, dominated the 
fi eld because the laws stated by Newton were no longer satisfactory. 
"Thi s lack of sati sfacti on is but one of the many similar mani festations of 
the present state of mathematical instruction and mathemati cal science. 
We are no longer content to bear w ith superficially clear statements which 
seldom if ever lead into actua l error-nor does it suffi ce to start w ith 
inaccurate statements and, as we advance, to modify them so as to bring 
them into accord with o ur wider v ision and our more stringent 
• ,, 14 
requ 1rements . 
The Engli sh and the German being excluded, Wil son would lean toward the French. 
Jacques Hadamard , a French mathematician, attended the Yale Bicentenni al 
fes tiv iti es. Taking seriously hi s inv itation to corn e to France, Wil son spent one year 
of leave in Pari s between 1902 and 1903. In Pari s, W il son attended lectures at the 
13 Edwin Wil son, "Sorne Recent Books on Mechani cs," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 
8, no. 8 ' ( 1902): 343 . See also Edwin Wilson, "Sorn e Recent Books on Mechanics," Bulletin of the 
American Mathematical Society 9, no. 1 (1902): 25- 39; "Sorn e Recent Books on Mechani cs," Bulletin 
of the American Mathematical Society 8, no. 9 ( 1902): 403- 12. 
14 Wilson, "Sorn e Recent Books on Mechani cs," 1902, 342 itali cs added. 
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École Normale Supérieure, the Sorbonne and the Collège de France. He audited 
courses given by Henri Poincaré, Hadamard , Camille Jordan, Émile Picard , Joseph 
Boussinesq and Henri Lebesgue. 15 In Paris, Wilson found an attitude toward 
mathematics, consistent, for Wilson , with Gibbs ', one in which pedagogy and 
epistemology were interconnected. In what Wilson called the "modern French 
School ," professors assumed limited knowledge of mathematics so that students 
could quickly learn it, command it and use it in their own investigations. For Wilson, 
the French School offered hence the best available solution to the problem of 
foundations because it was balanced; it reconciled past and present works; rigor and 
intuition; logic and judgment; the pure and the applied ; as well as abstract and 
empirical emphases. It was also simple and useful ; it limited freedom of abstraction 
with Hadamard ' s motto according to which reality drove the mathematics. Inversely , 
it compelled scientists to engage in deductive reasoning. 16 
Upon his return to New Haven in the summer of 1903, Wilson was told about Gibbs ' s 
passing away. Wilson would face difficult times at Yale, because leaders of the 
department wanted , Wilson felt, applied mathematics out of the department17 and 
distrusted intuition. 18 
15 E. Wilson to M. Frechet, 26 July 1916 (PEBW, Box 1, Fo lder 1915-16 C). On Parisian mathematics 
around 1900 see David Aubin, Hélène Gispert, and Catherine Goldstein, "The Total War of Pari s 
Mathematicians," in The War of Guns and Mathematics: Mathematica/ Practices and Communities in 
France and Jts Western Allies Around Wor/d War 1, ed . David Aubin and Catherine Goldstein (USA : 
AMS, 2014), 125- 78 . 
16 See Edwin Wilson, "Review: Émile Borel , Leçons Sur Les Fonctions Méromorphes," BAMS 9, no. 9 
( 1903): 506- 7; "The Theory ofWaves," BAMS 10, no. 6 (1904): 305- 17; "Review: Emile Picard, Sur 
Le Développement de l ' Analyse et Ses Rapports Avec Diverses Sciences: Conférences Faites En 
Amérique, and Emile Picard , La Science Moderne et Son État Actuel ," BAMS 14, no. 9 (1908): 444-
48 . 
17 E. WilsontoD.L. Webster,2 0ct.1926(PEBW, Box 10, Folder C). 
18 See James Pierpont, "On the Arithmetization ofMathematics," BAMS, 8, 5 (1899): 394-406 . 
17 
1.3 .2. The role and the nature of hypothes is 
In Paris, Wil son' s foundational concerns became concerns about the role and nature 
of hypothesis in mathemati cs and science. Following Poincaré ' s La Science et 
!'Hypothèse , whi ch he regarded as best representing contemporary French views on 
science, Wil son believed, 
'" lf the universe is governed by laws express ible by mathematical 
fo rmulas there must be somethi ng whi ch is invari ant. ' Thi s is about as 
much and about as little as a conscienti ous scienti st of to-day can say." 19 
In thi s vem, Wil son justified the use of G ibbs ' s vectorial analys is, arguing that 
" vectors [were] to mathematical phys ics what invariants [were] to geometry."20 He, 
however, did not yet specify what he thought the nature of invari ants was. He only 
stated what he be lieved it was not; and it was not the kind of invariants fo und in 
David Hilbert ' s mathematics, which was then significantly influencing young 
American mathematic ians. 
For W il son, Hilbert "created an epoch in the technique of mathematics."21 However, 
echoing Poincaré's appreciation of Hilbert 's work,22 Wil son stated that Hilbert ' s pure 
mathemat ics di splayed a " stri ct regard fo r abso lutely perfect logic and a natural 
corresponding di sregard fo r that intuition which hi therto [had] played such a 
preponderant ro le in geometry. "23 For Wil son, as H ilbert di sconnected mathematical 
19 Edwi n Wil son, "Mach' s Mechanic' s," BAMS 10, no. 2 (1903): 85. 
20 Wi lson, Vector Analysis: A Text-Bookfor the Use o/Students of Mathemalics and Physics, xii . 
21 Edwi n Wil son, "The Foundations of Mathematics," BAMS l l , no. 2 ( 1904): 77 . 
22 Henri Po incaré, "Poincaré's Review of Hilbert' s 'foundations of Geometry ,"' BAMS l 0, no. 
(1903): 1- 23 . 
23 Edwin Wi lson, "The So-Ca ll ed Foundations of Geometry ," Archiv Der Mathematik Und Physik 6 
(1903) : 104. 
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deduction from intuition and judgment, his pure mathematics lost its usefulness for 
immediate purposes. Hilbert ' s work, Wilson felt, was an emblematic expression of a 
"mania" in vogue for rigor, logic and arithmetization. 24 This mania, Wilson 
diagnosed , was threatening the work of his contemporary American mathematicians 
colleagues; it was yielding in America "unrest which is not good for thorough 
work."25 
Under this feeling of threat, Wilson provided his own Foundations of Mathematics 
and his own Foundations of Science by qualifying in his own terms, the notion of 
mathematical and scientific hypothesis. 
Wilson found enlightening Bertrand Russell ' s solution to the lack of mathematical 
foundations , which consisted of basing mathematics on logic, so that " [p ]ure 
mathematics [became] the class of ail proposition of the form ' p implies q. "'26 For 
Wilson , logical inference offered a solution because " mathematical or other reasoning 
presupposes a m ind capable of rational, that is, non-selfcontradictory ratiocinative 
processes." 27 Persistence of errors, Wilson underlined, resulted from a lack of 
analytical attitude and careful definition of terms. Russell , Wilson argued , had 
delivered an improved definition of logical calculus, segregated into three different 
branches: the calculus of classes (as nouns) , of relations (as verbs) and of 
propositions. With such a system of logic, presented as rules of language, Wilson 
believed that it was possible to determine definitions, operations, relations and 
equations that were at the basis of mathematics and of ail fields to which mathematics 
was applied. 
24 Ibid ., 122. 
25 E. Wil son to O. Veblen , 25 Mayl904 (OYP, Box 17, Folder E. Wilson 1904-26). 
26 Wil son , "The Foundations ofMathematics," 76. 
27 Ibid ., 79. 
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Wilson, however, was not keen to accept that mathematics could be reduced to 
formalism and symbolism. For him, Russell offered a solution to philosophical 
questions only; his treatment of physics remained purely idealistic. 
For Wilson, thanks to Hilbert and Russell , the technique and the philosophy of 
mathematics were better defi ned. Pure mathematics and symbolic logic, however, 
were not suffic ient to found mathematics on solid grounds, he claimed; they needed 
to be interconnected with each other and, most of ail , w ith science. A practical 
problem, Wilson deplored, was that pure mathematicians were not paying attention to 
logician 's work and logicians themselves were ignoring pure mathematicians' 
research . 28 To fil! the gap, following the American mathematician Edward 
Huntington,29 Wilson di stinguished between (applied) mathematics and pure-logical 
mathematics by breaking the term hypothesis into two di stinct but complementary 
categories: postulates and axioms. 
According to Wilson, postulates were marks in the mind disconnected from any kind 
of experience and represented the only a prÏOri truths in mathematics. They were the 
technical (Hilbert) and philosophical (Russell) pillars structuring pure mathematics 
and logical calculus respectively. As such , they determined the correct technical and 
deductive way of reasoning in applications of mathematics. Postulates represented a 
28 Edwi n Wilson, "Symbolic Logic," BAMS 14, no. 4 (1908): 175- 9 1. 
29 Edward Huntington, " Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of Logic," Transactions of the 
American Mathematica/ Society 5, no. 3 (1904): 288- 309. Wilson ' s use of the tem1 postulates is 
understood here from the perspective of the American postulationists, a group of young American 
mathematicians, to which Huntington was part. Although Hilbert himse lf argued that intuition and 
empiri cal experience were fondamental in the constitution of (hi s) axioms-which had little 
resemblance with the way Wilson approached ax ioms-, these yo ung American mathematicians eut 
the Hilbertian axiomatic app roach from its empiri cal emphasis. They changed the em phas is of the 
study of geometry as the sc ience of space toward the study of systems of axioms, which became an 
iss ue of autono mous interest. They were commi tted to a new way of dealing with mathematical a bjects 
as detached from their (phys ical) meaning. See Michael Scanlan, " Who Were the American Postulate 
Theori sts?," The Journal ofSymbolic Logic 56, no. 3 [1 99 1]: 98 1- 1002; Herbert Mehrtens, Moderne 
Sprache, Mathematik: Eine Geschichte des Streits um die Grundlagen der Disziplin und des Subjekts 
forma ter Systeme, 1 Autl edition (Frankfort am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990); Jeremy Gray, Plata 's Ghost: 
The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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sort of grammar, with which to structure scientific thinking. As purely technical and 
deductive reasoning, postulational thinking also implied getting rid of psychological 
considerations, to be considered only a posterior;. For Wilson, postulational thinking 
was therefore a necessary condition for mathematical thinking; it was, however, not 
sufficient. 
Axioms, Wilson stated, were self-evident truths, namely those approved by our 
experience, intuition and judgment, about the "actual" world. They existed in 
connection with specific subject matters that studied specific "facts" of nature. 
Indeed, they were like working hypotheses prevailing over the history of the specific 
subject matter of possible material universes or empirically verified assertions 
concerning actual material universes (laws of motion, axiom of parallels). In other 
words, axioms offered meaning and semantics to the mathematics. 
For Wilson , mathematics was like a language. lt consisted of imposing certain 
mathematical structures, as grammatical rules, to subject matters, which, in return 
provided the semantics, as meaning. Defining mathematics as a language supposed 
therefore that mathematics consisted of a permanent back and forth between 
postulates (grammar) and axioms (semantics), in which axioms (meaning) were 
preeminent. As Wilson wrote, the " basis of rationality must go deeper than a mere set 
of marks and postulates. It is foundation of everything and must be more real than 
anything else."30 Therefore, postulational thinking was intelligible only if it had a 
meaning in terms of the specific subject matter to which mathematics was applied. 
Such was the message of Wilson ' s Foundations of Science31, in which he tried to 
establish a correspondence between his postulates and axioms and Poincaré ' s ideas 
about hypotheses, as found in La Science et !'Hypothèse. 
30 Wilson, "The Foundations ofMathematics," 81 , footnote . 
3 1 Edwin Wilson, "The Foundations of Science," Bulletin of the American Mathematica/ Society 12, 
no . 4 (1906): 187- 93. 
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Stating that science helped us to classify and to deal with experience, Wilson 
e laborated upon the ro te, the nature and the value of scientific hypotheses as defined 
by Poincaré. For their rote, valid for postulates and axioms, hypotheses were 
idealizations held to establish a theory of science, or about science. In this fonction , 
hypotheses could be mutually contradictory. However, if contradictions were kept 
separated , Wilson argued, inconveniences remained solvable by our analytical 
capacities. 32 
Regarding their nature, Wilson stated that in Poincaré' s discussions on geometry and 
mechanics hypotheses were idealizations held as convenient conventions, which 
could be held arbitrarily as long as they were in agreement with our intuition and 
judgment. ln this conventionalist vein, Wilson found Poincaré' s motto enlightening: 
theory never rendered a greater service to science than when it broke away. Wilson 
had no great difficulty in making his postulates correspond with these ideas in respect 
to pure mathematics and symbolic logic; in both cases, psychological considerations 
were secondary. Similarly, Wilson regarded these ideas as compatible with his 
axioms, in the sense that convenience could serve as a pragmatic doctrine in the 
operationalization of mathematics. 
Wilson agreed with Poincaré that a hypothesis, as an axiom, was of value if it taught 
us how to measure something without necessarily defining it. However, Wilson 
believed that Poincaré dogmatically used some convenient conventions as arbitrarily 
endorsed principles33-indeed as postulates-; pragrnatism, Wilson argued, did not 
justify forgetting about idealized nature. Scientists should, to a ce1tain extent, care 
about the thing being measured. 
32 ln 1905, Wilson did not hold any more the idea according to which "we", mathematicians, did not 
like any more to change a posteriori initial hypotheses in order to better fit theories . 
33 Also see Jeremy Gray, Henri Poincaré: A Scienti.fic Biography (Princeton, .J. : Princeton 
University Press, 2013). 
22 
1.3.3 . Epistemology and pedagogy 
We have seen that Wilson assumed that psychological considerations were only 
secondary. To understand what he meant, it must be underlined that Wilson regarded 
the psychological question as being connected to the interrelation between pedagogy 
and cognition , not between sense experience and cognition . 
In 1905, Wilson began writing a textbook on calculus. Following Poincaré and 
repudiating Hilbert, he believed that instructing students first and only in formai 
mathematics was detrimental for their psychological and intellectual development. 
Constrained mathematics was a better fit for this educational purpose. His Advanced 
Calculus textbook was published in 1911. Presented as a " laboratory of 
mathematics,"34 it was addressed to mathematicians, physici sts and engineers with 
the aim of confirming and extending their working knowledge of calculus. This 
working knowledge, Wilson argued , contributed to the psychological development of 
students by helping them to affirm their self-confidence: by knowing how to use 
calcul us in " real" problems, students could use their mathematical skills with vigor to 
explore and develop their own fields. 
With this kind of mathematics, Wilson wanted to protect American students from 
what he regarded as being manias in vogue in American mathematics and science. 
*** 
Ali in ail , in his foundational discuss ions, Wilson defined what mathematical and 
sc ientific rationality was: it consisted of a permanent back a forth between postulates 
and axioms, where axioms prevailed over postulates. Wilson believed that with his 
34 On the idea of " laboratory of mathematics" in the American mathematical scene, see E liaki m 
Moore, "On the Foundations of Mathematics," BAMS 9 ( 1903): 402- 24. · 
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constrained mathemat ics, it was poss ible to ga in consensus regarding the " something 
w hich is invariant." But, what was that something? Was it nature? Was it convention? 
Was it mathemati cal and scienti fic rationality as he defi ned it? Wil son remained 
vague regarding these questions. A lso, Wil son's approach did not e lic it any kind of 
consensus within the communi ty of American mathematicians, who were concerned 
with closed mathematical systems. For them, mathematics had stopped being a 
di scipline of intuit ion/j udgment and quantities or of correspondences between 
mathematical notation and nature; it had become a fie ld of re lations and deduction,35 
of unconstrained creativ ity where mathematic ians were set free fro m mechanical 
analogies and could work on mathematical ones. 36 Ult imately, W il son rema ined silent 
on how consensus was reached. Furthermore, in contrast with Wilson' s impress ions, 
it was not evident that a French Schoo l of mathematics actua ll y ex isted . Although 
Poincaré, Picard, Borel and Hadamard were ail luminaries, there was no parti cular 
uni ty in their work; Poincaré ' s conventiona li sm, rather than best represent ing French 
science as Wil son thought, was indeed a source of di sagreement.37 These e lements set 
the context that would explain Wil son' s progressive and graduai marg ina lization 
from the community of Ameri can mathematicians. 
1.4. G ibbs, nationalism and pleas 
In 1907, Wil son was appo inted associate professor of mathematica l phys ics at the 
M assachusetts Institu te of Techno logy (MJT). In the transition toward mathemati cal 
p hys ics, Wil son suggested that consensus about scientific conventions was reached 
35 Moritz Epple, "The End of the Science of Q uanti ty: Foun dat ions of Analys is, 1860- 191 O," in A 
Histmy of Analysis, ed. Hans Niels Jahnke, vo l. HMath 24 (Prov id ence, RJ : American Mathemati ca l 
Soc iety, London Math ematica l Society, 2003), 291- 323 . 
36 Giorg io Israe l, La Mathématisation Du Réel (Pari s: Seuil , 1998). 
37 Jeremy Gray, Plata 's Ghost: The Modernist Transf ormation of Mathematics (Princeton, N .J .: 
P rinceton University P ress, 2008) . 
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when masterminds with extraordinary mathematical capacities formulated them;38 
Gibbs was one ofthem. 
At MIT, Wilson became closer to other fields , engineering and economics included. 
Concurrently, he adopted a disdainful attitude towards most American scientists 
feeling that their work lacked logical structure. Wilson believed mathematicians 
were, to a large extent, responsible for this, because they made their instruction at the 
collegial level too abstract; as a result, most students, and eventually most scientists, 
abhorred mathematics. At the same time, Wilson claimed, as mathematicians did not 
train Ph.D. students in applications of mathematics, young mathematicians were 
unable to understand modern works in science. Hence, there resulted a dislocation 
between American mathematics and the rest of academia. Consequently, science and 
technology, as well as pure and applied sciences developed separately. 39 The 
problem, for Wilson, resulted from the fact that American mathematical leaders 
"who came back from Prussia around 1890 systematical ly set about 
running sound mechanics and mathematical physics off the map [ ... ]. At 
the same time physicists with few exceptions were devoting ail their 
attention to experimental rather than theoretical problems."40 
Such a dislocation, Wilson thought, illustrated a decline in mathematical education in 
American colleges. To revalorize mathematics, it was necessary to connect it with 
other disciplines. 
38 Edwin Wilson , "Bryan 's Thermodynamics," BAMS 14, no. 3 (1907): 139-40. 
39 Edwin Wilson , "Review: Hohere Analysis Für lngenieure, by John Perry," BAMS 9, no. 9 (1903): 
504-6; "Mathematical Physics for Engineers," BAMS 17, no. 7 (1911): 350- 61. 
40 E. Wilson to D. Webster, 10 Feb. 1926 (PEBW, Box 10, Folder W). 
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Connecting American sciences was precisely the motto that the National Academy of 
Science (NAS) adopted around 1910.4 1 Of particular relevance for Wilson 's career 
was the establishment of the Proceedings of the NAS (PNAS) in 1914 as a vehicle of 
communication among American sciences, humanities excluded. Wilson became 
indeed the first managing editor of the PNAS,42 a position that he held until he passed 
away. With the advent of First World War (WWI), the NAS encouraged applications 
of scientific methods that could strengthen national security and prosperity.43 Wilson 
himself contributed to the scientific war effort by working on aerodynamics and on 
ballistics.44 
In this context of war, nationalism became a fundamental element in Wilson 's 
epistemology. In his foundational discussions, Wil son had emphasized the relevance 
of intuition and judgment. In a war context, the nation became an emblematic entity 
framing these elements. Illustratively, he invited Americans to be loyal to Gibbs, 
whose scientific style truly reflected American values. Wilson did not understand 
why American mathematical leaders ignored the American turn of mind: 
41 On the AS, see Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A Histoty of Policies and 
Activities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986); George Hale, National Academies and the Progress 
of Research (Lancaster: New Era Printing Co., 1915); Rexmond Cochrane, The National Academy of 
Sciences: The First Hundred Years, 1863-1963 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1978). 
42 Edwin Wilson, Histoty of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences: 1914-1963 
(Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1966). 
43 See Daniel Kevles, "George Ellery Hale, the First World War, and the Advancement of Science in 
America," lsis 59, no. 4 ( 1968): 427- 37. 
44 See National Advisory Committee for Aeronautic reports 1 (1915); 21 (1917); 26 (1919); 27 (1918); 
78 (1919); 79 (1920). In 1920, Wilson summarized his contributions in Aeronautics: A Class Text 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1920. 
"I believe that the great advance in pure mathematics in this country in 
the last 30 years based upon German influence is essentially foreign to 
our nature."45 
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It was thus a patriotic gesture not to follow the hitherto leading German kind of 
mathematics. Before using it, Wilson stated, a process of American naturalization 
should be followed: 46 mathematics should be rendered simple, intuitive and useful for 
immediate operational purposes. 
In this spirit, Wilson ' s work at the MIT and the NAS became almost an act of 
resistance against the increasing influence of the German rigorist attitude toward 
mathematics in science. Just before WWI ended, Wilson thought a true victory 
entailed militarily and scientifically taking over Central Powers. As America knew 
now the benefits of planning science with respect to national objectives, for a final 
victory, America needed to contrai the development of science. Such control, Wilson 
thought, had to remain subtle.47 
By "subtle contrai," Wilson meant reforming American collegial mathematical 
curriculum,48 which, he claimed, should better reflect national values. American 
values, he insisted , were precisely embodied by his Gibbsian constrained 
mathematics. Instruction of mathematics, as it was, obstructed immediate 
intelligibility and applicability of mathematics, putting in danger national welfare and 
. 1 . h d 49 nat1ona secunty, e argue . 
45 E. Wilson to J. Whittemore, 23 Apr. 1924 (PEBW, HUG4878.214 Box 7, fo lder U-V). 
46 Edwi n Wilson, Mathemalics and the Engineer, unpublished paper, (1919) (PEBW, HUG4878.2l4 
Box 3, fo lder miscell aneo us notes). 
47 Edwin Wilson, "Insidious Scientific Contrai," Science, New Series, 48, no . 1246 (l 918): 491 - 93 . 
48 Edwin Wilson, "Let Us Have Calcul us Early," BAMS 20 (l 913): 31. 
49 Edwin Wilson , " Sorne Books on Calculus," BAMS 21 , no . 9 (1915): 471 - 76. 
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1.5. Rapprochement with A merican science 
In hi s research in mathematical phys ics at MIT, citing Gibbs, Wil son developed 
vector analys is and used it in geometrical and algebraic appli cations.50 Play ing w ith 
hi s skill s in analys is, he addressed some theoretical questions of mechanics51 and 
stati stical mechanics.52 In collaboration w ith some of his MIT colleagues, Wil son ' s 
most significant efforts were in re lativ ity. 53 With hi s coauthors, Wil son offered the 
ftrst contribution to re lati v ity w ritten in vectorial notati on reproduc ing known results 
in mechanics and electromagnetics and introduced the notation of vectors in 
di ffe rentia l geometry developing in this way a sophisticated mathemati ca l framework 
from which generalized re lativity could be interpreted and reconstructed.54 
Eventua lly, in hi s practice as a mathematical phys icist, Wil son used hi s definition of 
mathemati cal and sc ientific rationa li ty as the something that was invar iant and which 
enabled the application of mathemati cs to a subj ect matter. In hi s research, Wil son 
used his mathematics to translate into the language of the Gibbs-Wil son vector 
50 Edwin Wil son, "On the Theory of Double Products and Strai ns in Hyperspace," Transactions of the 
Connecticut Academy of Art and Sciences 14 ( 1908): 1- 57. 
51 Edwin Wil son, "On the Diffe renti al Eq uations of the Equilibrium of an Inextensible String," 
Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 9, no. 4 (1908): 425- 39. 
52 Edwin Wi lson, "Note on Statisti cal Mechanics," BAMS 15, no. 3 (1908): 107- 15; "Thermodynamic 
Analogies fo r a Sim ple Dynamical System," Annals of Mathematics 10, no. 4 ( 1909): 149- 66. 
53 Edwi n Wil son and Gilbert Lewis, "The Space-Time Manifold of Relativity. The on-Euclidean 
Geometry of Mechanics and Electromagnetics," Proceedings of the A merican Academy of Arts and 
Sciences 48, no. 11 (1912): 389- 507; Edw in Wil son, "Review of A. Einstein and M. Grass mann: 
' Entwurf Einer Verallgemeinerten Relati vitâtstheorie Und Ei ner Theorie Der Gravitatio,"' BAMS 20, 
no. 5 (19 14); Edwin Wil son and Clarence Moo re, "Differentia l Geometry of Two Di mensional 
Surfaces in Hyperspace," Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 52, no. 6 (1916): 
269- 368; "A General Theory of Surfaces," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 2, no. 5 ( 19 16): 273- 78. 
54 For comments on Wil son' s and coauthors ' work on relativity , see Gerald Holton, "The Form ation of 
the American Phys ics Community in the 1920s and the Coming of Albert E instein," Minerva 19, no. 4 
(198 1 ): 569- 81; Scott Wa lter, "The Non-Euclidean Style ofMin kowsk ian Relat ivity," in The Symbo/ic 
Universe: Geomeliy and Physics, 1890- 1930, ed. Jeremy Gray, 1999, 91- 127; Karin Reich, "The 
A meri can Contribution to the Theory of Differential Invariants 1900- 1916," in The Attraction of 
Gravitation: New Studies in the His tory of Genera/ Re/ativity, ed. John Earm an, Michel Janssen, and 
John Norton, vol. 5, 5 vo ls. (Boston, Base!, Berl in: Bi rkhauser, 1993), 225-47. 
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analysis results at the borderline of physical research; he offered sophisticated 
mathematical systems presenting them as natural , where natural referred to 
conventional ways of giving meaning to physical facts; Wilson still focused on 
intuition and judgment, arguing that axioms prevailed over postulates, or in his 
words: 
" [l]ogic [ was] only the prose of mathematics; imagery [ was] its poetry, 
and there [was] often more inspiration in a vague impressionist poem than 
in the clearest prose." 55 
The British Blockade, starting in August 1914, eut American scientists off from many 
of the latest German scientific contributions. Wilson became aware of Einstein's and 
Hilbert's 1915 works on general relativity only two months after the publication of 
his Differential Geomehy, when Eliakim Moore confronted him and sent him a copy 
of Hilbert's Die Grundlagen der Physik, asking for Wilson 's opinion. 56 Wilson 
responded by emphasizing his disagreement with the fact that Hilbert established a 
causal relationship- where electromagnetic phenomena resulted from gravitation- , 
based on a purely mathematical correlation. He also wrote: 
" [in] regard to your question as to whether the mathematicians may not 
be indicating the physics of the future , I should say that they are certainly 
indicating a possible physics of the future, but that there are infinitely 
many systems of physics, and that the chances are very small that the 
particular system indicated , with no basis whatsoever in experiment or 
55 Edwin Wilson, "The Fourth Dimension as a Text," Science Conspectus 2, no . 4 (1912): 104- 7. 
56 On Einstein ' s and Hilbert ' s general relativity and their cooperation , see Karin Reich, Die 
Entwick/ung des Tensorkalküls: Vom absoluten D(fferentia/ka/kiil zur Re/ativitdtstheorie, 1994 edition 
(Base!; Boston: Birkhauser, 1994); Leo Corry, David Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics (/898-
1918): From Grund/agen Der Geometrie to Grundlagen Der Physik (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2004). 
experience, will turn out to be the system realized when experiment sha ll 
be suffici ent to indicate a system."57 
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This Hilberti an German attitude was becoming increasingly prevalent in phys ics. 
Nevertheless, Wil son ' s work on relativ ity earned him respectful recogni tion within 
the American (Massachusetts) sc ienti fic community. Thi s appreciat ion must have 
contributed much to Wil son' s promotion to full professo r in 19 12 and to chairman of 
the department of physics in 19 17. Also, in 1920, Lawrence Henderson, secretary of 
the Royce C lub, inv ited him to de liver a ta lk on the same subj ect. Wil son opened hi s 
talk with the quote opening thi s chapter. At that time, W il son still thought that 
fo undati ons of mathematics and science were unstable: there was not yet agreement 
regarding the ir defi nition. W il son then concluded bis Royce Club talk as fo llows: 
"Man's place to-day in phys ical N ature is fa r from centra l. He sho uld be 
decidedly humble. He knows infinite ly li tt le and what knowledge he has 
is fo r the most part either a partia l understanding of di screte facts or a 
conventional corre lati on of di fferent facts based not upon ultimate truth 
but upon the brief convenience of the leading minds of hi s time, -to the 
lesser minds the convenience of the leaders may be a serious 
inconven ience. "58 
For Wilson, mathematic ians and sc ienti sts could neither create the structures that 
rendered the physical world inte lli gible, nor s imply observe the world to deal 
sc ienti fica lly with it. They only could establi sh correspondences. The mechani cal 
po int of view of nature, he a lso suggested, should be replaced by a stati st ical 
approach, where no fondamenta l princ iples about the uni verse were required. For 
Wil son, the conservation of energy and continuity were only temporary convenient 
57 E. Wil son to E. Moore, 19 May19 16 (PEBW, Box 1, Po lder 1915-1 6 m). 
58 Wilson, " Space, T ime, and Grav itation," 234. 
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conventions.59 At the same time, he seemed then to be uncomfortable with the idea 
that conventions resulted from individual masterminds. In 1923, Wilson resigned 
from the AMS. 
1.6. The statistical turn 
Between 1920 and 1922, Wilson sat 111 the presidential office at MlT acting as 
secretary of an interim committee directing the Institute. As one of his executive 
tasks, he took part in the establishment of the Harvard School of Public Health 
(HSPH), which was founded in 1922. When the school opened its doors, Wilson was 
appointed chairman of the department of vital statistics.60 During the 1920s and 
thereafter, Wilson conducted paramount stat istical studies, both empirical and 
theoretical , 111 a large variety of fi e lds. 6 1 His efforts did not go unrecognized. 
Illustrative of such recognition was hi s e lection as president of the American 
Statistical Association (ASA) in 1929.62 
As in mathematics and physics, Wil son stated, foundations of statistics were missing; 
such unrest, he argued, was symptomatic of "the fervid impatience that had 
59 Edwi n Wilson, " Review of The Theory of Re lati vity by Robert D. Carmi chael," Science 39, no. 998 
(1914): 25 1- 52. 
60 Jean Curran, Founders of the Harvard School of Public Hea/th: With Biographica/ Notes, 1909-
/946 (New York: Jos iah Macy , Jr. , Fo undat ion, 1970). 
6 1 For a summ ary ofWi lson's sign ificant contri butions to statist ics see orman L. Johnson and Sam uel 
Kotz, Leading Personalities in Statistica/ Sciences: From the Seventeenth Centwy to the Present (John 
Wiley & Sons, 20 11 ), 344-45 . 
62 Around 1930, tensions between groups ho lding contrasti ng opinions about mathematics in stati st ics 
were rising within the ASA . Mathematically oriented statisticians proposed creating a separate 
organi zation, the lnstitute of Mathematical Statistics (IMS). Wilson was part of the movement, but 
opposed separation. (Patti Hunter, " An Unofficia l Communi ty : American Mathem atical Statisticians 
before 1935", An nais of Science 56, no. 1 ( 1999): 47-68 ; Stephen Stig ler, "The His tory of Statistics in 
1933", Statistical Science 11 , no. 3 ( 1996): 244- 52). ln stead, he pl eaded for reforms of co lleg ial 
mathematica l ed ucation (see Edwin Wilson, " Too Littl e Mathematics--and Too Much," Science 67, no . 
1725 [ 1928]: 52- 59). During hi s presidential address, Wilson stated that statistics required knowledge 
of mathematics and of the subj ect matter. He noted a lso th at if he had to choose between th em, he 
would always prefer th e latter (Edwin Wilson , " Mathematics and Statistics," Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 25, no. 169(1 930] : 1- 8). 
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developed in present times" 63 : statisticians, too, were prone to adopt wrong 
methodological attitudes. In this compromised condition , he thought, classical 
statistics was not well grounded scientifically for (scientific) practical applications. 
In his 1920 Royce Club talk, Wilson had held that knowledge was conventional and 
partial. As conventional , knowledge resulted from congeries of working hypotheses; 
as partial , scientific statements conveyed truth only in a certain proportion. The 
statistical question amounted therefore to quantifying that proportion that carried 
"truth," so that statistics became useful in the practice of science and in different 
activities of life. Such quantification supposed a rational way of reasoning, as in 
mathematics, where, if hypotheses were applicable to the problem at hand, 
conclusions could be considered as real. Echoing Charles S. Peirce, Wilson stated 
that the "great accomplishments of science [tended] to give a mechanistic philosophy, 
to cause us to overlook the rôle of chance which, as statisticians, we must always 
keep in mind." 64 In this spirit, Wilson sought "an alternative to mechanism, or 
determinism, [which] might be called by contrast, indeterminism, or statistics,"65 and 
offered a tentative definition of statistics. 
Wilson believed that Maynard Keynes ' s Treatise on Probab;/;ty offered the best 
available foundations of probability theory , which, for Wilson, lay at the basis of 
statistics. However, he disliked Keynes ' too philosophical treatment and the fact that 
he dismissed Gibbs ' and Peirce' s American contributions.66 By building on his own 
foundational ideas, Peirce' s statistics and Russell ' s logical calculus, Wilson separated 
63 Edwin Wilson , "The Statistical Significance of Experimental Data," Science 58, no. 1493 ( 1923): 
93. 
64 Edwin Wil son , E/ements of Statistics, unpublished and undated textbook, chapter 111 , p. 9. (PEBW, 
HUG4878 .2 14, Box 2, Folder Elements of Statistics) . At the N AS in l 923, Wil son was asked to write 
a biography of Peirce. Wil son accepted the task, farniliari zed himself with Peirce' s stati stical ideas, 
without ever completing the biography. On Peirce, see Louis Menand, The Metaphysica/ Club: A Sto,y 
of Jdeas in America, 1 st ed. (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). 
65 E. Wilson to T. H. Morgan , 11 July 1923 (PEBW, Box 5, Folder M). 
66 Edwin Wilson, " Keynes on Probability," BAMS 29, no. 7 ( 1923): 319- 22. 
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analytically three interconnected aspects of the fi e ld : sample theory (classes) , data 
analys is (relations) and stati stical infe rence (propositions). 
Sample theory consisted of establi shing associations of common attributes of 
indiv idual objects of a given group in order to fo rm an aggregate. Once aggregates 
were fo rmed, the analys is of the ava ilable data consisted of describing it us ing 
synthesizing constants, such as the average and the variance. Other times, data 
analysis implied findin g an empiri cal equation establishing a certa in relation, such as 
causation or corre lation, between vari ables . A lthough the determination of such 
fo rmulas often invo lved drawing curves connecting observed values with 
sophisticated techniques, Wil son thought that the form of such curves was mainly 
shaped by the stati stic ian 's judgment and in tuiti on. Experts, he stated, who had 
greater experience dealing with stati stical techniques, data and the subj ect matter 
under study, developed better judgrnents and intu itions.67 
W il son's skepticism towards class ica l statistics, namely Karl Pearson's and hi s 
foll owers' stati stics, 68 was rooted in a persona) di sdain regarding this analytical 
emphas is. Pearson, Wil son wrote, "has attempted to keep a il the [stati stic ians] 
practically in pri son inte llectually."69 In hi s stati stics, Wilson argued, fo rmulas tended 
to ga in uni versal validi ty while meaning was indi scriminate ly imposed on data. 
Eventua lly, Wilson deplored, everything appeared to be di stributed according to the 
Gauss ' Law.70 
67 Wil son, "The Stat istical Signifi cance of Experim ental Data." 
68 Raymond Pearl (1879-1 940) was an American bio logist; he had close t ies with K. Pearson. W il son 
and Pearl engaged in vivid controversy. See Sharon Kings land , "The Refractory Mode!: T he Logistic 
Curve and the History of Population Eco logy," Quarter/y Review of Biology 57, no. 1 ( 1982): 29- 52. 
69 E. Wil son to R. A. Fisher, 28 Dec. 1925 (PEBW, Box 8, Fo lder F). 
70 Edwin Wilson, " First and Second Laws of Error," Journal of the A merican Statistical Association 
18, no . 143 (1923): 84 1- 51; Wil son ' s cri ticism against Pearson contributed to Jimiting his influence in 
Ameri ca (Dav id Bellhouse, "Karl Pearson' s Infl uence in the United States," International Stat istica/ 
Review 77, no. 1 [2009): 51-63). 
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ln mathematics, Wilson argued, there was a separation between the process of 
drawing conclusions, a technical and logical matter, and the acceptance or rejection 
of hypotheses, a practical matter. This separation implied a relationship of trust 
between mathematicians, who could take it for granted that the Jogical consistency of 
their peers ' work was correct. In mathematics, he claimed, it was also customary that 
those using a formula were responsible for verifying whether or not it was applicable 
for the case at hand. The pitfall with the idea of responsibility in statistics remained 
that it was impossible to determine whether statistical premises were true or false 
because, Wilson remarked, statistical inference was yet to be defined .71 Such a 
definition required discriminating core notions of the field. Wilson distinguished 
probability from chance. For Wilson , probability was a technical word that 
"designates ideal happenings conceived to be taking place under certain 
specified assumption possibly not realizable in the real world and studied 
to gain theoretical background, to see what sort of thing may reasonably 
happen not what does happen; whereas chance is the more general term 
and must cover the variations unaccounted for in real happenings which 
seem to our best knowledge to occur in similar cases" .72 
Statistical inference consisted then of mediating between empirical and theoretical 
emphases by establishing a certain a correspondence between "chance" and 
"probability," namely determining to what extent compiled data was not a lucky 
strike. To accomplish that, the statistician had to make an argument as to the 
proportion of truth and meaning carried in the data. Such an argument consisted ·of 
comparing observed rates in the data with a range of trust-confidence interval-
calculated accordingly to a theoretical probability. 73 Such range of meaningfulness, 
71 Edwin Wilson , "Statistical lnference," Science 63, no. 1629 (1926): 289- 96. 
72 Edwin Wilson , Elements of Statistics, chapter lll , p. 9. 
73 Edwin Wilson , "Empiricism and Rationalism," Science 64, no . 1646 (1926) : 47- 57. 
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and ultimately such probability, represented an idealized referent with which to 
ca lculate the proporti on of truth and meaning conveyed in the data.74 In this direction , 
statistical infe rence could only be probable; stati stica l statements should always be 
"expressed in a guarded way"75 to help us determine the significance-likelihood-of 
the correspondence between theoretica l probabilities and data.76 
A li in a il , in Wil son's stati stics, working hypotheses of a subj ect matter served as 
theoretical c lass ificatory, indeed taxonomi ca l, schema fo r sampling, and probable 
inference served as an operational technique to determine the best approximate 
working hypothesis with respect to a p roblem in hand . As such, stati sti cs helped to 
arbitrate between reasons by determining degrees of to lerance within which a 
working hypothesis could be reasonably held. Stati stica l reasoning, however, did not 
enable uni versal applicability. When fo rmulas were taken as structura l 
generalizatio ns, Wil son suggested, statisticians became shamanic priests of given 
idolatri es. 77 For him, stati stics, like mathematics and sc ience, could not serve to 
control (physica l or socia l) nature; it could only help us to adapt to nature to atta in 
given objectives. Ali thi s marked Wil son's statistical turn. 78 
74 Edwi n Wi lson, "P robab le Tnfe rence, the Law of Succession, and Statisti cal ln ference," Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 22, no. 158 (1927): 209- 12. 
75 fa n Hack ing, "The Theory of Probable Jnference: Ney man, Peirce and Braithwa ite," in Science, 
Be/ief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R. B. Braithwaite, ed . David Mellor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Un ivers ity Press , 1980), 149. See also Theodore M. Porter, Trust in umbers, Reprint 
editi on [Princeton, N.J.: Pri nceton Uni versity Press, 1996], 12) 
76 Jerzy Neyman once declared that Wi lson an teceded his and Egon Pearson ' s notion of confi dence 
interval. See Jerzy Neyman, l ectures and Confere nces on Mathematical Statistics and Probability 
(USA: Graduate Schoo l, U.S. Dept. of Agricul ture, 1952), 222.lbid. 
77 Wil son, "Statistica l lnference." 
78 ln the genera l sense of Lorenz Krüger, Lo rra ine Daston, and M ichael Heidelberger, eds., The 
Probabilistic Revolution, vo l. 1: Ideas in History, 2 vo ls. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1987); 
Lorenz Krüger, Gerd Gigerenzer, and Mary Mo rgan, eds. , The Probabilistic Revolution, vo l. 2: Tdeas 
in the Sciences, 2 vo ls. (Cambridge Mass.: The MJT Press, 1987) . 
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1.7. Reforming American social science and economics 
From the HSPH, W il son engaged also with social science and economics 
endeavoring to establi sh lasting connecti ons between these fie lds, mathematics and 
statistics; Wil son' s program fit well wi th the inter-di sciplinarity agendas of 
contemporary Harvard presidents, Abbott Lowell and James Conant.79 
In the middle of the social unrest of the 1929 crisis, as he had done in mathematics, 
physics and statisti cs, Wil son diagnosed social science and economics as suffering 
from lack of sound scienti fi c fo undati ons. Consequently, he argued, social scientists 
and economi sts tended to adopt wrong methodological atti tudes. In disagreement 
with the interventioni st poli tical platfo rm of the Republican Party of the 1930s and in 
response to Progress ive social science and to New Dea l 80 and Institutional 81 
economics, he argued that this unrest had led some to "suggest ail sorts of crazy 
experiments"82 ; social scient ists and economists were ru shing and try ing "to contro l 
the as yet uncontrollable."83 Eventually, Wil son compla ined, unrest in these fie lds 
had a negative impact on society at large. 
As Wil son wrote to Henderson, who, Wilson thought, worked in the truly American 
scient ific sty le of Gibbs: 
79 On interdi sci pl inary in human sc ience at Harvard and on Henderson ' s influence in these 
developments, see Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences fi'om Parsons ta Kuhn 
(Cambridge Mass. : Harvard University Press, 201 2). 
80 See Willi am Barber, From New Era ta New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American 
Economie Po!icy, 1921-1933 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Uni vers ity Press, 1985); Thomas 
Leonard, Libera! Reformers (Princeton UP, Forthcoming). 
8 1 See Malco lm Rutherfo rd, The fnstitutiona!ist Movement in American Economies, 19 ! 8-1947: 
Science and Social Contrai (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 20 11 ). 
82 E. Wi lson to H. Burbank, 25 Nov. 1932 (PEBW, Box 18, Fo lder A-B). 
83 Edwin W il son, " Are There Peri ods in American B usiness Activity?," Science 80, no. 2070 ( 1934): 
199. 
"I have a feeling that a good many social scientists have to be protected 
from themselves and that it is up to people like you and me to do what we 
can to push social science ahead in a sound way ."84 
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Hand in hand with Henderson, Wilson sought to reform education of American social 
scientists and economists. 
Henderson had been developing the idea that society could be regarded as an organic 
system of individuals sharing a similar culture, which could be studied in terms of 
stable equilibrium.85 When Henderson began to think about these questions at the 
beginning of the 1920s, he again invited Wilson to offer a talk before the Royce Club. 
On March 25 , 1923, Wilson discussed Pareto ' s mathematical economics and 
paraphrased parts of Pareto 's Manuel d 'Économie Politique. He concluded with the 
following words: 
"Pareto ' s method of approach is critical and realistic and hard, as ail such 
approaches must be. For that reason we must not expect many to follow 
it. [ ... ]. What about education in political economy [and social science]? 
Shall we work along the straight and narrow and difficult path or stroll 
across expansive country exchanging verbal pleasantri es? Says Pareto: 
Faith alone strongly urges men to action and hence it is not desirable for 
the good of society that the masses, or even that many, should be 
occupied scientifically with soc ial matters . . .. [Those] who wish to make 
84 E . Wilson to L. Henderson , 10 Jan. 1933 (PEBW, Box 2 1, Fo l der H). 
85 lnspired by Gibbs ' s concept ion of chemica l-phys ical systems in stable eq uilibrium and impressed by 
Vilfredo Pareto ' s 1917 Traité de Sociology Générale, Henderson believed that socia l stab ility observed 
in most soc ieties proved that they were in eq uilibrium . For him, studyi ng society as a system in stab le 
equilibrium was intuitive, not theoretical. See Cynthi a Eagle Russett, The Concept of Equilibrium in 
American Social Thought (New Haven , Cann .: Yale University Press, 1966); John Parascandola, "L. J. 
Henderson and the Mutual Dependency of Variables: From Physical Chem istry to Pareto," in Science 
al Harvard University: Historical Perspectives, ed. Clark E lliott and Margaret Ross iter (U nited States 
of America: Associated UP, 1992), 146- 90. 
ail participate, hazily and without discrimination, m knowledge behave 
with little wisdom." 86 
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In contrast to the dominant American traditions in social science and economics, 
Wilson rejected social reforms as the main objective of scientific endeavor.87 Most 
social scientists and economists, whose work remained literary, Wilson felt, acted 
based on faith and did not know how to arbitrating between reasons. Through the 
educational reforms that he supported, Wilson wanted to establish the " right" 
relationships, first, between high education-of American social elites-and social 
science and economics and, then, between these fields-as practiced by this educated 
elites-and American society. 
The first transformation implied that for the sake of society only the best "type" of 
American gentile students, namely those attending universities such as Harvard, 
should hold with legitimacy the scientific status when studying and dealing with 
social and economic matters. In order to achieve that scientific status, Wilson 
claimed, they should be instructed in his Gibbsian mathematics and in Henderson-
Pareto style of work. 
The second transformation implied, for Wilson , that social science and econom1cs 
should first help understand the actual functioning of social institutions before trying 
to contrai them. For him, controlling and planning the development of science was 
necessary for controlling and planning Social Progress. 88 As nature was 
unpredictable and uncontrollable, he thought, our mathematical and scientific 
capacities cou Id help us, as a society, to better adapt to it in order to obtain the 
86 Roy ce Club, PEB W, HUG4878 .214, Box 1, Fol der : Book reviews, letters to the Editor, 9-1 O. 
87 Social reforms were a major motive for research in American social science and economics around 
this period of time. See Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (U nited States of 
America: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
88 Edwin Wilson , "Social Progress," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 73 , no. 15 (1940): 469- 72. 
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greatest advantages from it and avoid the greatest disadvantages.89 Also, he thought, 
the mechanical analogy when dealing with social and economic control had to be 
taken with skepticism. 
Working in these Iines, at the national Jevel , Wilson became impressively and 
effectively active through the 1920s and the 1930s at the organizational and 
educational fronts in social science and economics. He was particularly responsible 
for the organization of Section K of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (AAAS) around 1930. Under Wilson's leadership, meetings of Section K 
became a privileged place where a select group of scientists and mathematicians 
interested in social science and economics met with social scientists and economists 
working with mathematical and statistical techniques. Those meetings played a 
central role in the establishment of the cornmunity of Arnerican rnathematical 
economists and the Econometric Society. Wilson's activism was also remarkable at 
the Jevel of instruction at Harvard. Under his leadership, the first program in 
advanced mathematical and statistical economics was established in the early 1930s. 
He offered those courses, inspired by Paretian-Hendersonian concerns and in clear a 
Wilson-Gibbs mathematical spirit.90 
At the beginning of the 1930s, Wilson also found hirnself sitting in meetings of the 
departrnent of sociology. ln the first half of 1929, he had taken a sabbatical spent at 
the University of Berkeley in California.91 There, he had suggested to people to offer 
Henderson the Mills Foundation invitation, which Henderson subsequently received 
and accepted by "suggesting the second half of [ 1931] and proposing to lecture to 
undergraduates on the phi losophy of science and to give a serninar on Pareto ' s 
89 Wilson , "Are There Periods in American Business Activity?" 
90 See chapter J 1. 
9 1 E. Wilson to L. Henderson, 19 Oct. 1929 (PEBW, Box 38, folder E-K) . 
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scientific method."92 At Harvard, Wilson then suggested to Pitirim Sorokin , chairman 
of the department of sociology, the establishment of a course on Pareto ' s 
methodology that would be offered by Henderson, to whom Wilson wrote: 
"l don ' t entirely share your enthusiasm for[ .. . ] Pareto 's [Sociology] but 
as a member of the department of Sociology I suggested that you be 
invited to give the course and I have further suggested to Sorokin that we 
give you as large a class of competent students as possible."93 
ln 1932, Henderson started teaching, in collaboration with Charles Curtis, a seminar 
on Pareto and Scientific Methods. 94 At the same time, invited by Sorokin,95 Wilson 
started lecturing to sociologists on Quantitative Problems of Population. 
Over the 1930s, Henderson played a preponderant role in the development of Harvard 
soc ial science promoting the methodology of case studies. 96 Wilson, the 
mathematician, rather emphasized the notion of generality, which he thought was of 
immediate practical interest for economics; his Gibbsian vectorial and matrix 
mathematics could be useful to study the aggregate economy as well as the individual 
units of the economy and their interactions as being in stable equilibrium. Paul 
Samuelson, an economist who attended Wilson ' s courses during the 1930s, often 
acknowledged that he was Wilson 's disciple; his Foundations of Economie Analysis97 
92 L. Henderson to E. Wilson, 28 Feb.1930 (PEBW, Box 38, Folder E-K). 
93 E. Wilson to L. Henderson, 25 Jan. 32 (PEBW, Box 19, Folder H). 
94 This sem inar would subsequently g ive rise to the famous Pareto C ircle. See Isaac, Working 
Know!edge; Annie Cot, "A 1930s North American Creative Comm unity : The Harvard ' Pareto 
Circle,"' Histo,y of Po!itica! Economy 43, no . 1 (2011): 131- 59; Barbara S. Hey l, "The Harvard 
' Pareto Circle,"' Journal of the f-fisto,y of the Behaviora! Sciences 4, no . 4 (1968): 3 16-334. 
95 P. Sorokim to E. Wilson , 26 Dec. 1931 (PEBW, Box 17, Folder Sorokin), 
96 Isaac, Working Know!edge. 
97 Paul Samuelson, Foundations of Economie Ana!ysis (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 
1947). 
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was much influenced by Wilson-Gibbs mathematics as well as by Henderson-Pareto 
style of work that he learnt with Wilson. Samuelson developed the notion of stable 
equilibrium at the individual and aggregate levels in economics while translating it in 
mathematical terms and presenting it as intuitive.98 
1.8. The Stevenson Lectures in Citizenship 
Wilson retired in 1945, right after the end of War World II . For that occasion, as a 
reward for his work for American social science and economics, Joseph Willets, 
director of the Division of Social Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation, in 
association with Hector Hetherington, principal of the University of Glasgow, invited 
him to deliver the Stevenson Lectures in CWzenship in Glasgow, during the autumn 
1945 and the winter 1946 terms, and to d iscuss recent American contributions to the 
study of society. Wilson titled his first lecture Perplexities of Citizenship. On that 
occasion , he conveyed the implicit assumption that had led his foundational 
discussions since 1900. As he explained, the main problem of individuals, as citizens, 
consisted of making specific choices by selecting and ordering loyalties and values. 
Choosing among available alternatives was "one instance of the ever present fact of 
conflict attending life" 99, where individuals sought to reconcile their allegiances 
weighing conflicting interests. Implicitly, Wilson 's diagnosis of the state of 
mathematics, physics, statistics, social science and economics had precisely consisted 
of pointing out that individuals acting in these activities, facing lack of sound 
foundations , made wrong choices as they adopted wrong methodological approaches. 
ln his foundational discussions, Wilson had systematically proposed his definition of 
mathematical and scientific rationality as the best available choice for the practice of 
science: it was inter-mediate and could hence more easily lead to achieve consensus. 
98 See chapter IJI . 
99 Edwin Wilson , The Study of Society (PEBW, HUG4878.214, Box 4, Folder Stevenson Lecture 
Chapter l , 1 ). 
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He had also systematically pied fo r reforms of hi gh ed ucation in the lines of hi s 
Gi bbsian mathematics .to " help" students make the " right" choice. 
Now that he was addressing the " problem attending li fe," in return, Wi lson used his 
fo undational ideas, bro ught some modifi cations to them and emphasized aga in 
educati on as a poss ible so lut ion to the problem of citizenship. 
W ilson diagnosed modern citizens as suffer ing from lack of a rationale to make 
sound choices; consequently, they and their societies were perp lexed , and hence more 
eager to adopt wrong po litical and social stances. He stressed that tyranny and 
demagogy had proven effective in generat ing emotions, leading individuals and 
societies to make wrong choices, and inadequate plans (Naz ism, Communism). For 
the sake of democracy, W il son suggested in Glasgow, cit izens and democratic 
societies should appeal to the authority of- his defi ni tion of-science when making 
choices and plans. T here was no a un ique way of ordering loyalties and va lues, he 
explai ned. However, he stressed, - hi s- mathematical and scientific rationa li ty could 
help indiv iduals and societi es arbi trating between reasons; and hence it coul d he lp 
them deal w ith the ir perplex ities. Sc ience, he stated, could only throw some t iny 
lights as fo r the best way of ordering our va lues. lt was however s igni ficantly usefu l 
to deal with in the operations of society, at the governm ental or private levels, " in 
bringing chosen va lues towards rea lization." 100 To be scientific, Wil son specified, 
p lans must be expressed in a guarded way and prov ide for frequ ent rev isions, as it 
could not be expected that we could contro l nature or the long-term deve lopment or 
our social and economic inst itutions. 
In Glasgow, Wi lson stressed again the conventional nature of sc ience. "Science is 
social. Tts knowledge is that upon whi ch there is agreement," 10 1 he exp lained. At thi s 
100 Edwin Wi lson, The Study of Society (Chapter Il , 45). 
101 idem, (10. 1). 
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late stage of his career, Wilson went further and suggested that scientific consensus 
was a social construct. By appealing to the authority of Harvard president James 
Conant and of the English att critic John Ruskin, he described science as being 
embedded in culture. As science was social , he claimed, American social scientists 
and economists needed to know the culture of science so that they did not become 
asocial. Wilson ' s organizational and pedagogical efforts in American social science 
and economics had precisely aimed at disciplining in the scientific method students of 
these fields. In 1945, he still believed that reforms in these fields needed to be 
enhanced ; now that he was pleading for spreading the scientific attitude among 
citizens, Wilson stated, we should also 
" impress [upon the public] with the significance of the state of agreement 
toward which one [strives]; for it is only by virtue of this agreement that 
the results of science can be reliably applied. " 102 
By this, Wilson meant that popularizing shared conventions 111 social science and 
economics among citizens, namely educating and disciplining the public, should also 
be regarded as being part of scientific planning of social and economic matters. 
Spreading the scientific attitude could help realize planned social and economic 
objectives. Indeed, if there was consensus in public opinion about the meaning of 
social and economic facts , announcements of plans by governmental authorities, 
when credible, Wilson explained , could produce immediate changes in individual ' s 
choices and plans leading to wanted social and economic transformations at the 
aggregate level. For this educational purpose, Wilson believed, professionals of mass 
media were as important and influential than scientists. 103 
102 Edwin Wilson, The Study of Society, (10 .1 ). 
103 Edwin Wilson, The Study of Society. (Chapter II). 
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Ultimately, at the end of his career, having significantly engaged with social science 
and economics, he eventually started defining science as being social. At the same 
time, Wilson started regarding social science and economics as being useful for 
governing people: by spreading the scientific attitude among the public, it could help 
mold , indeed discipline, the behavior of citizens in practical life. 
1.9. Conclusion 
Through his career, Wilson jumped from one field to another. His professional 
trajectory illustrated a process of marginalization from the American research 
mathematical community and a concomitant process of incursion into other research 
and organizational scientific communities. In this process, he offered an original and 
unique definition of scientific rationality, mathematical in its essence. He also 
connected in effective and important ways his mathematical thinking with various 
subject matters, following his own ideas about scientific rationality. Over the whole 
period, Wilson treated mathematical and scientific rationality, as he defined it, as the 
main form of invariance needed in science. But as he let intuition and persona! 
judgment enter his epistemology, the different historical and professional contexts 
that framed his daily work over the period became constitutive elements of his 
foundational thought. ln this way, his patriotic, nationalistic, political , social and 
cultural biases gained preponderance over his ideas about science. They became part 
of his criteria for evaluating and judging scientific statements; they played the same, 
or an even more important role than rigor and logic in structuring mathematical and 
scientific thinking. 
For Wilson , the problem of mathematical and scientific foundations was a practical 
problem in the life of the mathematician and the scientist, each of whom solved it by 
making a choice as for the attitude they wanted to adopt in their scientific practices. 
Wilson ' s definition ofrationality stemmed from his definition of mathematics as a set 
of correspondences between postulates and axioms. His pleas for reforms of 
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American education of mathematicians and-natural and social-scientists were 
precisely aimed at molding, indeed disciplining, students to protect them from 
scientific manias in vogue and help them make the "right" choice regarding their 
scientific attitude, namely adopting Wilson 's defin ition of scientific rational ity. 
Wilson also suggested that scientific rationality was useful for citizens in handling the 
problem of practical , social and political life in society. Through education, the public 
cou Id be instructed in the standards of scientific rationality; they cou Id be taught how 
to behave in a scientific, rational way. They could be disciplined. For Wilson , 
Scientific consensus, for the development of sound science, was as important as 
social and political consensus in society, for social progress. Such interconnection 
between science and society was possible because Wilson understood his 
mathematical and scientific language as a vernacular: everyone could learn it and 
think with it. 
Throughout Wilson 's evolution , he made an undeniable and lasting contribution to 
the enhancement of inter-disciplinarity in America between the 1900s and the 1940s. 
In the last analysis, Wilson attempted to define not only mathematical and scientific 
rationality and to modernize science, but the entire foundations of what it meant to be 
rational and modern in a democratic world. 
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J a m e s  K i n g .  N i e l s  B o h r  L i b r a r y  &  A r c h i v e s .  A m e r i c a n  I n s t i t u t e  o f  P h y s i c s ,  
C o l l e g e  P a r k ,  M D  U S A .  h t t p : / / w w w . a i p . o r g / h i s t o r y / o h i l i s t / 5 0 6 5 . h t m l .  
- - - .  1 9 6 6 .  H i s t o , y  o f  t h e  P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A c a d e m y  o f  S c i e n c e s :  
1 9 1 4 - 1 9 6 3 .  W a s h i n g t o n :  N a t i o n a l  A c a d e m y  o f  S c i e n c e s .  
W i l s o n ,  E d w i n ,  a n d  G i l b e r t  L e w i s .  1 9 1 2 .  " T h e  S p a c e - T i m e  M a n i f o l d  o f  R e l a t i v i t y .  
T h e  N o n - E u c l i d e a n  G e o m e t r y  o f  M e c h a n i c s  a n d  E l e c t r o m a g n e t i c s . "  
P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  A c a d e m y  o f  A r t s  a n d  S c i e n c e s  4 8  ( 1 1 ) :  3 8 9 - 5 0 7 .  
W i l s o n ,  E d w i n ,  a n d  C l a r e n c e  M o o r e .  1 9 1 6 a .  " A  G e n e r a l  T h e o r y  o f  S u r f a c e s . "  
P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A c a d e m y  o f  S c i e n c e s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  
A m e r i c a  2  ( 5 ) :  2 7 3 - 7 8 .  
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CHAPTER li 
EDWIN B. WILSON AND THE RISE OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1920-1940 
2. 1. Introduction 1 
In hi s 1998 How Foundations Came to Be, after hinting at his indebtedness to hi s 
Harvard professo rs of the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter, Wassi ly Leontief, Gottfr ied 
Haberler and Alv in Hansen, Paul Samuelson acknowledged : 
"Perhaps most relevant of ail for the genes is of Foundations, Edwin 
Bidwell Wilson ( 1879- 1964) was at Harvard . W il son was the great 
Will ard Gibbs' s last (and essentially only) protégé at Ya le. He was a 
mathematician, a mathemat ica l physicist, a mathematica l statistician, a 
mathematical economist, a polymath who had done first-class work in 
many fi elds of the natural and social sciences. I was perhaps hi s only 
di sciple [ .. . ]. Aside fro m the fact that E.B. knew everything and 
1 E-mail : carvaj a5@gmail.com. l am gratefu l to Roger Backhouse, Pedro Duarte, Ivan Moscat i, Robert 
Leonard and Roy Weintraub for helpfu l comments on early drafts of thi s chapter, as well as to the 
members and the 201 6 fe llows of the HOPE Center, where th is chapter was presented du ring a 
seminar. The usual caveat appli es. 1 am a lso thankful to archi vists of the Harvard Uni versity Archi ves 
(HUA) and of th e Dav id M. Rubenste in Rare Book & Manuscript Li brary at Duke Uni vers ity (D U). 
Papers of Edwin Bidwell Wilson were consul ted at HUA, HUG4878 .203 (ind icated if diffe rent); Paul 
A. Samuelson Papers (PASP) and Lloyd Metzler Papers (LMP) were consul ted at DU ; James Tobi n 
Papers (JTP) can be consulted at Ya le Un ivers ity L ibrary. ln this chapter, th e number of the boxes in 
whi ch the re levant material was consulted will fo llow the respecti ve co ll ection. 
everybody, his great virtue was his contempt for social scientists who 
aped the more exact sciences in a parrot-like way." (Samuelson 1998, 
1376) 
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Although Wilson was central for Samuelson, Wilson 's imprint on the history of 
economics as intertwined with the history of other disciplines in America has not yet 
been the subject of a detailed historical analysis.2 A possible reason for this historical 
oversight: Wilson 's main role was not at the creative front, but at the organizational 
one, through intense academic proselytization and instruction. 
Wilson ' s active role in the promotion of mathematical and statistical methods in 
economics significantly influenced the rise of mathematical economics in America 
between the 1920s and the 1940s. In particular, he promoted Vilfredo Pareto ' s and 
Irving Fisher's mathematical economics; he also played a central role in the 
constitution of the community of American mathematical economists. Furthermore, 
he promoted and established the first program in modern mathematical and statistical 
economics at Harvard . Through the study of Wilson 's influence in the development 
of mathematical economics, new lights are also shed regarding the origins of the 
Econometric Society, of which Wilson was a founder member, but of which he 
rapidly distanced himself. 
Behind Wilson ' s activism m econom1cs lay his belief that, in the foundations of 
science, matters of pedagogy and epistemology were connected; he believed that 
American mathematics and science must better retlect American national values, and 
more significantly serve national security and prosperity. Wilson was confident that 
subtle planning of science would yield democratic science in America. Central to 
Wilson 's thought was his perennial belief that in science, as in society, progress was 
2 Yann Giraud (2007), Roger Backhouse (Forthcom ing; 20 15; 2014; 20 13), Bruna Ingrao and Giorgio 
Israel ( 1990) as well as Philip Mirowski (1989; 2002) and Roy Weintraub ( 1991 ) have ail pointed out 
Wilson 's relevance for the mathematical turn of economics, by focusing on his influence on 
Samuelson's work and career, not on Wilson himself. 
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too often made by indiv idua ls w ith wrong methodo logica l, po litical or soc ial 
positions; he argued fo r a middle-ground pos ition, which could he lp scienti sts deal 
w ith unrest created by di fficult choices regarding an approach to be adopted. 
Inbetweenness offered a possible so lution for the problem of the creation and 
protecti on of sc ientifi c knowledge, as it offered a so lu tion to the problem of social 
order: quantifiable consensus and agreement be ing Wil son's watchwords. 
Wilson ' s invo lvement w ith soc ial science and economics occurred band in hand with 
that of hi s Harvard co lleague Lawrence Henderson. The spirit under whi ch they 
worked was made explic it in a letter to Henderson, where Wil son wrote: 
" I have a fee ling that a good many social scienti sts have to be p rotected 
fro m themselves and that it is up to people like you and me to do what we 
canto push soc ia l sciences ahead in a sound way."3 
Us ing archi va i materi a l, this chapter will first di scuss Wil son' s incurs ion into social 
science and economics by briefl y commenting on hi s rev iews of Pareto ' s and Fisher's 
work. Then, in the fo llowing two sections, it w ill study Wilson's activ ism "to push 
soc ial sc iences," with a specia l emphasis on economics. In parti cular, the chapter w ill 
expla in how Wil son became invo lved with economi cs, by play ing a signifi cant ro le at 
the orig ins of the Econometri c Soc iety in America while be ing hi ghl y concerned w ith 
the relationship between economics and economic po licy, plannin g and contro l. 
Lastly, the chapter will di scuss how Wilson, di scontent with the evo lution of the 
econometric movement and New Dea l polic ies, turned hi s efforts towards Harvard 
and promoted and established the first program in advanced mathemat ical economics 
at the university . T he chapter w ill fini sh by presentin g the content of Wilson' s 
Harvard courses on mathemati cal economi cs and mathemati cal stati stics. 
3 E. Wi lson to L. Henderson, Jan. 10, 1933 (PE BW, 21). On W il son-H end erson connection, see 
chapter I section 1.7. of the present thes is . 
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2.2. Incursion into social science and economics 
Educated as a mathematician at Harvard University, Yale University and at the École 
Normale Supérieure in Paris around 1900, Wilson was one the " most active" 
members among the American mathematical research community during the first 
decade of the 1900s (Fenster and Parshall 1994). Wilson , however, gradually 
marginalized himself from that community, disavowing the influence that David 
Hilbert' s German structuralist mathematics was then exerting on his American 
colleagues.4 Wilson ' s career illustrates this process of marginalization , and corollary 
process of incursion into other fields. First, in 1907, he became associate professor of 
mathematical physics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Second, in 
1922, Wilson accepted the chairmanship of the department of vital statistics at the 
newly founded Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH). ln parallel spheres, from 
1914, when the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) was 
launched, Wilson served as managing editor ofthisjournal until the end of his life in 
1964. During the 1920s and thereafter, he also became active and hi ghly influential in 
numerous national scientific associations and societies. 
The task that Wilson gave himself in all the above-mentioned involvements consisted 
of fostering and establishing l~sti ng connections between mathematics and different 
subject matters, following Gibbs ' s kind of mathematics and defining, in an original 
and unique way, mathematics as intermediate and constrained.5 
Wilson ' s interests in social science and economics emerged during his years at Yale 
( 1899-1907) when he came to be associated with the sociologist William Graham 
4 See Wilson 1903c. 
5 On Wilson ' s Gibbsian definition ofmathematics see chapter I. 
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Sumner and the mathematical economist Irving Fisher.6 Wilson helped Fisher setting 
up business and stock market barometers.7 
These interests persisted and around 1910 Wilson promoted Fisher ' s and Vilfredo 
Pareto ' s mathematical economics; in reviews of their work, addressed to the 
readership of the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (AMS) and Science, 
Wilson presented economics as a field where mathematics could be naturally applied. 
In its contemporary state, he argued, political economy, as a science, was in its 
infancy: there was no consensus about theories and conclusions. Fisher ' s and Pareto ' s 
mathematical economics was the path to follow. They based their work on convenient 
conventional idealizations and they applied postulational reasoning by following the 
deductive rules of logical calculus. ln this way, Wilson argued, these mathematical 
economists were able to better define their assumptions and to adopta rational way of 
thinking. By adopting this attitude, economists would eventually be able to elevate 
the status of economics to science; to attain agreement regarding the fondamental 
idealizations and-mathematical-relations of the field; to improve their judgment 
and their data about economic and social life; and to make better decisions based on 
modern scientific judgment. However, neither Pareto' s nor Fisher's work was yet 
satisfactory, as it remained mainly theoretical. In this vein, Wilson argued that as 
some fields of mathematical physics were theoretical exercises because of lack of 
data, mathematical economics, which still faced similar problems, did not yet 
properly represent economic affairs but remained at the level of general economic 
theory. Wilson also questioned the analogy that Pareto and Fisher made between their 
mathematical economics and physics. For Wilson, comparing economic and physical 
facts, and using the same formulas without adapting them to the specific problem in 
hand , was arbitrary. Analogical thinking was useful because it could lead to 
6 E. Wilson to R. Vance, Dec. 19, 1922 (PEBW 3). 
7 E. Wilson to G. U . Yule, May 6, 1924 (PEBW, 7). 
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unexpected and enlightened perspectives, but must be limited in regard to its 
applicability (Wilson 1909a; 1912; 191 3; 1914). 8 
At the beginning of the 1920s, Wilson felt that he was "further away from those 
mathematical interests which the persons in control [of the AMS] define to be 
mathematics." 9 Believing German mathematics was "essentially foreign to 
[American] nature" 10 and thinking that American mathematical leaders ignored the 
American turn of mind , traditionally more eager for applications of mathematics than 
for pure rigor, Wil son resigned from the AMS in 1923. He had just joined the HSPH, 
where, Wilson often heard President Lowell claiming that the most important 
function as President of a university such as Harvard consisted of fostering " the 
development of that kind of work which is particularly fruitful , namely, that which 
originates in the 'no man 's land ' between two accepted fields of study." 11 
Du ring the 1920s, Wil son also became more involved with the functioning of the 
NAS; he particularly promoted including for membership di stingui shed social 
scienti sts and economists; he was also one of the few members of the NAS who 
appeared in the roster of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) when it was 
incorporated in 1924. 12 Almost simultaneously, he was elected member of the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) as well as of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS). In these institutions, Wilson actively promoted 
cooperation between mathematicians, statisticians, social scientists and economists. 
8 Wilson ' s reviews were aimed at showing how other di sciplines could ga in scientific leg itimacy when 
connected with mathematics and how in return this connection gave to mathematics its practi cal and 
operational intelligi bility . During the 1910s, Wilson came closer to the community of Ameri can 
political economists. ln 19 12, he was e lected member of the American Economie Association (AEA). 
9 E. Wilson to J. Coo lidge, March 30, 1922 (PEBW, 4). 
10 E. Wilson to J. Whittemore, May 23 , 1924 (PEBW, 7). 
11 E . Wilson to R. Richardson , 3 Nov. 1928 (PEBW, 13, ita lics added). On the developm ent of human 
and soc ial sciences, econom ics exc luded, and their interconn ections at Harvard, see Isaac 20 12. 
12 See Cochrane 1978. 
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Through these efforts, he not only enlarged his network; he also embarked on implicit 
and indirect negotiations with practitioners of different academic fields about the 
right definition of being scientific, which according to him implied necessarily, but 
not sufficiently, the use of mathematics. Symmetrically, Wilson also engaged in 
implicit and indirect negotiations with American mathematicians about the right 
definition of mathematical practices, which he thought should be redirected towards 
the establishment of interconnections between mathematics and science. 
In such negotiations, Wilson however feared what had pushed him away from the 
American community of mathematicians: 
"That which has always impressed me most, I think, in moving from one 
field to another is the tendency of any field to become more technical 
than the fundamentally established ideas warrant; the tendency in every 
quantitative field to develop arithmetical , or algebraic, or other 
mathematical technique far beyond what the data warrant." 13 
2.3. Becoming a mathematical economist 
Almost simultaneously to his resignation from the AMS, Wilson, a self-marginalized 
mathematician , began promoting mathematical economics at the national level in 
various scientific American associations and academies. 
2.3.1. Section K: the American origins of the Econometric Society 
In 1928, Wilson, the editor of the PNAS, found himself at the executive committees 
of the AAAS and the SSRC, in charge of Section K of the AAAS, willing to explore 
the " no man ' s land" of scientific territories and willing to modernize social science 
13 E. Wilson to J. Lipka, 17 Dec. 1923 (PEBW, 5). 
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and economics. 14 Wilson ' s idea for Section K consisted of gathering in joint meetings 
people from the AAAS, the AMS, the ASA and the AEA. The difficulty was to 
coordinate annual meetings of these associations. He particularly aimed at 
encouraging encounters between a select group of young social sc ientists and 
economists working in a mathematical and scientific spirit, whose papers were 
usually rejected by their own associations, and mathematicians and scienti sts 
interested in stati stics and economics, whose assoc iations also usuall y rejected their 
papers. From the community of economists, both Wesley Mitchell and Fisher 
reminded Wilson how difficult relationships between the AAAS and national social 
science associations had been .15 However, both Mitchell and Fisher16 were highly 
interested in Wilson's project. Mitchell was "glad that the AAAS [had] put Section K 
in [Wilson's] hands." 17 From the community of mathematicians, Ronald G. D. 
Richardson, Wil son's friend and secretary of the AMS, found Wil son's suggestion 
interesting. 18 In general terms, Wilson believed that " [i]f both sides do their own job 
well there should be in the next 25 years a very marked convergence of interest and 
understanding from both sides toward a common position ." 19 
14 Wilson ' s strong com mitment to this organ izational role became ev ident in 1927, when he suggested 
to James Catte!! , pres ident of the AAAS, that the association should encourage the sc ientifi c 
development of soc ial science and econom ics through its Secti on K (E. Wilson to J. Cattell , Oct. 4, 
1927 [PEBW, 11 ]). Wilson was then put in charge of Section K. The same year, invited by Frederick 
Mills, Wil son took part to a roundtable during the December meeting of AEA on The Present Status 
and Future Prospects of Quantitative Economies (Mill s et a l. 1928). 
15 Wilson and Mitchell had met in the round table of the 1927 AEA meeting. They also must have 
crossed paths in meetings of the SSRC. With Wilson ' s support, Mitchell was first elected member (W. 
Mitchell to E. Wi lson, May 2, 1928 [PEBW, 13]) and then Fellow (W. M itche ll to E. Wilson, Oct. 2, 
1928 [idem]) of the AAAS during 1928. ln their correspondence, there is a strong sense of mutual 
persona! and intellectual respect, indeed admiration. 
16 I. Fisher to E. Wilson, June 28 1928 (PEBW, 13). 
17 W. Mitchell to E. Wil son, Apr. 27, 1928 (PEBW, 13). 
18 R. Richardson to E. Wilson, Oct. 19 1928 (PEBW, 13). 
19 E. Wilson to W. Mitchell , May 3, 1928 (PEBW, 13). 
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Under Wil son' s contro l and with Charles Roos ' efficient admini strative effort, 
Section K became a privileged place where there convened a select group of 
individuals, interested in social science and economics and working with 
mathematical and stati stical techniques.20 Between 1928 and 1930, in New York, Des 
Moines and Cleve land respectively, the mathematicians Edward Huntington and 
Gri ffith Evans, the mathematical statistic ians A lfred Lotka, Paul Rider, Loui s Rietz 
and Harold Hote lling, the mathematical economists Charles Roos and Henry Schultz, 
Wil son himself as well as the Norwegian economist Ragnar Fri sch, among others, 
presented some of their work and/or acted as chairman du ring one or two meetings of 
Section K. The papers presented during these years in Section K dealt with 
population dynamics, measures of soc ial behavior, business cyc les, fo recasts of 
business phenomena, qua li ty contro ls of production as we ll as exhaustible resources 
(See Livingston 1929; 1930; 193 1). As noted by Roos to Wil son, "we now seem to 
have things coming our way in Section K."21 
ln 1930 in C leve land, Section K had j oint meetings with the AMS, the ASA, the AEA 
and other associat ions. Wil son was probably responsible fo r the spirit of convergence 
that led to the meeting of these associations in the same c ity, as he presi ded over the 
ASA in 1929, and the SSRC between 1929 and 193 1.22 ln the same spirit, Wilson 
conducted the affa ires of Secti on K in such a way as to avo id di scord between the 
20 W ilson appoi nted Roos as secretary of Section K. Roos had conducted doctora l research on 
mathematical economics under the guid ance of Evans, a Harvard Ph .D. mathematician, then at the 
Rice Jnstitu te in Texas. 
21 C. Roos to E. W il son, June 14, 193 1 (PEBW, 16) . 
22 W ilson convinced Will ford King, pres ident of the ASA in 1930, to go to Cleveland (B . Li vingston to 
E. Wil son, Feb. 12, 1930 [PEBW, 15]; he must have done similarly w ith other executives in the other 
associations and societies that met in Cleveland . 
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different associations. As he wrote to Mitchell , "I don ' t like secessions, they often 
turn into civil war. "23 
Of significance regarding Wilson ' s plan for Section K was the establishment, in 
America, of the Econometric Society. As noted by Roos to Wil son in a letter dated 
October 21, 1932, "the Econometric Society was built on the foundation laid by 
Section K." 24 The Society was a fruit of Frisch's efforts (Bjerkholt 1998). In 
America, Roos (actively) and F isher (nominally) supported Frisch 's initiative. In an 
informai evening meeting in Cleveland, the Econometric Society was launched.25 
Wil son, a charter member, was elected fellow of the Society,26 member of the 
Council of the Society and, later, member of the Advisory Editorial Committee of 
Econometrica.27 Among the elected American members, there were Evans, Fisher, 
Hotelling, Moore, Mitche ll , Roos, Schultz and Wil son. 28 Ail of them, with the 
exception of Moore, had been closely related to Section K. Overall , as Wilson noted 
to Frisch,29 the number of American members was larger than that of any European 
country. This was not accidenta i. To thi s, Frisch replied as follows: 
"I may tell you quite frankly that I made the American li st rather large on 
purpose, because I wanted to create a safety valve that could function in 
23 E. Wilson to W. Mitchell, Oct. 9, 1928 (PEBW, 13). In the same letter, Wilson emphasized that he 
did not want scholars to corne to Section K as an ac.t of rupture and separation from their respective 
associations. Section K, he insisted, was not aimed at competi ng with specifi c associat ions but at 
complementing them. lndeed, as he wrote to Mitchell, he wanted to keep the meetings of the section 
rather info rmai and discrete. To thi s, Mitchell responded that he sided with Wilson, for secession 
" might also precipitate another futile controversy over methods at large" (Oct. 13, 1928 [PEBW , 13]). 
24 C. Roos toE. Wil son, Oct.2 1, l932(PEBW, 19) . 
25 I. Fisher, R. Frisch, C. Roos to E. Wilson, Nov. 29, 1930 (idem). 
26 Memorandum in re the Econometric Society, Signed by J. Schumpeter and R. Fri sch at Bonn, Sep. 
28 , 1931 (PEBW, 16). 
27 I. Fisher to E. Wilson , Dec. 16, 193 1 (PEB W, 16). 
28 Memorandum in re the Econometri c Society. 
29 E. Wilson to R. Fri sch, Oct. 31, 1932 (PEBW, 18). 
the event of nati onal intrigues coming up between E uropeans. Possibly 
the America group may actas a safety valve."30 
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With hi s Secti on K, Wil son significant ly he lped to create and re info rce in Ameri ca a 
sense of community among American mathematical economists. The "American 
group" that was organized had the particulari ty that it was supported by the AAAS, a 
well-recognized American sc ienti fic institution. Thi s newly recognized community 
could therefore be call ed scientifzc not only because it used mathemati cal methods 
but also because the AAAS gave it institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, if Frisch's 
words were taken seri ously, it could be the case that thi s newly created American 
communi ty of mathemati cal economists was re info rced by the unifyi ng and 
regulatory ro le that it was supposed to play w ithin the international community of 
mathemat ical economists. 
The econometric project, however, as he fea red with ail quantitative fi elds, rapidly 
developed "fa r beyond what the data warrant."31 Wilson fe lt that econometri c ians 
gave too much emphas is to probability and purely theoreti cal economics, leaving 
as ide the empirica l stati sti cal economics that had been so important in the recent 
development of American economics. 32 For Wilson, the mathematical stati st ics of 
Karl Pearson and Ronald Fisher, play ing then signifi cant influence in the 
econometric movement (see Louça 2007), were not well grounded empirica lly . 
Wil son argued that the ir approach, based on probability theory, consisted of play ing 
games with pa irs of lotteries in which there was no emp iri cal truth; Wilson had 
30 R. Fri sch to E. Wilson, Nov. 24, 1932 ( idem). 
31 E. Wi lson to J. L ipka, 17 Dec. 1923 (PEBW, 5) . 
32 Wilson certa inly reflected on developments ofwhich Mitchell , part icul ar ly at the National B ureau of 
Econom ic Research, was an important leader. Even if du ring the early 1930s, W il son be lieved that 
Mitchell ' s work lacked mathematical sophisticati on and ri go r, he wo uld later describe the work of the 
Bureau as being reall y concerned with factua l scientific studi es of th e economy, a im ed at shaping 
scientific po li cy (E. Wi lson, The Study of Society from the Standpoint of Recent American 
Contributions [PEBW, HUG4878 .2 14, Box 4, Fol der Stevenson Lecture Chapter 7]) . 
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suggested that it was not possible to make scientific inferences based only on 
probability theory (W ilson 1926b, 296). Furthermore, Wilson claimed that 
mathematical statisticians indiscriminately adopted the hypothesis of the normal 
distribution, regardless of the problem in hand (Wilson 1923a). Wilson felt that 
econometricians did not understand " that probabilities and statistics [were] different 
things." His interest in developing the mathematical theory of probability was only 
due to his "greater interest in sc ience" 33 rather than pure technique. 
More particularly, Wilson thought that econometricians lay too much emphasis on 
probability theory when analyzing dynamical economic systems. This attitude, 
Wilson must have felt, showed econometricians' incapacity of facing reality. A round 
1910, Wilson had written some comments on statistical mechanics and argued that 
despite the fact that statistica l mechanics offered the advantage of not requiring 
improbab le hypotheses about the constitution of matter, the use of theory of 
probability to ail kinds of dynamical systems simply as analogy was unintelligible. 
He showed that the formai analogy between kinetic theory, thermodynamics and 
hydrodynamics was valid only in restricted cases (Wi lson 1908a; 1909b). In the 
1920s, he was also skeptical of modern works in quantum mechanics in which 
physical aggregates and their dynamics were arbitrarily constructed with probability 
theory; Wilson preferred assuming, simply as a working hypothesis, that nature was 
dynamical in essence and stud ied statistically only to ease the analysis; certain 
correspondences between statics and dynamics cou ld be estab li shed on the statistica l 
basis by assuming continuous distributions. 34 
At the institutional and organizationa l front, Wilson disavowed Frisch ' s (European) 
influence in the way certain matters of the Society were being handled. For example, 
" in regard to the proposai of Alfred Cowles 3rd to subsidize a journal for our 
33 E. Wilson to C. Roos, Sep. 16, 1936 (PEBW, 27). 
34 E. Wilson to F. Edgeworth March 12, 1923 (PEBW, 4). 
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[Econometric] Society,"35 Wilson felt that negotiations should be held by Americans, 
in more American ways. I that was not the case, Wilson suggested , Cowles's money 
should be invested in another American project. Wilson , as the second American 
member of the council of the Society with Fisher, thought that Europeans could, in 
his words: 
"scare Mr. Cowles off. It seems to me that Frisch is too much concerned 
about a good many things. I wonder if he is essentially a man of good 
judgment? ln many ways I had rather have Col. Rorty ' s reaction of this 
Cowles ' proposition than Frisch ' s, or any European's even if the 
European has had a good many American contacts. T expect to see 
Cowles in New Orleans. I think he has a little business with the Executive 
Committee of the AAAS. I think we could well consider whether rather 
than bother him to go to Europe and interview some foreigners who may 
not understand him as an American and whom he may not understand 
because they are foreigners we might perhaps do better to let him give his 
money to some other organization that won ' t be so fussy ." 36 
With the same nationalistic spirit, and probably reflecting on a clash of personalities 
between Wilson and Frisch , Wilson also disavowed Frisch ' s econometrics. 
lllustratively, as referee of Econometrica, he opposed the publication of a paper 
dealing with time series written by Frisch.37 For Wilson, the paper was an example of 
too much mathemaücs and "did not read the least little bit like the great papers of 
Willard Gibbs on the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances." 38 Wilson also 
suggested that mathematical economics needed to follow a process of 
Americanization in order to succeed in America and claimed that the " best way to 
35 l. Fisher to E. Wilson , Dec. 16, 193 1 (PEBW, 16). 
36 E. Wilson to J. Fisher, Dec. 18, 1931 (PEBW, 16). 
37 The paper was titled " Changing Harmonie Studies from the Point of View of Linear Operators and 
Erratic Shocks" (W. Nelson to E. Wilson, Aug. 23 , 1933 [PEBW, 21]). 
38 E. Wilson to W. Nelson, Nov. 13, 1933 (idem). 
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encourage [Americans] to dig into mathematics [was] to convince them that there 
[ was] some practical use for the mathematics."39 
Under such circumstances, in which Wilson disliked the too strong Frisch's influence 
within the Econometric Society in America and in which he also disliked 
econometrists ' unconstrained mathematical attitude, Wilson rapidly distanced 
himself from the econometric project, without openly embarking on methodological 
controversies. It was not coincidental that subsequent to the l 930 Cleveland meeting, 
Wilson chose more empirically oriented economists such as Leonard Ayres (1931), 
Mitchell (1933) and Carl Snyder (1934) to serve as chairmen of Section K. In 
contrast, in 1929 and 1930, Wilson had invited Rietz and Evans, who both held a 
Ph.D. in mathematics, to chair meetings of Section K. In the same process of 
distancing himself from the econometric project, in 1935, Wilson also asked no 
longer to be part of the Council of the Econometric Society.4° Furthermore, he 
declined four invitations by Alfred Cowles to deliver ta1ks at the Research 
Conference on Economies and Statistics at Colorado Springs, organized by the 
Cowles Commission. Wilson appeared in a tentative program for the first Conference 
in 1935, where he was supposed to talk about the decomposition of times series, 
which he never did. 
As he marginalized himself from the econometric movement, white still indirectly 
controlling Section K, Wilson retreated towards Cambridge, where he started 
promoting a program of mathematical economics at Harvard.4 1 
39 E. Wilson to R. Frisch, Nov. 15, 1933 (PEBW, 20) . 
40 E. Wilson to C. Roos, Jan. 2 1, 1935 (PEBW, 25). 
41 See section 2.4. 
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2.3.2. Increasing concerns about economic policy 
Du ring the 1920s, Wilson adhered to the progressive 42 and institutional ist 43 
American idea of regarding social science and economics as social engineering. In a 
letter to Mitchell on January 1932, Wilson explained that social science could be 
useful for planning and controlling social and economic affairs. For such purposes, it 
had to focus on smalt , manageable, closed systems. Wilson claimed that triumphs in 
public health had been made in domains where engineering processes had been 
applied. 44For Wilson, however, social engineering was more a possibility than a 
statement about the current state of social science and econom ics. He thought that the 
economist could become an expert who would play a central rote in the functioning 
of democracy and in the development of national prosperity with his scientific ad vice 
to private and public sectors; this expert would be interested in studying how society 
worked as a system, how social and economic affairs worked in practice and how 
institutions, especially education (Wilson 1940a), molded and constrained individual 
behavior. 
In contrast to progressives and institutionalists, Wilson disregarded social reformas a 
motive for scientific endeavor; he criticized their trust in social and economic control 
and planning. Like most of his Harvard colleagues, Wilson , A Republican, 
disapproved of New Deal policies and the political platform of the Democratic Party 
during the 1930s. Wilson ' s dissatisfaction with New Deal policies, however, was not 
only based on political grounds; his was a conservative stand based on a concern 
about, first, the right relation between high education and science and, second , the 
right relation between science and society. Wilson, the .social scientist, regarded 
society as a natural organic system; Wilson, the mathematical statistician, thought 
42 See Leonard Forthcoming. 
43 See Rutherford 20 11 . 
44 E. Wilson to W. Mitchell, Jan. 4, 1932 (PEBW, 19). 
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that science did not aim at contro lling nature but at helping us to better adapt to it. 
Hence, social science and economics were not supposed to directly seek social 
reforms (Wil son 1940c) ; their influence over social and economic affa irs should only 
be indirect, subtl e. 
Wil son had argued in 1919 that subtle planning of science yielded progress in 
science and soc iety. To better understand what he meant, it must be underlined that, 
fo r him, planning science and scient ific planning of society were two s ides of the 
same co in . He cla imed that scientifi c planning of society required good forecasting 
of socia l and econorni c affairs; however, he argued, "we presume to fo recast the as 
yet un fo recastable or atternpt to control the as yet uncontrollable." (Wil son 1934b, 
199) .45 
Thi s situation led W ilson to write hi s first ori gina l contribution in economics. W ith a 
spectral analys is, titled The Periodogram of American Business Activity, he arg ued 
that there were neither periods nor cycles in the data about American business 
acti vity (1934b).46 Hence, economic policy grounded on fo recast of business cycles 
was useless, even dangerou s. As he expla ined to Mitche ll in a persona! letter, Wil son 
believed that it was not yet known whether the managing of the economy would 
better or worsen the s ituation.47 He argued that the analogy between economics and 
rnedi cine or mechanics led some to talk about economic plann ing as if economics 
were at the eng ineering level.48 Because it was not yet known if th e remedies would 
45 Here Wil son was also criti cizing Fisher 193 0. 
46 W ilson wrote anoth er paper where he translated in to E ng li sh, to the readership of Science, the 
resul ts of his more techn ical paper (W il son 1934a) . 
47 E. Wil son to W. M itchell , Jan. 4, 1932 (PEBW, 19). 
48 E. Wil son to I. F isher, May 25 , 1932 (PEBW, 18). 
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or would not stabilize economic fl uctuations, the New Deal poli c ies were, fo r 
Wi lson, the social problem itself. 49 
If the mechanical analogy was to be taken seriously in economics for economic 
regulation, as Wil son wrote to F isher, one firs t needed to know what the concepts of 
inertia and fr icti on meant in the economic system and to determine the ir re lative 
magni tudes so that economic regul ation could actually regulate the system.50 More 
s ignificantly fo r Wil son, when studying the socia l effects of economic depression, it 
was necessary to adopta more empirical attitude and to di sentangle the effects of the 
depression on socia l institut ions and the effects of a governmental po l icy ari sing out 
of the depress ion (Wil son 193 8). A bove a il , Wil son be li eved that "Sound economic 
fo recasting and sound econom ic regu lation if they shall ever be obta ined [ were] st i li 
[ .. . ] decided ly in the future."51 Moreover, 
"There may be thi s rea l complication in the social fo recasting, v iz. , that 
possibly a knowledge of the fu ture if we cou Id gain it from the study of 
the past would so modi fy that future that we could not hope to fo recast it 
w ithout tak ing into account the degree to whi ch such knowledge as we 
had of it would infl uence its course." (W il son 1934b, 194) 
Wil son suggested that forecast ing in socia l science and economics could he lp contro l 
our own conduct to take advantage or avo id di sadvantage of forecasted events, 
chang ing at the same time social and economic events of the future. This impli ed that 
soc ia l science and economics could teach us self-control (W il son 1934b, 194). 
W il son c laimed that changes in social science and economics were needed to 
enhance social progress (W il son 1940b). In thi s way, fo r Wil son, subtle planning 
49 E. Wi lson to Mitchell , Jan. 4, 1932 (PEBW, 19). 
50 E. Wi lson tol.F isher, May 13, 1932(PEBW, 18). 
5 1 E. Wilson to J. Fisher, July 25, 1934 (PEBW, 23). 
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requi red first reforms in the educati on of socia l science and economics because it 
would be then eas ier to teach futu re social scienti sts and economists how to behave. 
In hi s words: 
"Now the social scientist has got to learn to have things considered as 
suggestions. He must not get up and wave hi s arms around and say that 
economics today is a tota lly di ffere nt thing from economics 40 years ago, 
that everything is changed because in science things don ' t change tota lly. 
[ .. . ] Sc ience is as a matter of fact the study of those things w hich don' t 
change or at any rate change so s lowly that we may regard them for 
practical purposes as non-chang ing or at any rate can ass ign limit to the ir 
change in amo unt and not time. Thi s is ail very carefu lly pointed out with 
its implications for social science by Pareto in his Manual of Political 
Economy."52 
The modernization of social science and economics through educati onal reforms in 
the sense of the G ibbsian mathematics and Paretian economics, W ilson thought, 
would eventua lly he lp contra i matters of society and realize planned objectives. Such 
transformation was possible because 
"there seems to be no present conclusive ev idence that learning a 
particular techniq ue is imposs ible to any person [ . .. ] and, therefore, each 
could presumably learn any technique and use it in much the same sense 
as he could learn any language and write in it." (W il son 1940a, 664) 
In 1940, W il son suggested hence that mathematics was a sort vernacular language. 
Such suggestion em bod ied his belief that mathematics and science offered an 
operational and pract ical way of contro lling and plannin g soc ia l and economic 
matters. However, as illustrati ons of Wilson's nationa li stic and politi cal prej udices, it 
was clear that, fo r him, thi s vernacular should be hi s G ibbsian Ameri can language 
52 E. Wi lson to C. Snyder, June 2, 1934 (PEBW, 24). 
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and the way of controlling and planning should be different from the New Deal 
policies proposed by the Democratic Party over the 1930s, because he felt, these 
policies were not based on sound scientific foundations. 
Before closing this section, two points of interpretation should be noticed. First, in 
Wilson ' s ideas about the foundations of knowledge, the line that separated intuition 
and persona! judgment from prejudice was porous. Second, while he tried to connect 
science and society, Wilson thought that science, as he defined it, was above society. 
2.4. A program for mathematical economics at Harvard 
As a discrete way of proposing an alternative to the econometric movement without 
engaging in methodological quarrels and moved by his concerns about economic 
policy, Wilson turned his efforts towards Cambridge at the more local level of 
Harvard , where he assumed effective leadership regarding statistical and 
mathematical economics. 
In 1928, Wilson had declined an offer to teach statistical economics made by Harold 
Burbank, chairman of the department of economics at Harvard. 53 Then, at the 
beginning of 1930, Leonard Crum reported to Wilson that Burbank wanted them "to 
discuss the prospect of further development of the mathematical side of our work in 
economics."54 Jt was then decided that Wilson would start offering a course on 
statistical economics, titled Foundations of Statistical Theory in the 1931-32 
academic year. He wanted to run the course "as a sort of pro-seminar taking the 
question of the possibility of determining a measure of stability for the economic 
situation ,"55 working on statistical data and hoping that some "students m ight really 
be considering economics more than statistics and getting into a position where they 
53 E. Wil son to H. Burbank, May 29, 1928 (PEBW, 12). 
54 L. Crum to E. Wilson, Jan . 4, 1930 (PEBW, 15). 
55 E. Wilson to H. Burbank, March 23 , 1932 (PEBW, 18). 
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could handle a statistical economic thesis. " 56 But most students were auditors. 
Despite low attendance, " the course met ail expectations and needs" 57 of the 
department. At the end of 1932, invited by Burbank,58 Wilson started attending 
departmental meetings. 
With the idea of establishing an American school of mathematical economics, m 
November 1932, Wilson presented to Burbank the possibility of alternatively 
offering a theoretical (in the sen se of mathematical statistics) and an empirical (in the 
sense of Mitchell) course on stat istics. He futiher proposed the establishment of a 
new course on mathematical economics (in the sense of Pareto). Each course would 
be given once every three years. He insisted to Burbank that such courses were 
necessary, pleading for a more active role "of the university in the changing social 
order."59 Schumpeter, an "open-minded" advocate of mathematical economics who 
was a fellow of the Econometric Society and who came permanently to Harvard in 
1932 (McCraw 2010), supported Wilson ' s effo11s. Certainly with Schumpeter' s and 
Crum ' s endorsement of Wilson ' s offer, Burbank launched a committee of instruction 
in advanced mathematical economics composed by Wilson , Schumpeter and Crum at 
the beginning of 1933. Following Wilson ' s lead, the committee worked m 
conjunction with Huntington and William Graustein of the department of 
mathematics. Eventually, the committee supported the idea of establishing a program 
in advanced mathematical economics.6° For Wil son, the aim of such a program 
consisted of developing, through instruction , the necessary conditions so that young 
56 Idem . Wil son ' s 1934 paper on periodograms was probably an outcome of hi s course. 
57 H. Burbank to E. Wilson, Apr. 13, 1932 (idem). 
58 H. Burbank to E. Wilson, Oct. 29, 1932 (idem). 
59 E. Wilson to H . Burbank, Nov. 25, 1932 (idem). 
60 Report, Meeting of the Committee (Wi lson, Crum , Schumpeter) on Instruction in Mathematical 
Econom ies, Tuesday , April 18 (idem). 
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economists could learn how to use both mathematics and stati stics m order to 
modernize economics. In his own terms: 
" [W]e are tram mg economists not for the next 10 years but for their 
academic life and that the trend is such that a very considerable number 
of economists will have to be adequately familiar with both mathematical 
theory and statistical procedures 20 to 30 years from now."61 
Following the suggestions of the committee, the department established first an 
introductory course on mathematical economics. Schumpeter gave it during the 1933-
34 academic year. Wilson regarded that course as a temporary "proselyte" course, 
g iven by a leading economist, which would help introduce mathematics to the 
department. 62 
In March 1934, Wilson renewed his offer to Burbank of a more empirical course in 
statistics and another on advanced mathematical economics.63 Schumpeter, whose 
mathematical skills were not sophisticated enough for his introductory course, 
proposed Wilson to replace him . Wilson declined the offer. He had a more advanced 
course in mind. Looking for additional support, Wilson argued to Frank Taussig that 
the situation in mathematical economics was urgent. "Mathematical and statistical 
economics seem to me both to tend to get away from sound economic theory into 
mathematical or statistical manipulation. If they do this they can do more harm than 
good."64 Taussig agreed.65 
61 E. Wilson to W. L. Crum, May 1, 1933 (PEBW, 20). 
62 E . Wilson to H. Burbank, Apr. 12, 1934 (PEBW, 22). 
63 E. Wilson to H. Burbank, March 23 , 1934 (PEBW, 22). 
64 E. Wilson to F . Taussig, March 12, 1934 (PEBW, 20). They regul arly corresponded regarding 
advisory publishing questions of the Quarter/y Journal of Economies, of which Taussig was the editor. 
65 F. Taussig to E . Wilson , March 17, 1934 (PEBW , 24). 
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W i !son ' s activism for the establishment of a pro gram of mathematical econom ics was 
rewarded with the acceptance of "a more advanced course in Mathematical 
Economies-one which [would] fall within the range of [his] interest."66 The course 
was opened mainly for graduate students. Wilson ' s idea of alternating his courses 
was also accepted , but he should alternate yearly between a course on mathematical 
statistics and a course on mathematical economics, only. In respect to the latter, as 
written in the abstract of the course, Wilson wanted it to be a "systematic study of 
one or more of the classical formulations of economic theory in terms of mathematic 
symbols with collateral reading from writings of Marshall , Edgeworth, and others, 
who sometimes used the mathematical methods."67 
Once Wilson 's course was introduced in the list of courses at Harvard, Schumpeter 
thanked Wilson: 
"I want to say again how intensely grateful I feel to you for g1ving 
yourself to the subject and to the cause. You are the first eminent scientist 
to do so to this extent and if we shall be able to show results at Harvard 
and establish ourselves as one of the nurseries of economic thought in this 
field it will be your merit." (J. Schumpeter to E. Wilson, 24 May 1934. In 
Schumpeter 2000, 269) 
Moved by Schumpeter's kind words, Wilson replied , explaining how he understood 
the configuration of the established program. 
"As I see it, your job is to take people who don ' t know their mathematics 
and coach them along encouragingly until they shall be able to plug at 
specific aJticles in economics which use some mathematics, whereas my 
job is to [ ... ] encourage him who knows some mathematics to see that he 
can think in a connected mathematical fashion about his problems. [ . . . ] I 
66 H. Burbank to E. Wilson, March 30, 1934 (PEBW, 22) . 
67 E . Wilson to H. Burbank, May 17, 1932 (PEBW , 22). 
take it that your advanced courses in economic theory would be in many 
ways pleasanter for you to give if you could have students who could 
carry a mathematical argument, not merely follow one. On the other hand 
it would be tragic, it seems to me, if you had to give a lot of your time to 
teach them to follow a mathematical argument. They ought to have this 
language at their disposai when they corne to you so that they could 
concentrate on economics as such."68 
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During the 1934-35 academic year, Schumpeter and Wilson offered their respective 
courses on mathematical economics. Schumpeter' s course was well attended by 
students and by staff of the department (McCraw 2010), whereas Wilson ' s course, 
too difficult for average students, had fewer students. 
During the 1930s, Wilson became the pillar of mathematical economics at Harvard. 
With his permission, Schumpeter attended some of his lectures in 193669 and tn 
1937. 70 During the 1935-36 academic year, Wassily Leontief, who had arrived at 
Harvard also in 1932, replaced Schumpeter and taught the introductory course of 
mathematical economics. In 1936, Wilson offered his course on mathematical 
statistics. Back in 1933, he had helped Leontief with "certain mathematical problems 
which [he encountered in his] research on demand and supply."71 Until 1943, Wilson 
offered each one of these courses, alternating them every two years, while Leontief 
kept teaching the introductory mathematical course. 
68 E. Wilson to J . Schumpeter, May 29, 1934 (PEBW, 24) . 
69 J . Schumpeterto E. Wilson, Apr. 24, 1936 (PEBW, 27). 
70 J . Schumpeter to E . Wilson , May 19, 1937 (PEBW, 28). Tn the same vein, Mitchell acknowledged 
that he " never [saw] a piece of [Wilson ' s] work without envying the skill and the masterly restraint 
with which [he employed his] mathematical gifts and accomplishments" (W. Mitchell to E. Wilson, 
Dec. 2, 1932 [PEB W, 19]). 
71 W. Leontiefto E. Wilson , Feb. 3, 1933 (PEBW, 21) . 
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2.4.1. Harvard economics courses 
During the 1920s, Wilson had established a close relationship with Lawrence 
Henderson, who was then developing his ideas about stable equilibrium as applied to 
social science and economics.72 ln this spirit, Henderson invited Wilson to offer a talk 
on Pareto before the Royce Club, an interdisciplinary discussion group of which 
Henderson was the secretary. On March 25 , 1923, Wilson descriptively discussed 
Pareto 's mathematical economics; he explained that Paretian economics consisted of: 
" 1 °. Statics, which has to do with any unchanging economic 
configuration, with economic equilibrium. 2 °. Kinematics, which studies 
successive equilibria, and which is not yet well developed . 3°. Dynamics, 
which has to do with economic momentum, [and which] has not been 
developed at ail. [ ... ]. We have to study the desires or tastes of people, 
and the obstacles in the way of their satisfaction, and how the tastes and 
the obstacles combine into an economic equilibrium. We must proceed 
with a maximum of reality and measureableness."73 
ln his mathematical and statistical courses for economists, Wilson developed on these 
Paretian concerns. Over the years, he seemed to have changed the subjects that he 
covered in each of his lectures. Even though the material covered each year cannot be 
exactly established, his lectures can be approximately reconstructed in various 
complementary ways. For this purpose, use will be made of archivai material found 
in Wilson ' s, Lloyd Metzler 's74 and James Tobin ' s75 archives. Wilson ' s published 
papers in economics, his and others ' writings on dynamics and Gibbs 
thermodynamics will be of help, too . 
72 On Henderson and equilibrium in socia l science, see Russett 1966. 
73 Royce Club, PEBW, HUG4878.2 14, Box 1, Folder: Book reviews, letters to the Editor, p. 5. 
74 Metzler attended Wilson's course in mathematical economics, probably during the spring of 1939. 
75 Tobin attended Wilson 's course in mathematical econom ics du ring the sp ring of 1941 . 
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2.4.2. Mathematical Economies 
When Wilson was first preparing his 1935 course, he consulted Schumpeter, 
Burbank, Taussig at Harvard as well as Roos and Mitchell as to the most relevant 
material and work to be covered. Wilson believed that Marshall ' s mathematical 
appendices were "scrappy" and that Griffith Evans, in his Mathematical Introduction 
for Economies (1930), did not "study broad problems or at any rate [ did not] give the 
student a broad point of view as to the applicability of the mathematical method. He 
seems to treat the whole subject as a series of rather minor problems thus catering to 
the American students great failure, namely, of being a clever solver of insignificant 
problems."76 
Wilson thought he would develop on the works of Cournot, Walras, Pareto, Bowley, 
Edgeworth, Marshall , Evans and Fisher, and that if he had time, he would also caver 
the most modern papers by Roos, Frisch and Schultz. 77 In 1935, Wilson introduced78 
the course by covering Arthur Bowley ' s The Mathematical Groundwork of 
Economies (1924). In subsequent years, he seemed to have only mentioned here and 
there Bowley ' s work. 
In Wilson ' s archives, two full folders titled Notes on Economies contain what seem to 
be the undated notes that Wilson used when preparing bis lectures in mathematical 
econom ics. In the first folder, the material relates to Wilson ' s interpretation and 
mathematical exposition of extant literature on tapies mainly related to consumer 
theory. ln the second folder, the material shows Wilson ' s presentation of physical 
systems in stable equilibrium, which he eventually used , as analogy, to re-defining 
76 E. Wilson to F. Taussig, May 17, 1934, (PEBW, 24). On Evans ' s mathematical economics, see 
Weintraub 1998. 
77 E. Wilson to C. Roos, Oct. 6, 1934 (PEBW, 23). 
78 E. Wilson to J. D. Black, July 14, 1936 (PEBW, 26) . 
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the notion of consumer stable equilibrium.79 Over the years, Wilson complemented 
his lectures, leaving however a rather disordered track of this evolution in his folders. 
Based in certain documents found in these folders and in other archives, some 
conjectures can be made regarding the course. 
According to the separation into two distinct folders , it can be the case that Wilson 
divided the course into two main sections. As for the evolution of the course, it must 
be the case that in 1935, the first time that the course was given , emphasis was laid on 
material found in the first fol der, as Wilson certainly limited himself to discuss extant 
mathematical economics in connection to consumer theory; it must also be the case 
that in 1937, and probably in 1939, Wilson ' s focus was rather on the mechanical 
analogy. By then, Wilson had contributed to A Commenta,y on the scientific writings 
of J. Willard Gibbs with a paper on Gibbs ' lectures on thermodynamics (Wilson 
1936) and had probably had the time to explore more in detail the analogy with 
consumer theory. Consistent with this conjecture, Schumpeter, who attended some of 
the 1937 lectures, "was strongly impressed with the immense value to the economists 
of such lectures [ on theoretical mechan ics or physics] as [given] in the first part of the 
course."80 Also, in the second folder, in one of the various sets of sheets (numerated 
with roman numbers), Wilson first developed static, kinematic and thermodynamic 
equilibria (1-XX); then, on this basis, he described first the consumer stable 
equilibrium analogically to the physical equilibrium, and only then he discussed 
consumer theory, as found in extant mathematical economics literature.81 ln 1941 , 
and probably in 1943, Wilson developed on questions of independence-substitution-
complementary in consumption as well as of Pareto ' s law of income distribution and 
briefly talked about thermodynamics in economics. This time, Wilson presented the 
79 Wilson probably felt that the analogy was not arbitrary, first, because he regarded, with Henderson, 
the concept of consumer' s stable equilibrium as being intuitive, and second, because he did not use 
probability. 
80 J. Schumpeter to E. Wilson , May 19, 1937 (PEBW, 28) 
81 E. Wilson , otes on Economies, PEBW, KUG4878 .214, 1. 
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materia l as a sort of critical response to Harold T. Dav is's The Theory of 
Econometrics (1 941 ); Wil son suggested then that Dav is' stati sti cal inference 
methods, when dealing w ith time series, were not yet opt imal.82 
As fo r the content, in the section of the course where he interpreted the theory of the 
consumer, as he fo und it in contemporary literature, Wil son talked about 
maximization of utility fun ctions w ith two and multiple variables under budgetary 
constra int, the marginal utility of money, demand fu nctions in the sense of Walras, 
Pareto, Marshall and Hicks as well as the connection between ut ili ty and demand 
fu nctions. 
At some po int in the course, Wil son quoted Henry Schultz ' s Theory of Measurement 
of Demand (1 93 8, 10- 12) and mentioned, in passing, the de-finition of the operati onal 
method as interpreted by Percy Bridgman (1 927) and by Schultz himself. 83 Wil son' s 
publi shed papers in economics would have emerged from thi s part of hi s lectures. 84 In 
thi s way it can be argued that in thi s section of the course, over the years, Wil son 
covered the bas ic elements that would help him offer a Generalization of Pareto 's 
Demand Theorem (1935), some compari sons between Pareto's and Marshall 's laws 
of demand (1939; 1943), some mathematica l inconsistenc ies fo und in extant 
economics li terature such as in Hicks ' theory of value (1944a), some di scussions on 
utili ty functi ons ( 1944b) and ut ility indexes (1946) as well as some comments on 
substitution (1944a) and complementarity (1945) in consumption. Production seemed 
to have been out of the sy llabus. 
82 JTP, 7, Fo lder "Ec 104b E.B . Wil son", p. 204-6. 
83 E. Wil son, Notes on Economies, PEBW, HUG4878 .2 14, 1. W ilson c learly identified with such 
ideas, which, in his own terms, had been centra l fo r hi s foundationa l discuss ions. See chapter l. 
84 As Wi lson ex plained to Tauss ig, edi tor of the Quarterly Journa l of Economies, when submitting his 
firs t paper to the Harvard Journal, Gerhard T intner and Nicho las Georgescu-Roegen, who attended his 
1935 course in mathemati cal economi cs, had to ld him that some of the developments that he offered 
were actually orig ina l (E. Wil son to F. Tauss ig , March 28, 1935 [PE BW, 26]) . S imilarly, he " dug out 
some notes of [hi s] course" to write hi s 1944 Hicks on Pe,fect Substitutes (E. W il son to P . Samuelson, 
Nov. 29, 1943 [PASP, 77]). 
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ln the section of the course where he developed on the mechanica l analogy (second 
fo lder), Wil son ta lked about equilibrium of a mechanica l system and osc illati ons 
leading to it; he described the characteri stics of a stable equilibrium and presented the 
Le Chatelier Principle as interpreted by Jean Bapt iste Perrin ' s Traité de Chim;e 
Phys;que ( 1903, 188), as a princ iple of stabili ty of equilibrium in the case of 
infi ni tes imal changes of a parameter. Wil son then covered the theory of 
therm odynamical equilibrium, including the phase systems of Will ard Gibbs, 
:'uggesting that it could be studied as a static, time-independent problem.85 He also 
underlined that stable equilibrium requi red some inequa liti es that he precisely 
defi ned, in both discrete and continuous cases. Fo llowing these lines of thought, he 
then presented the consumer maximization as a static time-independent problem, and 
so lved it in the di screte case, stable equilibrium of which also required certain 
discrete inequa lities. He then so lved it in the continuous case, suggesting that the 
di screte and continuous cases were equivalent; the form er was more general and less 
abstract, fo r it did not require derivative calculus. 
W ilson developed consumer equilibriu m explic itly ana logically to the 
thermodynamic equilibrium assert ing that there were some similarities. F irst, in both 
complex systems, the analys is resul ted fro m an assumed extremum pos ition; second, 
both systems "must always be c losed"86 and , third , in both systems some inequaliti es, 
w hi ch were ca ll ed by Wil son the Gibbs condit ions, characterized the stat ic stable 
equilibriurn pos ition. Such inequalities resulted from an optimization under constra int 
p roblern , which was so lved at a il t imes, not over time, since "With ti me introduced, 
everyone recogn izes that preferences change."87 
85 Wil son ' s Gibbs' lectures on thermodynamics (1936) probably illustrate the kind of insight about the 
G ibbs' mathematical sty le that he gave during hi s lectures to economists. 
86 LMP, 7, Fo lder Econ-theory : Harvard courses Notes 1938- 1939, W il son p. 6. 
87 JTP, 7, Folder "Ec 104b E. B. Wi lson," p. 187. 
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The novelty of such analysis relatively to extant (Pareto) mathematical economics, 
Wilson argued, resided in the more general aspect of his study, which was made 
"with finite differences [rather] than [only] with derivatives."88 In this vein, after 
providing a proof of Lagrange multipliers, Wilson explained in one of his lectures: 
"Originally, calcul us developed from considerations of finite differences, 
and formulas were derived by neglecting power terms of finite 
differences."89 
Wilson did not cover dynamical systems in connection with business cycles analysis 
in his course on mathematical economics. He felt that applicability of the different 
working hypotheses found in the treatment of dynamical systems in physics to deal 
with the aggregate economic system was not self-evident and required further study.90 
There was not yet a satisfactory postulational foundation for business cycles, nor a 
sound correspondence between business data and economic theory of cycles, he 
thought. Before pretending to control the economy, Wilson claimed, economists 
needed to establish whether or not stabilization policies stabilized or not the system 
through time.91 
Such work, Wilson argued , should be done simultaneously in the spirit of Pareto ' s 
mathematical economics and Mitchell ' s institutional statistics. It can be conjectured 
that with such a Pareto-Mitchell approach , Wilson aimed at developing something 
intermediate that would counterweight Frisch ' s structuralist econometrics and 
Davis ' s Theo,y of Econometrics (1941) when dealing with business cycles, without 
embracing directly Mitchell ' s approach . Such study was necessary, Wilson argued, 
88 LMP, 7, Folder Econ-theory : Harvard courses Notes 1938-1939, Wil son p. 1 O. 
89 JTP, 7, Folder "Ec 104b E. B. Wilson ," p.177. 
90 E. Wil son to W. Mitchell , Nov. 16, 1936 (PEBW, 27). 
91 E . Wilson to 1. Fisher, May 25 , 1932 (PEBW, 18). 
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because sound fiscal , public finance, monetary and price policies were needed . 
Wilson seems even to have written a draft on the subject. In this draft, as he 
summarized it to Burbank, he argued that there was an urgent need of a better 
definition of national incarne to better understand the effects of spending large 
fractions of national incarne through governmental expenses. He suggested also 
studying rigidities created thereby, the relation between public and private credit, the 
possibility of a compensatory mechanism for business cycles as well as deficit 
financing and debt retirement.92 By explaining to Burbank that Alvin Hansen, who 
was appointed at Harvard in 1937, agreed with him on these matters, Wilson was 
certain that this sort of study was 
"a job that is going to make a real reputation for somebody and will 
ultimately become Jam sure the central feature of our school if the school 
maintains the kind of intellectual level that we want to have it maintain . 
There is a dreadful lot of statistical work that ought to be done in 
following up the study of this problem. [ ... ]. I found we have to do an 
awful lot of preliminary statistical work in the public health and 
epidemiological fields and I don ' t see why we should not have to in the 
economic field if we try to handle the real problems of practical 
importance in an effective way."93 
On November 1938 Wilson consulted Schumpeter for suggestions for his courses and 
insisted: 
92 E. Wil son to H . Burbank, May 14, 1937 [PEBW, 28). Wil son was familiar with Keynes ' work on 
money , which he regarded as brilliant but purely theoretical and inapplicable in reality (E. Wilson to 
Snyder, Sept. 19, 1934 [PEBW, 24]), but was familiar only with some criticisms of Keynes ' s The 
Genera/ Theory (1936). 
93 E. Wilson to H. Burbank, May 14, 1937 (idem). 
"I can in any way carry part of the load of the teaching of mathematical 
economics on the more mathematical side I shall be very happy."94 
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Wilson ' s comments led to a meeting on December between Wilson and Leontief to 
coordinate the program in mathematical economics. Wilson then reported to Burbank 
that Leontief: 
"suggests that I take up dynamical economics (which he doesn ' t touch at 
ail except perhaps by implication) on the background of the texts and 
other writings of C.F. Roos and of Tinbergen who has recently published 
a 73 page monograph by Herman in Paris entitled an Econometric 
Approach to Business Cycle problems and who has further contributions 
in various journals particularly econometric and the Giornal Degli 
Economisti." 95 
If Wilson ' s report were taken seriously, to coordinate the program of mathematical 
economics, Leontief would have encouraged Wilson to cover dynamical economics 
to deal with business cycles.96 
2.4.3. Topics in Statistical Theory 
Over the years, in his statistical course, Wilson focused increasingly on mathematical 
stat istics rather than on actual data analysis. Privately, he titled his course 
Mathematical Statistics, as the 1938 notes of hi s course by one of his (unknown) 
students attested. 97 
94 E. Wilson to J. Schumpeter, Oct. 4, 1938 (PEBW, 3 1 ). 
95 E. Wilson to H. Burbank, Dec. 20, 1938, emphasis added (PEBW, 30) . 
96 E. Wilson to H. Burbank, Dec. 20, 1938 (PEBW, 30). 
97 E. Wilson, Notes on Mathematica/ Statistics, PEBW, HUG4878 .2 l 4, 2. 
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I!1 the course, contemporary works in mathematical statistics that developed on 
probability were not actually covered; he was rather critical of them, going so far as 
to "wonder if [the modern concept of probability] has something to do with 
statistics," rather than with pure mathematics. 98 ln the same vein, in the 1930s, 
despite believing that Ronald Fisher was the leading statistician of his time, he had a 
"suspicion that he belongs essentially to the group which considers it more important 
to apply formulae just on ultra refined mathematical considerations than to the group 
who consider it of the greatest importance to examine carefully how in fact the data 
do behave and to adapt their statistical methods as simply as possible to the 
material." 99 The latter group, he suggested , was composed by those of the 
Scandinavian school, namely J0rgen P . Gram, Thorvald N . Thiele, Carl V. Charlier, 
and Wilhelm Lexis, whom statistics, Wilson argued, had influenced John Maynard 
Keynes when writing his Treatise on Probabihty. 100 
In his course of 1938, Wilson ' s general aim consisted of providing tools in analysis 
and probability lying behind sample theory to estimate parameters and fitting 
frequency functions. The emphasis on calculus and lag operators was evident and the 
references to Wilson ' s Advanced Calculus (1911 a) and Edmund Taylor Whitaker and 
G. Robinson ' s 1924 The Calculus of Observations numerous. In the first chapter, 
Wilson discussed operators; he introduced them as the fundamental basis of analysis. 
In the same section, Wilson dealt with difference equations and developed on the 
Taylor Series, among other formulas of approximation. In the second chapter, Wilson 
covered gradation , which was Wilson ' s contemporary term to talk about curve fitting 
and other smoothing techniques. ln the third chapter, Wilson discussed sample 
98 E. Wilson to F. Mills, Oct. 30, 1935 (PEBW, 25). 
99 E . Wilson to F. Mills, May 28, 1938 (PEBW, 31). 
100 E. Wilson to A. Fisher, Jan . 3 1, 1924 (PEBW , 6). Wilson believed that Keynes had offered the best 
postulational foundations of probability , although his Treatise remained largely unsati sfactory (Wilson 
1923b) . 
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theory, introducing it by stating that a "desirable, but not yet attained, sample theory 
would be one that was independent of the form of the universe from which the 
sample was drawn" (p .52). He then presented the theory of moments as well as 
certain distribution functions. In the fourth chapter, Wilson talked about ways of 
approximating (asymptotically) probability distributions by discussing the Gram-
Charlier series: the series, he explained, "has to converge to have a meaning" (p.76), 
the faster the better. In the following chapters, after discussing logarithm transforms, 
Wilson covered the method of maximum likelihood. Wilson closed the course with a 
brief comment on interpolation, namely on how to construct a curve or a function 
from a finite number of discrete points or values of a given variable, with an example 
on population. 
Wilson believed that his course was "not of very great advantage to a person who 
works with actual statistical material ;" 101 first because he mainly emphasized 
analytical statistics, and second, because he did not discuss statistical inference. The 
emphasis of the course and the absence of inference were probably due to the fact that 
Wilson felt that a taxonomy of the dynamics of the aggregate economic system as 
found in business cycles based on postulational thinking was first needed; such an 
approach was coherent with his emphasis on analytical statistics. In the 1940s, 
Wilson still believed that "a set of postulates, within which our concepts can have 
logical meaning, [ .. . ] for probability theory lying behind statistics" 102 was missing. 
His analytical statistics appeared therefore to be a discrete alternative to the 
econometric movement, developed for and presented only in Harvard cJassrooms. 
Wilson 's lasting influence in economics was most of ail embodied in the work of one 
of bis students who attended both of his Harvard courses: Samuelson, who 
10 1 E . Wilson to J. Schumpeter, May 30, 1936 (PEBW, 27). 
102 JTP, 7, Folder "Ec 104b E.B . Wilson", p. 158 . 
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acknowledged Wil son' s great influence on hi s thes is and his subsequently famous 
Foundations of Economfo Analysis. 103 
2.5 . Conclusion 
As Samuelson pointed out m the quotation openmg this chapter, Wil son knew 
everything and everybody. He successfull y promoted the "no man' s land" of inter-
di sciplinari ty in America. Wil son was a communi ty builder. He significantly 
contributed to the connecti on of the communiti es of mathemati c ians and scienti sts 
with the community of economists. At a specific moment in time, he created the 
necessary institu tiona l support w ithin legitimate scientific communiti es for the 
establi shment of a community of mathematical economists in the United States . 
Wil son's punctu a l support enabled A merican mathematical economists to hold the 
scientific label w ith legit imacy, a legit imacy, which they did not yet have in 
departments of economics at the ir univers ities. Concomitant ly, he was centra l fo r the 
Ameri can ori gins of the Econometric Soc iety. 
At Harvard , at a more local level, he establi shed the first program in mathemati cal 
economics. W ith hi s Mathematical Economies and Mathematical Statistics courses, 
Wilson wanted to connect economics w ith data, while developing much economics 
with little mathematics. For Wil son, this idea implied develop ing modern economics 
as a compromise, as a ba lance between past and present contributions in economics 
and between a certain theoretical emphas is, as offered by Pareto's and F isher' s 
mathematical economi cs, and a certa in empirica l emphas is, as developed by the 
Ameri can institutionali st tradition that focused on statistical economics, of whi ch 
Mitchell was a worthy representati ve. Wil son thought that hi s attitude towards 
mathematica l and stati sti cal economics embodi ed Gibbs' truly American attitude 
103 On Wil son' s infl uence on Samuelson's thes is (194 1a) and Foundations of Economie Ana fysis 
( 194 7), See chapter 111 of the present thes is. See also Backhouse 20 15; Forthcom ing . 
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towards mathematics and science; it emphasized the relevance of mathematical 
reasoning while suggesting that shared intuitions in a subject matter prevailed over 
mathematical and theoretical structures; it focused on analytical statistics rather than 
on pure probability theory, as Frisch and his contemporary econometricians, Wilson 
felt, tended to do . In this spirit, Wilson offered , in his courses at Harvard , a possible 
alternative to econometrics, as it was being developed around 1940, without arguing 
that the solution to quantitative economics was merely to be found in Mitchell 's 
work, which lacked mathematical rigor according to Wilson. In his courses, with 
Henderson, Wilson also presented the notion of equilibrium as intuitive and defined 
it in discrete terms. 
Wilson ' s lasting influence 111 economics was most of ail embodied at a persona! 
level , as his ideas about mathematics and statistics significantly influenced 
Samuelson, who eventually wrote Foundations of Economie Analysis within a 
Wilsonian frarnework. 
In the last analysis, if grounded on his attitude, Wilson thought, modern economics 
could eventually serve to control and plan the economy. Modern econornics would 
eventually yield to modern society , and vice versa. 
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CHAPTER III 
EDWIN B. WILSON, MORE THAN A CATALYTIC INFLUENCE FOR PAUL 
SAMUELSON ' S FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANAL YSIS 
3.2. Introduction 1 
On November 2i11 1940, Edwin Bidwell Wilson acted as chairman of the Examining 
Committee at Paul Samuelson ' s thesis defense along with Joseph Schumpeter and 
Overton Taylor at Harvard University2. For Samuelson ' s defense, Wilson wanted a 
large part of the staff of the Department to attend the examination because he rated 
Samuelson ' s work as summa cum laude, but knew that he was biased. In his words: 
" I may be prejudiced. I find in [these] developments [of Samuelson ' s 
thesis] of a great many things I suggested in my lectures on mathematical 
1 
carvaja5 @gmail.com. I am thankful to Roger Backhouse, Nicolas Giocoli and Robert Leonard for 
their helpful comments on this chapter. The usual caveat applies. I am also grateful to archivists of the 
Harvard University Archives (HUA), of the David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library at 
Duke University (DU). Papers of Edwin Bidwell Wilson (PEBW) were consulted at HUA, 
HUG4878 .203 (indicated if different), Paul A. Samuelson Papers (PASP) and Lloyd Metzler Papers 
(LMP) were consulted at DU. James Tobin Papers (JTP) can be consulted at Yale University Library . 
ln the following chapter, the number of the boxes in which the relevant material was consulted will 
follow the respective collection. 
2 E. Wilson to E . Chamberlain , 22 Nov. 1940, (PEBW, 34). 
economics in 1936 (] believe). I said at the time that I had not the 
opportunity to develop this line of thought to the perfection which I 
should deem essential if I were to publish about it but that I was throwing 
it out to any interested persons in the class. Samuelson has followed 
almost ail the leads J gave besicles a great many things that I never 
mentioned."3 
95 
ln October 1940 just after leaving Harvard for the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Samuelson had written to Wilson as follows: 
"1 should like [ ... ] to express, however inadequately, what I feel to be my 
debt to your teachings. I think I have benefitted from your suggestions, 
perhaps more than from anyone else in recent years, and even chance 
remarks which you have let fait concerning Gibbs's thermodynamical 
systems have profoundly altered my views in corresponding fields of 
economics."4 
Subsequently, Samuelson expanded his thesis into a manuscript that became 
FoundatÏOns of Economie Analysis (1947). Following the publication of his book, 
Samuelson wrote again to Wilson: 
3 Idem. 
"Ever since my book came out, I have been meaning to write to you to 
express its indebtedness to your lectures. In fact, the key to the whole 
work suddenly came to me in the middle of one of your lectures on 
Gibbs ' s thermodynamics where you pointed out that certain finite 
inequalities were not laws of phys ics or economics, but immediate 
consequences of an assumed extremum position. From then on , it became 
simply a matter of exploration and refinement. "5 
4 P. Samuelson to E. Wilson , 9 Oct. 1940 (PEBW, 35). 
5 P. Samuelson to E. Wilson, 20 Jan . 1948 (PASP, 77) . 
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* * * 
Wilson was an American polymath who played a central role in the constitution of an 
American community of mathematical economists around 1930 and in the origins of 
the Econometric Society. He promoted and established a program of mathematical 
and statistical economics during the 1930s at the department of economics at 
Harvard, where Samuelson conducted his graduate studies between 1935 and 1940.6 
Late in his life, Samuelson acknowledged that he "was perhaps [Wilson's] only 
disciple" (Samuelson 1998, 1376). 
Wilson 's " importance to Samuelson and hence to Foundations cannot be overstated" 
(Backhouse 2015, 331). ln this chapter, certain aspects of this importance are 
examined. By regarding Foundations from the perspective of Samuelson's active 
commitment to Wilson, as regards mathematics, statistics and science, this chapter 
sheds new I ight on Samuelson ' s early mathematical econom ics. 
Samuelson's commitment to Wilson was manifest at various levels. First, Wilson ' s 
foundational ideas provided a unifying basis for the different parts of Samuelson's 
thesis and Foundations. The projects on which Samuelson worked during his doctoral 
years, sorne of which composed the thesis, were rather disparate; in the thesis and in 
Foundations, however, Samuelson presented the different chapters as a unified 
comprehensive whole, which he thought could serve as new scientific foundations for 
economics. Such perceived unity was precisely based on Wilson 's ideas, which were 
embodied in the mottos that abound in Samuelson ' s thesis and Foundations , such as 
" mathematics is a language," "operational meaningful theorems," and " useful" 
knowledge. 
Second, Wilson ' s foundational ideas were also significantly influential in the way 
Samuelson dealt, in the thesis and in Foundations, with the study of the econorny as a 
6 See chapter TI. 
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system in stable equilibrium, treating separately and connectedly, depending on the 
emphasis of the analysis, the microeconomic and the macroeconomic levels of the 
system. More particularly, Wilson ' s thought influenced the way Samuelson framed a 
certain number of theoretical concerns. Through his ideas about how economists 
should mathematically define a position of stable equilibrium, Wilson was 
particularly important to Samuelson ' s consumer theory, cost and production theory as 
well as dynamics. For Wilson, mathematical economics based only on marginal and 
differential calculus was empirically empty, as the formulas that were developed 
within these frameworks were defined by abstract, because continuous, relationships. 
For Wilson, the discrete was more general than the continuous; the discrete was also 
more cogent with data. Furthermore, since Wilson believed that calculus had emerged 
as an abstraction of the study of the discrete, he assumed that without Joss of 
generality correspondences between the discrete and the continuous could be 
established. 
Precisely, the most important of Samuelson's Wilsonian concem in the thesis, and 
therefore in Foundations, consisted of establishing correspondences between the 
continuous and the discrete, in order to translate the mathematics of the continuous, 
used in standard contemporary economics procedures of optimization and in the 
treatment of dynamical systems, into formulas of discrete magnitudes. Extant 
statistical methods for the treatment of economic data, both Wilson and Samuelson 
felt, remained unsatisfactory and arbitrary. In Samuelson ' s early work, the local and 
the discrete-in surn the observable in idealized conditions-provided the best way 
of operationalizing marginal and differential calculus in economics. The discrete 
resonated intuitively with data; the continuous did not. From this Wilsonian 
perspective, Foundations appears not only to be an exercise in mathematical 
economics, but also and unexpectedly, an exercise in mathematical statistics, based 
on observable, not observed, data. 
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In the following pages, the master and the disciple will be first brietly introduced. 
Secondly, we will show how Wilson framed and limited Samuelson ' s doctoral thesis, 
being particularly influential in three dimensions: the introductory chapters; the 
microeconomic level of the system; and the aggregate level of the system. Lastly, 
Wilson ' s influence on Samuelson's expansions of the thesis leading to FoundatÏons 
will be discussed, showing how he contributed to the development of the most 
mathematically and statistically oriented parts of such expansions. 
3.3. The master and the disciple 
3.2.1. Edwin Bidwell Wilson 
Wilson was born in 1879, in Hartford, Connecticut. Educated in the school that bis 
father directed , he was then trained as mathematician at Harvard University, Yale 
University and at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris around 1900. Wilson 
subsequently became one of the " most active" members among the American 
research community of modern mathematicians during the first decade of the 1900s 
(Fenster and Parshall 1994). He, however, gradually marginalized himself from that 
community, disavowing the influence that David Hilbe1t ' s German structuralist 
mathematics 7 was then exerting on his American colleagues 8 and concomitantly 
committing to the traditional applied American mathematics that Josiah Willard 
Gibbs, his mentor at Yale, practiced. Wilson ' s career illustrates this process of 
marginalization , and corollary process of incursion into other fields. First, in 1907, he 
became associate professor of mathematical physics at Massachusetts Jnstitute of 
Technology (MIT). Second, in 1922, he accepted the chairmanship of the department 
of vital statistics at the newly founded Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH), 
7 See Wilson 1903d. On Hilbert ' s structuralist mathematics, see Carry 2004a; Carry 2004b. 
8 On the development of modern mathematics around 1900 in United States of America see (Parshall 
and Rowe 1994). 
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opening the door to hi s incursion into socia l science and economics. In paralle l 
spheres, since 19 14, when the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 
(PNAS) was launched, Wil son served as managing editor of this journal until the end 
of hi s li fe in 1964.9 
The task that Wilson gave himsel f in ail the above-mentioned academic involvements 
consisted of fostering and establi shing lasting connections between mathematics and 
different subj ect matters, follow ing hi s Gibbsian mathematics.10 
At Harvard , beginning in 1932, Wil son started teaching mathematical statistics to 
economists; with Joseph Schumpeter' s endorsement, he then began lecturing on 
mathematical economics in 1935. In the latter course, Wil son presented mathematical 
economics analogica lly to Gibbs' s thermodynamics. From 1935 until 1943, he gave 
each of the last two courses alternative ly every two years. Wil son aimed hi s 
instruction in economics at protecting students from what he di sdainfully regarded as 
the beauty of pure theoretical treati ses in econom ics 11 and pure mathematics and pure 
mathematica l stati stics. 12 Wilson thought that students of economics, by learning 
Gibbs's kind of mathematics, would learn how to behave in a scientific way . 
9 On Wilson' biography, see Hunsaker and Mac Lane 1973. 
10 On Wil son' s attitude towards math emati cs, see chapter 1. 
11 Wilson deeply di sdained some of Maynard Key nes ', Irv ing Fisher's and Joseph Schumpeter's work, 
where in they addressed, he fe lt, the question of contro lling and planning the economy as if economics 
had already attained a respectfu l scient ific level. ln general terms, Wil son' s rejectio n of th ese 
theoretical eco nomists ' work refl ected his aversion of scientific approaches based on uni versalizing 
principles, whi ch he thought, had an ex istence, only, in th e mind of those who developed them. ln th e 
same way, he abhorred Hilbert 's structu ralist approach in mathemati cs, which, he thought, was only 
concerned with the elegance of mathemati cal structures. Rather than developing on structural and 
universalizing ideas, Wil son preferred to develop conventional working hypotheses conveni ent fo r 
so lving specifi c and concrete (theoreti ca l or empiri cal) problems at hand . His approach, he fe lt, was 
more rea listic and useful , as it supposedly remained constantly constrained by phenomena of the real 
world . ln addition to thi s epi stemolog ica l po int of di sagreement, around 1930, Wi lson di sliked 
Keynes ' s and F isher' s interventioni st atti tud e regarding economic policy . See chapter 1. 
12 At its begi nn ings, Wilson was involved with the econometric movement. With hi s leadership in 
Section K of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, he significantly contri buted to 
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3.2.2. Paul Samuelson 
Samuelson was born in 1915, in Gary, Indiana. H is parents were both Jewish Poli sh 
immigrants; he grew up in the " nineteenth century Protestant cul ture of the rura l 
Middl e West." 13 During the First World War, the family prospered thanks to their 
owning a drug store. In the early 1920s, the family moved to Chicago, where 
Samuelson would later attend Hyde Park High School. 
The family's drug store and the arithm etic problems, with which the famil y was 
confro nted in the preparation of drugs and in econom ic p rice-cost p roj ections, 
probably awoke, at a young age, Samuelson' s interests in mathemat ics and 
economics. ln high schoo l, Samuelson attended extra-curricular mathemati cal 
courses, 
14 in which he was tra ined in co ll ege mathematics (S hoesmi th 1916) . Hyde 
Park High Schoo l was located near the University of Chi cago, where Samuelson went 
to college between 1932 and 1935. He majored in economics, white taking a 
significant number of mathemati ca l co ll ege courses. He performed exceptionally 
well ; hi s excellent results all owed him to obtain a newly created pre-doctora l 
scholarship given by the Socia l Sc ience Research Counc il (SSRC), awarded only to 
eight of the most promising students in economics in the country in 1935. 15 
With hi s SSRC scho larship, Samuelson was able to free ly choose a graduate program 
in economics, with a il expenses covered. He went to Harvard . During the summer 
the estab li shment of the 1930s American communi ty of mathematical and statistica l economists who 
subseq uent ly played an active ro le as econometric ians. Rapidly, the project turn ed toward High 
Econome/ries (Louça 2007) under the lead of Ragnar Fri sch ' s structuralist econometri cs, whi ch 
Wilson regarded as an ex pression of the European tendency towards pure abstract ion and pure 
theori es. Frisch ' s structura list approach, fo r Wil son, did not correspond to G ibbs ' s truly scientific 
attitud e. Frisch laid too much emphas is on probability theory, whi ch, fo r Wil son, lacked empirica l 
truth (E . Wilson to F. M ill s, 30 Oct. 1935 [PEBW, 25)) . 
13 Auto-biographi cal pieces (PASP, 149, Folder Unpubli shed Writings, Chapter 1. p. 1 ) . 
14 See Barnett and Samuelson 2004 . 
15 Auto-biographi cal pieces (PASP, 149, Folder Unpublished Writings, Chapter 2). 
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before arnvmg 111 New England, he took a course in differential equations. The 
training that he had received at Chicago, as Samuelson recalled, made his Harvard 
classwork relatively easy and let him focus on his mathematical interests. 16 During 
the 1935-1936 academic year, Samuelson took, in particular, Leontiefs Price 
Analysis course, and Wilson ' s course on Mathematical Statistics. 
During the spring of 1936, Samuelson did well in Wilson ' s course, without obtaining 
the best mark of the group. Wilson regretted that Samuelson was too concerned with 
his qualifying examinations and did not concentrate on the course. 17 Samuelson 
impressed Wilson though. As he wrote to Henderson, when recommending 
Samuelson as a Junior Fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows (HSF), Wilson 
believed : 
"one of the most brilliant young men in political economy whom I have 
ever met is Samuelson. [ . . . ] I had him in my course in mathematical 
statistics and he was the most original and inquisitive of ail the 
students." 18 
During the summer of 1936, Samuelson took a course on the theory of equations, 
where linear matrix equations were treated , at the University of Wisconsin 
(Backhouse 2015). During the following spring, Samuelson attended Wilson ' s course 
on mathematical economics. The course was difficult, but Samuelson was 
mathematically well-trained, and as he later recalled , Leontief s course also prepared 
him to digest Wilson ' s more advanced material (Samuelson 2004). 
In 1937, Samuelson was elected Junior Fellow of the HSF. The membership came 
with a comfortable scholarship, and also with the restriction that he could not work 
16 Idem. 
17 E. Wilson to J. Schumpeter, 6 June 1936 (PEBW, 27). 
18 E. Wil son to L. Henderson , 12 Jan. 1937 (PEBW , 28) . 
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towards obtaining a higher degree. Presumably following this rule, during his 
doctoral years, Samuelson did not work to complete a comprehensive and well-
constructed thesis. Between 1937 and 1940, instead, he conducted research and wrote 
an important number of papers, not all published, on consumer theory, cost and 
production theory, capital and investment theory, business cycles, population 
dynamics, international trade and welfare economics, as well as comparative statics 
and dynamics. In order to fulfill the requirements of the department of economics and 
to graduate, however, in 1940, Samuelson took some of his fellowship projects, put 
them together, added three introductory chapters and a mathematical appendix, and 
submitted a thesis, defended in November 1940. 
"You did a fine job at your doctor ' s examination," 19 Wilson wrote Samuelson soon 
after the defense. Concerned about career opportunities for Samuelson, Wilson was 
then actively supporting Samuelson ' s thesis to be considered, as soon as possible, for 
the David A. Wells Prize,20 which was awarded to Samuelson in 1942.2 1 
3.3. The commitment: the thesis 
Samuelson titled his thesis Foundations of Analytical Economies: The Observational 
Signifzcance of Economie Theo,y (1941 a). The disse1tation had nine chapters and a 
mathematical appendix. The first three chapters were introductory; from the fourth to 
the seventh chapters, Samuelson analyzed optimizing behavior of the firm first 
( chapter four) and then, in three chapters, of the consumer. In the last two chapters, 
Samuelson studied stability conditions of equilibrium of aggregate economic systems, 
first emphasizing comparative statics and then focusing on dynamics and its more 
19 E. Wilson to P. Samuelson 14 Jan . 1941 (PASP, 77). 
20 E. Wilson to E. Cham berlain , 20 Nov. 1940 (PEBW, 34). Wilson wanted the conditions ofeligibility 
for the award to be changed in such a way that Samuelson cou Id apply in 1940, despite the fact that hi s 
thesis was defended at the end of the year. 
2 1 See Backhouse 20 15, 13 . 
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formai aspects. In the mathematical appendix, Samuelson covered maximization, 
especially quadratic fo rms.22 
As it w ill be di scussed in the first point of thi s section, Wil son was key regarding 
Samuelson's introductory chapters; in them, Samuelson extensively used Wil son' s 
G ibbsian ideas about mathemati cs, stati stics and science in order to present the 
di ffe rent and somehow di sparate parts of the thesis as a comprehensive whole, whi ch 
could supposedly serve as new foundations of economics. At the same time, the 
chapters that Samuelson inc luded in hi s thesis corresponded well to the doctora l 
projects on w hich Wil son had had the most signifi cant influence. The last two points 
of thi s section will explore such influence on theoretica l concern s, which eventua lly 
led Samuelson to treat as distinct, but interconnected, the individual and the aggregate 
levels of the economy, regarded as a system.23 
Before di scuss ing these three po ints, it must be emphasized that the first in stant iation 
of Samuelson' s commitment to Wil son in matters of mathematics, stati sti cs and 
sc ience appeared in the opening page of the thesis, where he wrote: "Mathematics is a 
Language." Samuelson attributed, rightly or wrong ly, thi s motto to Gibbs,24 legacy of 
whom was transmitted to him by Wil son, who prec isely defin ed mathemati cs as a soit 
of language. For Wil son , mathematics as a language implied two main ideas, whi ch 
Samuelson probabl y wanted to evoke, and which set the spirit of the thesis since its 
openmg page. 
22 ln hi s d issertation, Samuelson d id not include cap ita l and investment theory, international trade and 
welfare economics . 
23 Lawrence Henderson, a Harvard physio logist, had developed on the notion of systems in equilib ri um 
for the study of the fu nctioning of society (Russett 1966) . W il son and Henderson had worked hand-i n-
hand during the 1920s and the 1930s, aim ing at introducing th eir sc ient ific methods into the 
curri culum of Harvard students of social science and economi cs. When Samuelson met Wil son in the 
mid-thi rt ies, system an d operationa l thi nking were intrinsically connected to Wil son 's att itude towards 
mathematics, statistics and science. See chapter I. 
24 See Ru keyser 194 1, 280. 
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First, regarding mathemat ics as a sort of language implied, fo r W il son, definin g 
mathemat ics as intrinsica lly connected with science. 
For Wil son, mathem atics consisted of establi shing correspondences, as translations, 
between pure ly mathematical abstract entit ies, which represented certai n 
mathematical structures, w hich he call ed postulates, and conventiona l working 
hypotheses found in subject matters, which he called axioms. In these translations, 
postulates and axioms, W il son c laimed, must simultaneously restrict each other: 
while postul ates imposed logical structure to the subj ect matter, acting thus as a sort 
of grammar, axioms constra ined freedom and abstracti on of postulates and gave them 
meaning connectedly to the subj ect matter, acti ng thus as a sort of semantics. W ithout 
the ir corresponding meaning/trans lat ion in science, mathemati cal structures were as 
beaut ifu l and as use less as pure theoretica l treati ses of subj ect matters, W il son fe lt. In 
this vein, he insisted that emphasis should be placed on meaning, provided by shared 
conventions of subj ect matters, beli eving that the "bas is of rationa li ty must go deeper 
than a mere set of marks and postulates" (W ilson 1904a, 81 , foo tn ote ). 
At the same time, fo r W ilson, mathematical necessarily implied immedi ate 
usefu lness, which could be achi eved only if translations between postulates and 
axioms were establi shed. In such translations, mathematical operators and operations 
should be used, he expla in ed. Sometimes, new operators and operati ons should even 
be developed, in accordance with the immedi ate problems at hand . 25 This 
"operational or symbo li c s ide," Wil son be lieved, required first learning "a seri es of 
rul es of operation often both dull and uninte lligible,"26 genera lly found in algebra or 
25 Illustratively, around 1900 when writing a textbook on Vector A nalysis (W il so n 190 1) based on hi s 
notes of Gi bbs ' s co urses, Wi lson developeq new algebraic operators that were needed in vecto r and 
matrix ana lys is (mul tip le a lgebra), in order to accomp li sh operations similar to those found in 
arithmetic or sim ple a lgeb ra. ln particul ar, he developed On Products in Additive Fields (W il son 
1905). 
26 E. Wi lson, un publi shed and und ated paper (PEBW, 4878.2 14, Fo lder miscell aneous papers, Chapter 
I. Genera l Introd uction, p. l ). 
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advanced calculus, but which could be regarded as simply as the arithmetic 
operations of division and multiplication. These operations "have no obvious 
connection with the meaning of the numbers concerned; they are not in themselves of 
practical or intellectual interest."27 Operational thinking, for Wilson, was distinct 
from postulational thinking. The former represented , in the practice of the 
mathematical scientist of applied mathematician, the (algebraic) way through which 
he should establi sh correspondences between postulates and conventional working 
hypotheses. This implied, for the mathematical scientist or applied mathematician , 
being familiar with certain mathematical structures, knowing how to play with his 
skills in (multiple) algebra or advanced calculus, white mastering the conventional 
working hypotheses of the subject matter of interest.28 
Wilson ' s marked interest in axioms, as working hypotheses, reflected his belief that 
they represented something necessary for the use of mathematics in science, which 
could be regarded as invariant as they supposedly represented things that "change so 
slowly that we may regard them for practical purposes as non-changing or at any rate 
can assign limits to their change in amount and not [in] time." 29 Also, Wilson 
thought, scientific knowledge resulted from a plurality of working hypotheses. 
Scientific knowledge was therefore never to be held as universally true, but merely as 
partial , probable and approximate. Because the reason for prevalence of a certain 
working hypothesis over another set was not self-evident (Wilson 1920b), scientific 
knowledge, for him , was also conventional. In this way, as a result of the possibility 
to "assign limit to their change in amount and not [in] time," working hypotheses 
conveyed truth and meaning, relative to the problem at hand , only in a certain 
proportion at given moments in time, Wilson believed. Statistics, he thought, offered 
27 E . Wilson, unpubli shed and undated paper (PEBW, 4878.214, Folder miscellaneous papers, Chapter 
l. General Introduction, p.2). 
28 E . Wilson , unpubli shed and undated paper (PEBW, 4878.214, Fol de r miscellaneous papers, Chapter 
1. General Introduction) . 
29 E. Wil son to C. Snyder, 2 June 1934 (PEBW, 24). 
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a definite way of determining the most likely working hypothesis regarding a specific 
set of data, as it could be used to quantify that range that carried truth and meaning 
while connecting working hypotheses and data (Wilson 1926b, 296). 30 ln other 
words, in defining mathematics as a language, (mathematical) statistics or numerical 
mathematics, for Wilson, played the same operational role than (multiple) algebra or 
advanced calculus in establishing the translations between postulates and working 
hypotheses. 
Second, for Wilson, defining mathematics as a language implied regarding 
mathematics as a vernacular, which ail individuals could learn (Wilson 1940). The 
core of Wilson's definition of mathematics resided in the process of translation 
between postulates and working hypotheses. To determine such correspondences, the 
mathematician or the mathematical scientist, needed to know certain operational 
(algebraic and statistical) techniques. And , as Wilson stated: 
"there [seemed] to be no present conclusive evidence that learning a 
particular technique [was] impossible to any person [ ... ] and, therefore, 
each could presumably learn any technique and use it in much the same 
sense as he could learn any language and write in it." (Wilson 1940a, 
664) 
For Wilson, these operational techniques were the language that economists should 
learn if they wanted economics to become truly scientific. This was the language that 
Samuelson learnt and used in his thesis. 
30 These ideas about conventionalism and indeterminism had led Wilson, when he turned his efforts to 
statistics during the 1920s, to propose a metbod dealing with statistical inference as probable and 
approximate. Wilson had then defined something that he might have called a range of meaningfulness, 
the construction of which vaguely referred to the notion of statistical likelihood and which implied the 
concept of the not-yet-well-established notion of confidence interval (Wilson 1927). Wilson treated 
probable inference as an operational way of quantitatively determining the most likely working 
hypothesis regarding a specific set of data (Wilson 1926b, 296). Statistical inference, for him, therefore 
consisted of determining the best approximate correspondence between theoretical and empirical 
en titi es. 
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3.3.1. Introductory chapters 
3.3.1.1. Methodology 
Samuelson started the thesis by criticizing how, 111 the econornics, "bad 
methodological preconceptions" (Samuelson 1941a, 2) had Jeft the field without 
sound scientific foundations. During his career, Wilson had systematically diagnosed 
ail the fields with which he engaged as suffering from Jack of scientific foundations . 
As a result, he claimed, practitioners in these fields tended to commit to wrong 
methodological approaches, either purely theoretical or purely ernpirical. 31 
Samuelson precisely airned at establishing a methodological balance between 
economic theory and data representing "empirical human behavior" (Samuelson 
194la, 2) . 
As a consequence of unsatisfactory rnethodological approaches, Samuelson believed, 
disagreement arnong econornists about applied and theoretical concerns was the rule 
rather than the exception. Following Wilson, Samuelson believed that consensus was 
a necessary condition for any scientific practice. The purpose of the thesis was thus to 
achieve minimal consensus about the basic working hypotheses at the foundations of 
economics. 
Also for the same methodological reasons, Samuelson held that economics Jacked 
unity ; its different branches remained unsatisfactorily connected. ln order to offer a 
unifying approach in economics, it was necessary, Samuelson claimed, to build on 
the high level of generality provided by mathematical thinking. In his courses to 
economists, Wilson emphasized the greater Jevel of generality that could be attained 
in economics when the mathematics was properly applied.32 
3 1 See chapter I. 
32 See chapter li , in particular section 2.4 .2. , of the present thesis. ln the introductory chapters of his 
thesis, Samuelson quoted Eliakim H. Moore' s principle of generality by abstraction: "The existence of 
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ln this spirit of generality, Samuelson suggested that he had begun by studying 
separately different subfields of economics and their related concept of equilibrium: 
he had ended by studying economics and its (general) aggregate equilibrium 
framework. He also claimed that in his research in various subfields, he had "found 
out" that certain discrete inequalities acted as a formai analogy connecting these 
different subfields. Wilson's ideas about (mathematical) generality shaped 
Samuelson's work in two ways. First, Samuelson ' s approach consisted of using 
(Wilson-Gibbs) matrix analysis to study the economy as an aggregate system, 
individual units of which cou Id be regarded as being interconnected. At the same time 
that (matrix) generality enabled the study of the economy as a general system, 
interconnectivity between individual units implied that the different branches of 
economics were also interrelated and interdependent. Second, Samuelson aimed at 
developing formulas composed by finite differences that corresponded to formulas 
defined at the margin; according to Wilson, when it came to defining an equilibrium 
position, the discrete was more general than the continuous. lllustratively, the discrete 
inequalities that Samuelson established embodied, he argued , the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for obtaining definite mathematical results in economics, 
namely , the conditions for reaching a point of equilibrium. Such discrete inequalities 
corresponded to formulas already established in the standard treatment of individual 's 
optimization problems with marginal calculus and of dynamical and stable aggregate 
economic systems with differential and functional calculus. 
analog ies between central features of various theories implies the existence of a general theory which 
underlines the particular theories and unifi es them with respect to those central features" (Samue lson 
1941 a, 1 ). Because Samuelson must have fe lt that Moore's principle exp lained clearly what Wilson 
had taught him , he used Moore, rather than Wilson or Gibbs . Moore was then probably the most 
important figure in the recent history of Ameri can mathematics (Parshall 1984 ). Sam uelson 's use or 
Moore was a lso a rhetorical argument of authority. 
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3.3.1.2. Basic working hypotheses 
Reflecting Wilson's emphasis on conventional working hypotheses, instead of 
focusing only on structural elements, Samuelson claimed that he rejected ail universal 
principles. He wanted to establish scientific statements which, in his words: "are not 
deduced from thin air or a priori propositions of universal truth and vacuous 
applicability." (Samuelson 1941a, 5) 
In the thesis, Samuelson worked on the basis of two general working hypotheses, 
which he took as conventional , which embodied specific ways of dealing with the 
economy as a system, and which , he thought, embodied other conventional 
hypotheses in economics. 
First, Samuelson regarded optimizing individuals-consumers and firms-as 
separated and isolated systems in stable equilibrium. Samuelson argued that this first 
general working hypothesis, which ensured a correspondence between conditions of 
stable equilibrium in a system and an individual 's optimizing behavior, did not 
assume normative statements about individual ' s behavior. lt rather supposed a 
naturalistic assumption, reflecting, in idealized conditions, how individual elements 
adapted themselves to their natural and institutional environments. Such an approach 
consisted of defining equilibrium with respect to specifically demanded and/or 
supplied quantities that corresponded to an optimal individual ' s position. Such 
quantities, as for the optimizing individual was concerned , implied therefore 
simultaneously concepts of optimality and stability of equilibrium. A simple 
summation of ail individuals ' optimal quantities yielded in this way the 
corresponding quantity at the aggregate level , at a given moment in time. 
In this vein , Samuelson did not make normative statements about individuals ' 
behavior. He made, rather, normative statements about how economists should study, 
scientifically, consumer and firm theory : as " mathematics is a language," economists 
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should be able to learn how to connect these theories with some sort of mathematical 
structures (of optimization) and with observable quantities, if only in idealized 
conditions. 
Samuelson also argued that his system-framework was useful for the scientific 
practice of distinct branches of economics, which should be approached from the 
perspective of optimization under constraint and its correspondence with specific 
observable quantities. In the general system-framework Samuelson employed, the 
different branches of economics could be studied as being interconnected, as the 
variables of one problem could be regarded as the parameters of another. Such 
interconnections yielded relations of interdependence between variables, as stable 
equilibrium conditions implied that ail variables were simultaneously determined ; the 
only causal relationships, he claimed, resulted from changes of parameters. In this 
way, Samuelson dealt with optimizing economic behavior and its corresponding 
notion of stable equi librium as a problem of comparative statics; discrete local 
equilibria could be meaningfully connected with discrete values of variables and 
parameters. 
Not ail meaningful econom1cs, however, Samuelson underlined, emerged from 
studying stability conditions of equilibrium as corresponding to individual ' s 
optimizing behavior. A comprehensive analysis of stability, he believed, required 
analyzing dynamical considerations of aggregate systems as found in business cycles. 
lndividual ' s optimality and stable equilibrium, Samuelson insisted, did not 
necessarily imply optimality and stability at the aggregate level. 
ln this direction, Samuelson argued that the second general working hypothesis of his 
thesis consisted of assuming that the aggregate system of the economy, namely the 
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interaction over time of aggregate variables, was in dynamical stable equilibrium.33 
This second working hypothesis involved, for Samuelson, supposing that there was a 
correspondence between comparative statics and dynamics, as a way of connecting, 
while keeping separated, optimizing behavior of individuals, a static problem, and the 
evolution through time of the aggregate system. With such a correspondence, 
Samuelson presented comparative statics as a special case of dynamics; this 
intuitively implied that individual ' s optimizing behavior was a special case, related to 
discrete moments in time, of the continuous evolution over time of the aggregate 
system at large. ln his dynamics, Samuelson suggested, individuals were necessarily 
optimizing at every discrete moment in time, not over time. Further, at discrete 
moments in time, their optimizing behavior gave rise to the aggregates of the system. 
With his two general working hypotheses, Samuelson tied together the different 
chapters of the thesis using the notion of system; with it, he presented the 
microeconomic level , which dealt with individual ' s optimizing behavior at given 
moments in time, and the macroeconomic level, which was related to the interactions 
between aggregate macroeconomic variables through time, as being distinct problems 
which could be studied as interconnected , as they shared, he emphasized, a similar 
formai structure.34 In both cases, certain inequalities were regarded as the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of achieving stable equilibrium positions, which Samuelson 
claimed, implied the existence of operationally meaningful theorems. 
33 ln the introducto1y chapter of the thesis, Samuelson suggested that he was following Ragnar Frisch ' s 
(1936) and Jan Tinbergen ' s (1935) recent work on economics dynamic systems. As will be discussed, 
he was also significantly influenced by Wilson ' s ideas about dynamical systems in physics. 
34 However, Samuetson did not clearly establish the necessary and sufficient conditions of the formai 
interconnection between the microeconomic and the macroeconomic levels. 
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3.3.1.3. Operationally meaningful theorems: 
Samuelson's reference to operationally meaningful theorems was another important 
instantiation of his commitment to Wilson ' s ideas about mathematics and statistics. 35 
Samuelson's operationally meaningful theorems in economics embodied Wilson 's 
emphasis on operational (algebraic and statistical) techniques that should be used in 
the translation between postulates and axioms. The represented a Wilsonian way of 
mathematically structuring economic thinking; of attributing meaning to 
mathematical structures connectedly with conventional working hypotheses in 
economics and; at the same time, of determining the meaningfulness of these working 
hypotheses by connecting them with data, if only under ideal conditions. 
Emblematically of his thesis, Samuelson took as a conventional working hypothesis 
the notion of stable equilibrium as related to the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
levels. He then made them correspond to certain mathematical structures, which 
represented the "structural characteristics of the equilibrium set" (Samuelson 1941 a, 
15) . Illustratively, in his consumer and firm theory, Samuelson translated the 
problem of the individual consumer and firm into a problem of constrained 
optimization, rendering thus equivalent the notions of individual 's equilibrium and 
individual ' s optimality. In his dynamics, Samuelson translated the intertemporal 
interrelations between aggregate variables into a problem of functional analysis, 
making correspond the notion of aggregate steady state and possible scenarios 
( explosive of stable) of the future evolution of the economy. 
Whereas the use of marginal calculus in optimization problems and of differential 
equations in business cycles analysis was already standard in Samuelson ' s time, 
35 Samuelson ' s reference to operationally meaningfu l knowledge was also another rhetorical argument 
of authority as it resonated well with Percy Bridgman ' s comprehensive philosophy of knowledge 
(B ridgman 1927). lt remains however difficult to establish how Bridgrnan 's ideas directly framed and 
limited Samuelson ' s early mathematical economics. 
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standard mathematical and statistical econom1cs, Samuelson believed, remained as 
operationally meaningless as it did empirically empty. In this vein , Samuelson most 
of ail sought to connect his working hypotheses, structured by postulational thinking, 
with some sort of data. The problem in economics, he bel ieved, was that there was 
not yet enough available economic data, as detailed quantitative empirical 
information. In the thesis, the emphasis was placed on observable, not observed , data. 
Whether or not economic data was missing, Samuelson seemed to have adopted 
Wilson ' s skepticism of Pearsonian and Fisherian statistical estimation procedures. In 
his course on mathematical economics, indeed, Wilson argued that his analysis was 
original relative to the general relevant literature, particularly Pareto's economics, as 
it was more general because it was made "with finite differences [rather] than [only] 
with derivatives." 36 Also, in his course on mathematical statistics, having in mind 
economic spectral analysis, Wilson taught the fundamental elements in calculus 
laying being lag operators, emphasized analytical statistics and numerical 
mathematics and used his Advanced Calculus (1911 a) and Edmund T. Whitaker and 
G. Robinson ' s 1924 The Calculus of Observations as main references. Wilson did not 
caver standard inference theory , of which be was rather critical. Reflecting Wilson ' s 
ideas, Samuelson wrote: 
One cannot leave the matter here [at the level of marginal and differential 
calcul us], for in the world of real phenomena ail changes are necessarily 
finite, and instantaneous rates of change remain only limiting 
abstractions. lt is imperative, therefore, that we develop the implications 
of our analysis for finite changes. Fortunately, despite the impression 
current among many economists that the calculus can only be applied to 
infinitesimal movements, this is easily done." (Samuelson 1941 a, 54) 
Data always cornes in a discrete form , Samuelson hinted. 
36 LMP, 7, Folder Econ-theory: Harvard courses otes 1938-1939, Wilson p. 1 O. 
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From this Wilsonian perspective, Samuelson 's operationally meaningful theorems 
were not only statements in mathematical economics; they also appear-and this is 
less evident-as statements in mathematical statistics, as Wilson ' s foundational 
statistical ideas were also framing and limiting Samuelson ' s thought. Wilson believed 
that extant statistical methods in the emerging (econometric) quantitative movement 
remained arbitrary.37 In Samuelson ' s thesis, there were no standard statistical tests. 
Following Wilson ' s analytical statistics, Samuelson attempted rather to establish 
correspondences between formulas of discrete elements and equations of continuous 
elements, in order to show that old abstract economics based on marginal and 
differential calculus had a corresponding form in the more general discrete world (of 
comparative statics), intuitively more cogent with data. At the same time, such 
correspondences between the discrete and the continuous, which represented what 
Samuelson meant by operationally meaningful theorems, did not imply the use of 
probability theory, of which Wilson was more than skeptical. 
3.3.2. The individual level 
In 1937, Samuelson published his two first papers. He elaborated on the consumer' s 
(1937a) and the entrepreneur ' s (1937b) behavior, by assuming that they optimized 
intertemporally. These papers on mathematical economics appeared in February and 
in May respectively. Samuelson must have finished the first paper before taking 
Wilson ' s course on Mathematical Economies; in the May paper, Samuelson briefly 
referred to Wilson ' s Advanced Calculus (1911 a) and to Whittaker' s and Robinson 's 
The Calculus of Observations (1924), both covered by Wilson in his 1936 course on 
Mathematical Etatistics. In these papers, Wilson ' s deep influence on the way 
Samuelson approached mathematical economics was not yet evident. Wil son' s 
presentation of Gibbs ' s thermodynamical systems that " have profoundly altered 
37 See footnote 12. 
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[Samuelson's] v1ews 111 corresponding fi e lds of economics" (see footnote 4) took 
place a lmost at the same t ime that these two papers were publi shed; it is unlikely that 
Samue lson had had the time to full y engage with its di fficult contents. In thi s vein, it 
can be conj ectured that once Samuelson explored more in detail Wilson's course 
materi a l on mathematical economics and thermodynamics, he started then neglecting 
the old Fisherian working hypothesis of in tertempora l op timizat ion, as Wil son's 
presented the consumer maximization problem as being independent of time. 
In the thes is, w ith the first working hypothes is, whi ch cons isted of assuming an 
extremum pos ition, Samuelson presented the consum er and the firm problem 
analog ically; hi s idealized consumer and firm did not optimize over time, but at ail 
moments in t ime.38 
3.3.2. 1. Consumer theory 
After hav ing attended Wil son's lectures in Mathemati ca l Economies during the 
spring of 1937, in a series of papers a il publi shed in 193 8, Samuelson c la imed to 
have establi shed new fo undati ons fo r consumer theory by establi shing its empiri ca l 
implications (1 938a; 193 8c; l 93 8d).39 When Samuelson sent to Wil son the last of the 
three c ited papers fo r suggestions, the latter responded explaining that he had 
actually refereed the work fo r publicati on in Econometrica. In general terms, W il son 
believed, 
38 Consequently, for Samuelson, the dynamics, as the evo lution through t im e, of the aggregate system 
res ul ted neither fro m consum er's concerns about sav ings and future consumption, nor fro m the fi rm ' s 
concerns about fu tu re values of its assets. Thi s interpretation of Wi lson's infl uence on Samuelson' s 
consum er and firm theories could exp lain why Samuelso n did not introdu ce in th e thes is hi s work on 
capital and in vestment theory . 
39 In 1937, Samuelson a lso attended Haberler ' s In ternat ional Trade course. On Haberler' s significan t 
infl uence on Sarnuelson ' s consum er theory , part icularly through hi s ideas about in dex numbers, see 
Backhouse, Forthcom ing, Chapter 9: Making conn ections. 
"There is no evidence in the sty le in which the paper is written that you 
have taken anything other than an inte llectual attitude toward any of the 
questions. If however, there are any pa1t icular po ints where you yourself 
have any doubt or think other people might have some whi ch you want to 
take up w ith me I shall be glad to di scuss the matter w ith you."40 
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"Samuelson [had] fo llowed almost a il the leads [that Wil son had] gave"41 him, and , 
fu1t her, had brought s ignificant improvements to the ana lys is. 
In the thes is, Samuelson elaborated on the Evolution of the Utility Concept (1 941 a, 
111 -34), which eventua lly culminated, he hinted, at hi s operationa lly meaningful 
theorems, deducible, he argued however, from the standard ana lys is. 
Samuelson regarded utili ty theory as a convenient convention, which did not yet 
refl ect on "the factua l behav ior of consumers" (194 J a, 114) . lts re levance, " for better 
or worse," was due to the fact that it " has occupi ed an imp01tant position in economic 
thought fo r the last half century. Thi s atone makes it highly desirable that its meaning 
be clearly understood" ( 194 1a, 11 3-14) . The notion of ut il ity in economics 
represented therefore one of these invariants in science that Wil son regarded as 
necessary fo r the app licabili ty of mathemati cs; determining its operationa l 
meaningfuln ess, required then properly connecting it w ith some mathematical 
structures and w ith some sort of data. 
Util ity theory, Samuelson explained, had evolved as economists tended to reject 
"utili ta riani sm, ethica l and welfare connotations of [ ... ] Bentham[ ' ], Sidgwick[ ' and] 
Edgeworth[ ' ]" early work. " Concomitant ly, there has been a shift in emphasis away 
from the physio logica l and psycho logica l hedoni sti c, introspecti ve aspects of utility." 
ln thi s vein, Samuelson c laimed, " many wri ters", parti cularly Vilfredo Pareto, 
William Johnson, John Hicks and Roy A llen, "have ceased to believe in the ex istence 
40 E. Wi !son to P. Samuelson, 10 March 193 8 (PEB W, 3 1 ). 
41 E . Wil son to E. Chamberla in , 22 ov. 1940, (PEBW, 34). 
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of any introspective magnitude or quantity of a cardinal , numerical kind. With this 
skepticism has corne the recognition that a cardinal measure of utility is unnecessary. 
That only preference scale, where comparisons of more or less are possible, is 
required for the analysis of consumer's behavior" (Samuelson 1941a, 111-12). 
However, Samuelson remarked , some authors, such as Oscar Lange (1934), Irving 
Fisher (1927), Ragnar Frisch (1932b) and Henry Schultz (1938), among the most 
significant, still took the cardinal measure of utility as a val id working hypothesis.42 
In a Wilsonian spirit, Samuelson suggested that the methodological attitude of this 
second group of authors was irresponsible: they did not verify applicability, namely 
the meaningfulness in respect to data, of certain arbitrary "special and extra 
assumptions," (Samuelson 1941a, 147) which were needed to connect utility theory 
with consumer' s price and quantity behavior.43 
ln his course on Mathematical Economies, Wilson presented consumer theory 
analogically to thermodynamics by explaining that certain discrete inequalities, 
which he called the Gibbs conditions, characterized the static and stable equilibrium 
position of thermodynamics and economics systems.44 Such analysis did not imply 
the use of calculus, Wilson argued, but corresponded, in the discrete, to the 
conditions of stability of equilibrium of standard economic problems of optimization 
under constraint, in a static world. In his lectures, Wilson ' s consumer analysis was 
indeed time independent: " With time introduced, everyone recognizes that 
preferences change."45 
42 He certainly al so had in mind Harold Hotelling (l 932; 1935). 
43 Samuelson in particularly showed that the auxiliary assumptions of independence of utility and of 
constancy of the marginal utility of income - that were needed to derive the standards negatively 
inclined demand curves from the cardinal utility analysis- were operationally meaningless, because 
their empirical implications could not be properly derived from idealized price and qu antity behavior. 
44 See chapter Tl. 
45 JTP, 7 , Folder "Ec 104b E .B. Wilson", p. 204-6. 
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In thi s Wil sonian spirit, in the thesis, Samuelson framed hi s Meaningful Theorems 
(1941 a, 134-44) on consumer analys is in a time-independent and static ideal ized 
world . He rephrased something that he had called in hi s doctoral papers the postul ate 
of "consistency in idealized indi vidual' s behav ior," w ith which he had connected 
utility analys is with observable data, by establi shing certa in correspondences 
between observable expenditure, the preference-field and the demand fon ction. 
In the thesis, Samuelson expla ined hi s approach to consum er theory by assuming that 
hi s idealized individual could be confronted with two different sets of prices and 
incarne: (pf, I 1 ) and (pf ,/2) ; in each situation, Samuelson thought, hi s consumer 
would choose two different sets of goods: xf and xf , respectively. These two 
situations were not thought of as happening in di ffe rent moments in time, but 
s imultaneously. Samuelson focused on expenditure, eva luated with the fo ll owing 
summation: Lf=i pf xf, fo r the first situation. Then, he considered the level of 
expenditure in the case in which the second set of goods would be evaluated at the 
prices of the first, w ith the fo llowing summation r i 1 pf xf. From thi s little th ought 
experiment (no real data invo lved) implying only discrete magn itudes (pri ces, 
incarn e and demanded quant ities of goods), Samuelson deduced hi s operationa lly 
meaningful theorem for consumer theory: 
"n 1 2 < "n 1 1 . z· F[ ( 2)] < F[g( 1)] L.. i=l Pi xi - L.. i=1 Pi xi imp ies g xi - xi 
where g (x) corresponds to an ordinal index of utility, unique except for F[·] , a linear 
transform at ion.46 His theorem was genera l as it was not only valid fo r compensated 
changes of prices. lt conta ined the main ideas of hi s consistency postulate: "lf thi s 
cost Œt1= 1 pf xl] is equal to or less than the amount of money that the first batch 
46 Samuelson a lso offered a similar thought experim ent, which y ie lded sim ilar resul ts in terms of the 
pri ce and quantity re lationships. He supposed thi s time the indi vidual to be constra ined to move along 
the same indifference locus; thi s case enabled Samuelson to ana lyze the case of a compensated change 
of one pri ce. 
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actually cost Œl1= 1 Pf xf] , we have conclusive evidence that the second batch is not 
higher on the indi v idual' s preference scale than the first batch; for if it were, the 
individual could not have been in equilibrium in the first place, s ince he would not be 
minim izing total expendi ture for the attained level of sati sfacti on. In other words, if 
he could have bought the second batch, and he bought the first, we rul e out the 
poss ibili ty that he prefers the second to the first" (1941 a, 137). Consequent ly, " the 
ind ividual always behaves consistently in the sense that he should never ' prefer' a 
fi rst batch of goods to a second at the same lime that he ' prefers ' the second to the 
first" (Samuelson 1938c, 353 ita lics added).47 
With hi s approach, which consisted of play ing with hi s skill s in logical and 
arithmetical operations and hi s knowledge of the economic theory of index numbers, 
Samuelson was able to infe r certa in relations in the preference-field fro m observable 
expenditure. On thi s bas is, he was then able to deduce a speciftc correspondence 
between such information/re lat ion and demanded quantity behav ior, expressed by the 
demand fu nction. To accompli sh thi s, and building on hi s theorem, Samuelson 
deduced the fo llowing re lati onships: 
In the last fo rmul a, Samuelson argued, the operationa lly meaningfuln ess of his 
theorem could be understood, as it "contained almost a il the meaningful empirical 
implications of the who le pure theory of consumer' s cho ice" (Samuelson 1941 a, 
138-39). In thi s ve in , fro m thi s fo rmula, Samuelson was able to deduce known and 
empirical restrictions upon the demand fun ctions. In patt icular, he was able to derive 
the "valid quali tative restrictions upon the s lopes [and curvatures] of the demand 
functions" (Samuelson 194 1 a, 139). 
47 In terms ofpreferences, Samuelson ' s cons istency postu late implied that if x 1 -< x 2 and x 2 -< x 1 do 
not ho ld simultaneously, then x 1 -< x 2 impl ied x 2 -1:. x 1 . 
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Following Wilson 's lead , Samuelson showed that a discrete inequality relationship, 
the second one, corresponded to the necessary and suffic ient conditions of stabi I ity of 
an extremum position, as found in standard procedures of consumer constrained 
optimization defined at the margin. The second inequality, Samuelson argued, 
"conta ined a lmost ail the mean ingfu l empirica l implications of the who le pure theory 
of consumer's choice" (Samuelson 194 la, 138-39); it corresponded to the well-
established negative-slope and stability-concavity restrictions 111 maximization 
procedures upon (Marshallian) demand functions.48 In this way, he connected hi s 
consistency postulate, grounded on observable data- not observed data-and the 
notion of equilibrium, with some structural characteri stics of optimization under 
constraint.49 
In the standard continuous analysis, however, there was an empirical restriction, 
which Samuelson did not succeed 111 deriving from hi s di screte formula: the 
integrability conditions.50 ln hi s word s: 
Integrab ility conditions " reflect differential properties of our demand 
functions which are hard to visualize and hard to refute. For our empirica l 
data consists of isolated points. These must be smoothed in some sense 
before our relations can be tested ; th e smoothing, even by the best known 
statistical methods, is to a degree arbitrary, and so refutation and 
verification are difficult. 
48 From the second inequality, Samuelson derived a negative relat ionship between prices and 
demanded quantities: Z:I1-1 t,.p; !}.x; < O; the negative substitution effects: iJx; + Xj iJx; < O; as well as 
- i}pj i} / 
the negative semi-definiteness of a Hessian matri x: Lt=l L J=l ( :;~ + xj 0;,i ) dp;dpj ~ O. 
49 Stanley Wong ( 1978) underlined a major logica l fl aw in Sarn uelson ' s consumer theory, as his 
co nsistency postulates does not explai n why certain bundles that irnplied the sarn e cost are not bought. 
so The integ rabi li ty prob lem consists of establi shin g the conditions of ex istence of the utility fonction 
that generates the consurnption choices, which are observab le and which can be expressed by a 
demand fonction . ln standard procedures of rnaxirnization of a utility fonction , the syrnrnetry of the 
cross-price substitution effects, namely the symrnetry of the substitution matrix or Hessian rnatrix, was 
assum ed. On integrability, see Hands 2006. 
I have tried, but thus far with no success, to deduce implications of our 
integrability conditions which can be expressed in finite forms; i.e., be 
conceivably refutable merely by a finite number or point observations." 
(Samuelson 1941 a, 134, footnote 13) 
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In spite of the difficulties that he encountered, Samuelson remained optimistic about 
his approach and hoped that "a proof may still be forthcoming by which [his 
approach] may be slightly generalized to include the question of integrability" 
(1941a, 139, footnote 14). 
Ail in ail , in consumer theory, Samuelson felt that he had developed something new, 
grounded on the old. Because he firmly believed that with his operationally 
meaningful theorem he had successfully translated abstract formulas defined at the 
margin into a discrete form , Samuelson felt that he had developed the empirical 
implications of the abstract utility and Marshallian demand theories. He thought that 
he had failed to encompass integrability questions within his framework, precisely 
because he had not been able to establish such a continuous-discrete connection. In 
this process of translation, Samuelson did not take the relationship between prices 
and quantities as a structure existing in the market place; he took it as the 
conventional working hypothesis that prevailed in the Marshallian tradition. It was 
this working hypothesis that primarily needed to be connected with some sort of data 
and simultaneously with certain mathematical structures of optimization. Samuelson 
did not attempt to find invariant regularities by using statistical or probabilistic 
methods to estimate significance of parameters related to demand information. He 
used a thought experiment in which the emphasis was placed on discrete data 
concerning an idealized consistent individual 's price and quantity behavior, at a 
given moment in time; he then interpreted this data as providing information about 
his individual ' s optimizing behavior (he must be minimizing expenditure) and 
derived a discrete inequality relationship, which not only was also inferred from this 
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indiv idual' s p references but also corresponded to the condit ions of stable equilibrium 
that were fo und in standard s procedures of optimization. 
From our Wilsonian perspective, it can be argued that the novelty of Samuelson ' s 
consumer theory in respect to hi s contemporari es appears in the emphasis that he 
gave to the working hypothes is of a stable indiv idua l' s equilibrium, which fo llowing 
Wilson, had to be defi ned in the discrete. From this po int, Samuelson connected such 
a definiti on of the stable equilibrium with certain mathematical structures of 
optimization and with some sort of data. In thi s way, he could present hi s work as 
operationally meaningful, namely empirically, theoretically and mathematically 
grounded, emphasiz ing more one aspect or the other, depending on the part of the 
thes is.51 Thi s amalgamation of these three di fferent e lements had in Samuelson' s 
thes is the consequence that the noti on of stable equilibrium could simultaneously be 
regarded as empiri cally intuitive, theoretically grounded and mathematically 
e laborated. 
3.3.2.2. Production and cost theory 
Wilson' s influence on Samuelson ' s production and cost theory was Jess significant 
than on consum er theory, as Wil son did not cover the theory of the firm in hi s 
courses. However, W il son ' s influence can be fe lt at two moments in the fourth 
chapter. 
5 1 ln th e most accompli shed of hi s work on cons um er theory , publi shed in Econometrica, Samuelson 
had a lso offered a generalization of hi s approach into group demanded-quantity behavior, whi ch 
corresponded to the aggregation, as a sum , of individual's demanded quanti ties (1938d). The aggregate 
demand fo nction had the same characteri st ics of indi vidua l demand fon ctions. l ronica lly, Samuelson' s 
consistency approach was not fo lly cons istent. Stanl ey Wong (1978) has underlin ed a maj or logica l 
fl aw in Samuelson' s work in consumer theory . For the purpose ofthis chapter, it suftices to note that if 
in Samuelson ' s thought experim ent, fo ur different sets of prices and in corn e and the ir respective batch 
of goods were considered, and if the respecti ve costs were successively compared two by two, then, 
some inconsistenc ies would appear. Samuelson' s consistency postul ates does not expl ain w hy certain 
bundles that im pli ed th e same cost were not bought. 
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First, Wilson ' s criticism of wrong methodological approaches must not be very far 
from Samuelson ' s thinking when arguing, as an introduction of his forth chapter, that, 
in his words: 
Economie Theory as taught in the textbooks has often tended to become 
segmentalized into loosely integrated components, such as production, 
value, and distribution . There are, no doubt, pedagogical advantages to 
such a treatment, and yet something of the essential unity and 
interdependence of economic forces is lost in so doing." (Samuelson 
1941a, 68) 
Samuelson studied simultaneously the determination of optimal output and optimal 
input by the firm , 52 two connected problems that had been kept separated in 
econom1cs, he noticed. In his new unifying (not yet dual) approach, cost and 
production were part of the same technological relation, as embodied in the 
production function . In the study of optimal behavior of the firm , he explained, 
minimization of costs given a level of production could be regarded as equivalent to 
the maximization of the level of production given a level of expenditure. The problem 
of the firm was therefore analogical , he insisted , to the problem of the consumer, in 
which minimization of expenditure given a level of utility and maximization of utility 
given a level of expenditures were regarded as equivalent. Further, optimization, in 
the consistent behavior of the firm regarding its demand of inputs, Samuelson argued , 
was independent of the market structure of the firm. In this spirit, Samuelson solved 
first the constrained problem of minimization of cost determining optimal demand for 
inputs and then the unconstrained problem of maximization of profits establ ishing the 
optimal suppl y of outputs.53 
52 Leontief, who was then developing his input-output framework, must have been much influential in 
the way Samuelson tackled his cost and production theory. 
53 ln this chapter, it is difficult to determine the references specifically related to theory of the firm on 
which Samuelson was developing his ideas. He mentioned the lectures of Jacob Viner, hi s professor in 
124 
The second instance of Wil son' s re levance fo r Samuelson' s p roduction and cost 
theory emerged as the latter found some difficult ies when dealing with cases in which 
"certain costs [ were] regarded as completely fixed," or when a "fi rm [ was 
constra ined] to employ the same total of labor." 54 These problems raise new 
questions about stability when dealing with systems, equilibrium of which depended 
on "prescribed va lues of [ ... ] ' conjugate variables ' ," 55 or parameters. They led 
Samuelson to study thermodynamics,56 where, he c la imed, analogical problems were 
found , and w hich implied opt imizing with a greater number of constrain ts. But as the 
system had more constraints, Samuelson was concerned about the implication fo r the 
stability of equilibrium when the system faced changes of a parameter. 
In hi s course on Mathematical Economies, W il son had treated, in pass ing, the Le 
Chate lier Principle as a principle of stability of equilibrium in the case of 
infinites imal changes of a parameter. 57 Fo llowing Wil son, Samuelson interpreted thi s 
princ iple as imply ing, in the case of infi ni tes imal changes, that the greater the number 
of constra in ts the system had, the more stable the equilibrium position was in 
response to the marginal change of a parameter. The question remained to be 
establi shed whether the princ iple could be generalized to the case of di screte fi ni te 
changes. 
During hi s fe ll owship years, when he was dea ling w ith these issues, Samuelson even 
wrote a paper on the Le Chate lier Principle, w hich he sent to Wil son; in hi s word s, 
hi s 
Chicago, certa in mi sconceptions of margi nal ana lysis by Joan Robinso n (1933), and Haro ld 
Hotell ing' s work ( 1932). 
54 Sam uelso n, undated and unpubl ished paper, "The Le Chate li er P rinc iple of Eq uili briu m" (PASP , 
137, Fo lder Unpublished Writings Thermodynami cs , p. 7-8). 
55 idem, p. 1. 
56 Samuelson ' s reference here was Pau I Epstein ' s Textbook on Thermodynamics ( 193 7). 
57 See chapter Il. 
"manu script represents a dangerous excursion [ ... ] into a field about 
which I know very I ittle. It was inspired paitly by some remarks of y ours 
in class some time ago, [and] pattly by some work I have been doing in 
the field of economic theory."5 
In his response, Wilson wrote as follows: 
[G]eneral as the treatment is I think that there is a possibility that it is not 
so general in some respects as Wi llard Gibbs would have desired . [ ... ]. I 
remember Gibbs used to talk about non-negative quadratic forms 
meaning those which never had negative values though they might take 
zero values for values of the variables which weren ' t zero. Moreover, in 
discussing equilibrium and displacements from one position of 
equilibrium to another position he laid great stress on the fact that one had 
to remain within the limits of stability. Now if one wishes to postulate the 
derivatives including the second derivatives in an absolutely definite 
quadratic form one doesn ' t need to talk about limits of stability because 
the definiteness of the quadratic form means that one has stability. [ ... ]. 
I wonder whether you can ' t make it clearer or can 't corne nearer 
following the general line of ideas of Willard Gibbs as given in his 
Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances, equation 133. He doesn ' t use 
derivatives but introduces a condition which is equivalent to saying that 
his function has to be on one side or in a tangent plane to it. He doesn ' t 
even assume that there is a definite tangent plane but merely that at each 
point of his surface it is possible do draw some plane such that the surface 
lies except for that point and some other points entirely to one side of the 
plane. " 59 
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Following Wilson 's disciplining comments, Samuelson acknowledged that his paper 
" relates to instantaneous rates of change and does not approach the general ity of the 
Gibbs formulation which makes no continuity or differentiability assumptions but 
only requires certain arithmetic inequalities (' single concavity conditions ' ) to hold."60 
58 P. Samuelson to E. Wilson , 29 Nov. 1938 (PEBW, 31 ). 
59 E. Wilson to P. Samuelson, 30 Dec. 1938 (PEBW, 31). 
60 P. Samuelson to E. Wilson , 25 Jan. 1939 [1938] (PASP, 77). 
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Assuming that he remained in the limits of stability, Samuelson then came to the 
conclusion, as he wrote to Wilson again, that as a matter of formai definition the Le 
Chatelier Principle did not hold in the discrete case of finite changes, when several 
constraints were taken into account. More precisely, in his words: 
" Implicitly assuming that we remain within ' the limits of stability ', I was 
able through the Gibbs approach to show that 
L'.l<XL'.lX11 (n constraDnts) ~ 0 
This corresponded to the theorems on ~ derivatives: 
dx1 1 
- 2:'.0 
da (n constraints) 
Jntuitively, I had expected that the generalized theorem on the ~ 
derivatives of the form 
dx11 dx11 dx11 
da (no c.) 2=: da (1 c.) ~ ... ;::::: da (n-1 c.) ~ O 
would have an analogous theorem of the Gibbs type of the form 
Unfortunately, I was notable to develop a proof of this, and in trying to 
do so, became aware that such a theorem is not true, at least on the basis 
of the very general Gibbs curvature assumptions."61 
6 1 Idem, p. 2-3 , strikethrough text in original. 
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In the thesis, however, "By making use of Professor E. B. Wilson 's suggestion that 
[the Le Chatelier Principle] is essentially a mathematical theorem applicable to 
economics" (Samuelson 1941a, 98), Samuelson claimed that it held for finite as well 
as for marginal changes, as long as the system remained at the limits of equilibrium 
(Samuelson 1941 a, 43 footnote 12). lt corresponded to the economic intuition 
according to which, for a firm in equilibrium, there was no possible movement that 
would improve its profits, no matter the number of constraints it had to face. 
Samuelson used Wilson as a rhetorical figure of authority in order to introduce, as a 
general principle, his Le Chatelier Principle. To some extent, Samuelson was not 
persuaded that the formai analogy embodied in the existence of certain inequalities 
was formally consistent relative to ail the cases that he analyzed; there were 
substantial differences in the treatment of discrete and continuous cases. He followed 
his master' s reassuring suggestion and the intuitive economics insight, however, 
which led him to take the Le Chatelier Principle seriously. He also presented his cost 
and production theory as being operationally meaningful. 
In the chapter on the firm , Samuelson used these ideas to deal with the possibil ity of a 
discontinuous production function , reflecting on the case of fixed production 
coefficients (Samuelson 1941 a, 96-98). He only explicitly referred to Gibbs, when 
dealing with boundary problems, in which some inputs might not be used (Samuelson 
1941a, 84- 89). 
3.3.3. The aggregate level 
In the thesis, with the second working hypothesis, which consisted of assuming a 
dynamical stable equilibrium and the correspondence between comparative statistics 
and dynamics, Samuelson aimed at establishing consensus in the way the dynamics 
of the aggregate economic system should be studied and to offer operationally 
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meaningful theorems. He analyzed how equilibrium of the aggregate system was 
determined through time by studying the "stability conditions relating to the 
interaction between economic units," namely between aggregate variables 
(Samuelson 1941 a, 193), through time.62 
Such interactions were often studied by analyzing the dynamics and stability 
conditions of Marshallian or Walrasian aggregate supply-and-demand systems when 
confronted with changes of prices.63 But in a Wilson ' s spirit, Samuelson thought that 
"the economist would be truly vulnerable to the gibe that he is only a parrot taught to 
say 'supply and demand"' (Samuelson 1941a, 192). For Samuelson, Wilson 's "great 
virtue was [precisely] his contempt for social scientists who aped the more exact 
sciences in a parrot-like way" (Samuelson 1998, 1376). 
Samuelson ' s " mathematical dynamics reflects in large measure the beliefs and 
prejudices of E. B. Wilson" on dynamical systems (Weintraub 1991 , 58). In 
particular, Samuelson ' s ideas about the correspondence between comparative statics 
and dynamics seemed to have been directly related to Wilson 's lectures in 
Mathematical Economies, where he discussed thermodynamical systems. 
In the early 1920s, in correspondence with Francis Edgewotth , Wilson had claimed 
that there were two main working hypotheses in quantum theory regarding the 
treatment of dynamical systems. In the first working hypothesis, it was assumed that 
atomic nature was dynamical in essence and studied statistically only to ease the 
analysis. In the second working hypothesis, "the dynamical is a consequence of the 
statistical": it was assumed that atomic nature was essentially discrete and that 
dynamics resulted from arbitrary manipulations with the theory of probability through 
which the discrete elements (quanta) were averaged and put into aggregates "to 
62 Samuelson attempted to connect Ragnar Frisch ' s (1931 ; 1932a) and Jan Tinbergen ' s quantitative 
economics ( 1935) with Maynard Keynes' (1936), Haberler' (1937) and Alvin Hansen' ( 1938) more or 
less theoretical economics. 
63 See for example Hicks 1939. 
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develop dynamics on the stati stica l bas is." Aggregates did not result from a sampling 
and taxonomical stati st ica l analys is; they and their dynamics, he thought, were free ly 
constructed. He beli eved that the two approaches were legitimate, depending on the 
problem in hand . However, he rerna ined skeptical about using probabili ty to free ly 
construct aggregates and the ir dynamics .64 
Samuelson' s dynamics were also informed by hi s persona( research expen ence on 
business cycles65 and population dynamics,66 in which he refl ected, to a certa in 
64 E. Wil son to F. Edgeworth , 12 March 1923 (PEBW, 4) . In 1936, A Commenta,y on the scientiflc 
writings of J. Willard Gibbs, in two vo lumes, was publi shed. In the first volume, Wil son discussed 
Gibbs 's lectures on thermodynamics. In the second vo lume, Paul Epstein com mented on Gibbs 's 
Methods in Statistics. E pste in ' s argum ent vaguely resonated with W il son ' s comment on the different 
working hypotheses in physics to dea l with dynamics. He explai ned, indeed, that in o ld quantum 
theory, there was a equi valence between dynamical systems and integrable systems. He a lso pointed 
out that in the new quantum theory, based on wave theory, such was not necessarily the case because 
quanta could jump fro m one stat ionary equili brium state to another and there was no way of 
determini ng the probabili ty of a speciti c traj ectory . Epstein then argued that such " probabili ty could 
only be inferred ind irectly and approx imately, by class ical analogies known under the name of 
' principle of correspondence"' (1936, 530). Based o n the princ iple of correspondence, Epstei n 
suggested, modern physicists connected and clarifi ed the re lationship between the o ld and the new 
quantum theory . 
65 Samuelso n embarked on research in business cycles, only after having attended A lvin Hansen' s 
Harvard seminar dur ing the spri ng of 1938 (see Backhouse 20 12). Particularly, Samuelson comb ined 
the multipli er and the acceleration approaches, reducing then the Key nes-Hansen macroeconom ic 
system of equat ions to a second-order linear diffe rence equat ion (Samuelson 1939a). The analys is 
came then to study the behavior of a polynomia l and ti nding the roots of the characteri stic equ ation of 
the system. Depending on the val ues of the roots, themselves deti ned by two parameters, the marginal 
propensity to consume (a) and the factor of proporti ona lity (P), Samuelson was able to offer an 
analytical typo logy of the d ifferent dynamical poss ibiliti es of the cycle. National income would e ither 
approach a certain steady state asymptotically or by cyclica l and decreas ing osc ill at ions; o r, it would 
di verge fro m a certain steady state asy mptotically o r by cycli cal increas ing osc illat ions (for the last 
case, called the pump-priming case, see a lso Samuelson 1940). Rapidly, Samuelson associated the 
notion of stat io nary equili brium with the notion of fu ll employment (Samuelson 1939b ). Convergence 
towards such stati onary equil ibrium requ ired as necessary and sufticient formai co nd itions certain 
d iscrete ineq ualities, involving only the marginal propensity to consum e and the factor of 
proportionality. T he assum ed values of such para meters determined therefore th e evo lution of the 
system. Samuelson sum marized the four possi bil iti es and the boundaries of the qua litative behav ior of 
national income in a chart, axes of which were the va lues of a and ~, and whi ch simulated a poss ible 
graph ica l representation of Gi bbs' s phase systems (Samuelson 1939a, 78 ; 1939a, 792). 
66 At the same time that he worked on business cycle analys is, Samuelson embarked, in co llaboration 
with Marion Crawford, his w ife since 193 8, on the study of population dynamics; they coauthored two 
unpubli shed papers. It is highly probable that Samuelson aga in consulted W il son, a specialist on 
population; Samuelson and Crawford concluded, in one of their papers, that em pirica l fo rmul as, such 
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extent, the spirit of Wilson-Gibbs mathematics. Illustratively, in business cycles, 
Samuelson presented his work as a way of mediating between what he regarded as 
being wrong methodological approaches when it came to understand the cycles, 
particularly the inter-relations between investment and consumption, as well as the 
role of government expenditure in the functioning and performing over time of the 
economy. Illustratively, he believed, "there would seem to be some ground for the 
fear that, this extremely simplified mechanism [-the multiplier analysis-] is in 
danger of hardening into a dogma, hindering progress and obscuring important 
subsidiary relations and processes" (Samuelson 1939a, 75). In business cycles, 
Samuelson aimed at establishing a certain consensus in the way interrelations 
between aggregate variables should be studied , by reconciling certain aspects of 
Ragnar Frisch ' s econometric approach (1931 ; 1932a) and certain theoretical 
economic ideas of Maynard Keynes (1936), as well as connecting his Harvard 
professors ' economics, in particular Gottfried Haberler (1937) and Alvin Hansen 
(1938), with some aspects of Jan Tinbergen ' s quantitative approach (1935). 
More generally, in business cycles and population dynamics, Samuelson encountered 
a similar formai difficulty when facing series and polynomials that did not converge. 
These difficulties led him to entertain the idea that the treatment of stability and 
dynamical questions required more mathematical emphasis; such was the case in the 
chapter on stability of aggregate systems of the thesis, wherein Samuelson aimed at 
deriving "meaningful theorems of observational significance such as could even 
ideally be empirically refuted under any conceivable circumstances" (Samuelson 
1941 a, 1 91). 
as the normal or the logistic curves, were of poor help when predicting future behavior of population 
(See Samuelson and Crawford "The structure of a population growing according to any prescribed 
law," 1939, Ps archives), a conclusion that was coherent with Wilson ' s claims on the question (Wilson 
1925; Wilson and Puffer 1933). 
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Samuelson ' s emphasis, however, lay on comparative statics rather than on dynamics 
as he focused on the (di screte) properties characterizing stationary equilibrium, more 
cogent with data, and not on moving equilibrium : "ln order fo r the analys is to be 
useful it must provide info rm ation concerning the way our equilibrium quantiti es w ill 
change as a result of changes in the parameters taken as independent data" 
(Samuelson 194 l a, 192). With th is in mind , Samuelson did not present business 
cycles and population dynamics in a topical way . Instead, he used some examples of 
business cycles as well as examples of aggregate supply-and-demand dynamical 
systems to illustrate hi s general ideas about stabili ty. 
Samuelson ' s approach was general ; he defin ed dynamics as the study of behavior 
through time of ail variables of a system from arbitrary condit ions and referred to 
stability-as perfect stabili ty of the fir st kind-as the cases in which "from any initia l 
conditions a il the variables approach their equilibrium values in the limit as time 
becomes infinite" (Samuelson 194 la, 198). He used the general and mathematical 
fo rmulati on of fun ctionals to map a great number of vari ables themselves fu nctions of 
time.67 
ln this general framework, Samue lson was able to show the correspondence between 
John Hicks's difference equation-system, related to the dynamics of a mul timarket 
system, wi th a di fferential equati on system. He also showed, in the Keynes-Hansen 
business cycles case, that there were important correspondences between the static 
and dynamical cases, studied either with di fference equations or w ith differenti a l 
equations systems. In all these cases, certa in inequa lit ies represented the necessary 
and suffi c ient conditions for stability . A lso, in a il these cases, the correspondence 
between di fference equations and di fferenti a l equati ons embodied the ideal of 
67 Given Wilso n' s skepticism of Frisch ' s structu ra li st econometri cs, it must not be a co ïncidence that 
Samuelson ca ll ed fun ctionals equati ons (Samuelson 1941 a, 196) the same kind of eq uati ons that Fri sch 
ca ll ed structura l equations (Frisch 1936, 1- 2). The diffe rence is important, as, fro m W il son' s 
perspecti ve, sctructura li st approaches illustrated a so1i of uni versa li zi ng sc ientific app roach; fro m the 
same perspective, fu nctiona ls embodi ed o nly a poss ible operati ona l way to deal with complex systems. 
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possible translations between continuous and discrete mathematical formulas , white 
the correspondence between static and dynamical systems showed, Samuelson 
thought, that the study of dynamics shed light on comparative statics problems, and 
vice versa. 
ln the last paragraph of the thesis, the mathematical appendix excluded , Samuelson 
concluded, painting out that the study of dynamics and stability had led him " into the 
most difficu lt problems in h igher mathematics" (Samuelson 1941 a, 250), some of 
which he had shown in the thesis, and some of which he did not yet have fini te results 
for . 
After the defense of the thesis, Wilson advised Samuelson to translate the 
mathematics into English . ln his words, 
"What I am interested in in your thesis is to have the thing go out if 
possible so that good economic theorists who are not primarily 
mathematical economists can get fairly easily from it the things they need 
to keep them from making mistakes in their literary or semi-mathematical 
discussions. You have pointed out in the thesis several places where you 
have definite results that should preclude certain mistaken discussions on 
the part of econom ic theorists but I don ' t bel ieve that in the present form 
the economic theorists will get the point. I think there are too many 
formulas which would scare them off and that a good deal of the text 
could profitably be rewritten and considerably expanded for their benefit. 
If this were done in such a way that your contribution meant a good deal 
to a wide range of economic theorists it would not only help them but it 
would help them to appreciate the value of rigorous mathematical 
economics of which nota few ofthem are rather skeptical."68 
Wilson liked the thesis; it embodied his program for mathematical economics. Wilson 
had always wanted to show economists how his kind of mathematics cou Id be of help 
in making economics more scientific. Notwithstanding this, Wilson believed that, in 
68 E. Wilson to P. Samuelson 14 Jan . 1941 (PEBW, 37) . 
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its too-m athematical form , the thesis would not play the pedagog ica l role among 
economists that he wanted it to pl ay . Two years after the defense, Samuelson 
communicated to Wil son that he was revising the thes is and would love to have hi s 
suggestions. In response, Wilson wrote: 
"The thesis is so good and you are so busy [ w ith war work and 
instruction] that I wonder whether you ought to put your time in rev is ing 
it at ail unless there is something really rather important in the way of 
improvements which you think you can make."69 
Eventua lly, Samuelson did not fo ll ow Wilson' s advice and kept working on the 
highly mathematical problems that he had encountered. 
Samuelson and Wil son remained in c lose contact as Samuelson was working on a 
manuscript based on hi s thes is, which he would submi t fo r publicati on to the Harvard 
University Press at the beginning of 1945.7° Foundations of Economie Analysis, as he 
titl ed the extended vers ion of his thesis, wasn' t publi shed until 1947, due to 
publi shi ng de lays. 
3.4. Foundations: the fini shing touches 
When Samuelson defended hi s thes is, he was already appo inted Assistant Professor 
of economics at MIT (Backhouse 201 4). There, between 194 1 and 1945, he was put 
in charge mainly of graduate e lective economics courses. H e lectured on Economie 
Analysis and Business Cycles and offered a course ti tl ed Mathematical Approach to 
Economies and another, in co ll aboration w ith Harold Freeman, titl ed Advanced 
Economie Statistics. He a lso taught Public Finance to engi neering (marine 
69 E . Wi lson to P. Samuelson, 10 Apr. 1942 (PAS P, 77). 
70 
"My Well s Prize di ssertation has fi nally been handed in to the University Press" Samuelson wrote to 
Wil son on February 27, 1945 (idem). 
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transpo1tation) und ergraduate students as of 1943. 71 Concomitant w ith hi s 
instructional responsibilities, Samuelson embarked on war work; between 1941 and 
1943, he acted as a consultant to the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) in 
Washington. 72 Already in July of] 943, he "was engaged in some part-time, technical 
war work," probably at MIT.73 In v iew of thi s experi ence " in testing anti-aircraft," 74 
Samuelson was released from hi s instructiona l duties from March 1944 to Ju ly 1945 
to work as a full-tim e staff member mathematician on balli stics at the MIT Radiation 
Labo ra tory. 75 
Despite his war research experiences, Samuelson kept unchanged the core of hi s 
thesis for Foundations, in parti cular the three introductory chapters. As he wrote to 
Wilson , "The principle changes have been a new chapter on Welfa re Economies, 
further di scuss ion of dynamics and an appendix on e lementary difference 
equations."76 In the framin g of some of these expansions, Wil son was still hi ghly 
influentia l.77 
On dynamics, Samuelson further developed the di ffi cult problems in hi gher 
mathemati cs that he had encountered ; these involved studying stability issues of 
71 MIT Annual repo rts, 1942-1 946 . See http ://libra ri es .mit. edu/archi ves/mithi story/pres idents-
reports.htm 1. 
72 For Samuelson's em piri ca l work at the RPB see (Backhouse 20 12; Maas 201 4). 
73 P . Samuelson to E. Wilson, 29 July 1943 (PAS P, 77). 
74 P . Samuelson to K . Compton, 2 1 March 1944 (PAS P, 19). 
75 See Samuelson' s correspondence w ith F. Loomis (PASP, 6 1, Fo lder Radi ation Lab). For 
Samuelson' s work at th e Radi at ion Laboratory, see Backhouse and Maas 20 16. 
76 P. Samuelson to E . W il son, 27 Feb. 1945 (PASP, 77). 
77 B etween 1940 and 1943, when Samuelson seemed to have fini shed the mathemati cal expansions fo r 
Foundations, other signifi cant influences must have been at pl ay at MIT; in parti cul ar, Samuelson 
often interacted wi th the mathemati cian orbert W iener. Of re levance fo r the Wilson-Samuelson 
connection was the fact that W il son had insistently promoted Wiener' s career, writing various letters 
of recomm endation and supporting him fo r th e Guggenheim Scholarship (E. Wil son to . Wiener 
10.6. 1925 [PEBW, HUG4878 .203, 9 , Fo lder U-Z, HUA]), whi ch Wiener obta ined in 1926. Wil son 
beli eved that Wiener was th e best young American mathematician of hi s time. 
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linear and non-linear systems. In this analysis, Samuelson called his correspondence 
between dynamics and comparative statics the Correspondence Principle. He 
introduced the catchy term in Foundations, already in the introductory chapters. As 
with Epstein,78 Samuelson thought that the relation between old and new economics, 
as had been the case regarding the relation between classical and modern quantum 
mechanics, could be clarified: there were possible translations between the discrete 
and the continuous.79 
Further exploring the mathematical difficulties that he had encountered in the thesis 
involved connecting his dynamics with (analytical) statistics, which he attempted to 
do in the second appendix on difference equations and in various mathematical and 
statistical papers that he wrote between 1940 and 1943 .80 Given ail his war duties, 
Samuelson seemed to have used his lectures as a way of making progress in his 
research. As he wrote to Harold Hotelling in July 1943, with whom he had been 
corresponding about his research on mathematical statistics, 
"For the last three years, in lectures, and in my notes I have been 
developing various numerical methods in connection with inverting linear 
equations, scalar and matrix iteration, determination of latent roots and 
vectors."81 
To deal with these complex problems, Samuelson connected statistics with numerical 
and computational methods; in these efforts, he was not only building on Wilson ' s 
lectures on mathematical statistics, he was actually collaborating with Wilson on 
instruction of mathematical and statistical economics by sending him some of his 
78 See footnote 53 . 
79 See Samuelson 1942. 
80 See for example Samuelson 1941; 1942b; 1942a; 1943c; 1943a. 
81 P. Samuelson to H . Hotelling, 21 July 1943 (PASP, 34). 
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MIT studentsand letting them write papers (for final examination) " in a cooperative 
fashion ,"82 in which Samuelson and Wilson would agree on the subject covered. 83 
In 1942, they seemed to have encouraged their students to make some exp lorations 
based on the work of Whittaker and Robinson as well as of Alexander C. Aitken. In 
the middle of the following year, Samuelson sent two papers that he had written to 
Wilson in which he full y developed on the work of these applied mathematicians. 
Despite the fact that the ru les of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 
(PNAS), which Wilson still ed ited , prevented him from sponsoring particular 
papers,84 he made " an exception to the general rule and [took] them under [his] own 
sponsorship."85 The papers appeared in the December 1943 vo lume of the PNAS.86 
Samuelson was happy about their publication: he "cou ld make reference to them in 
connection with other work on the fire,"87 re lated probably to hi s war work on 
ballistics and/or to hi s appendix on difference equations. 
With respect to the new chapter on welfare economics, Wilson ' s influence on 
Samuelson remained unclear, as Samuelson argued in his doctoral papers on trade 
theory and welfare econom ics that there was no way of determining operationally and 
meaningfu lly the existence of a unique utili ty index enabling welfare comparisons 
(Samuelson 1938b; 1938e; Samuelson 1939b). In the thesis, Samuelson did not 
82 E. Wi lson to P. Samuelson, 10 May 1942 (idem). 
83 ln particular, Samuelson ' s Ph.D. student Lawrence Klein took one of Wi lson 's courses . Wi lson was 
impressed by Klein , and even suggested Samuelson to sponsor him for election at the Harvard Society 
ofFellows (E. Wilson to Samuelson, 12 Apr. 1943 [PAS P, 77]); Samuelson thought that Klein was 
"topnotch," but was not yet ready to be left a lone for independent research (P. Samuelson to E . Wilson , 
29 Jul y 1943 [idem]). 
84 E . Wilson to P. Sam uelson , 27 July 1943 (idem). 
85 E. Wi lson to P. Sam uelson , 2 Nov. 1943 (idem). 
86 See Samuelson 1943 ; 1943c. 
87 P. Sam uelson to E. Wilson , 5 Nov. 1943 (PASP, 77) . 
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include hi s work on trade theory and welfare economics, p robably because he fe lt that 
it did not respond to Wil son's call fo r operationally meaningful knowledge. 
In FoundatÏOns, at the end of the first part, in which he was exploring the 
consequences of the assumption of extremum pos itions, Samuelson added hi s work 
on welfare economics, introducing it wi th an extensive hi storica l account of the 
subject. Samuelson st ill argued "that the theorems enunciated under the heading of 
welfare economics are not meaningfu l propos itions." (Samuelson 1947, 220). 
Samuelson was probably then no longer writin g only fo r Wil son. 
3.5. Conc lusion 
As suggested by Wil son and Samuelson in the opening quotations of this paper, 
Samuelson' s doctora l projects, thes is and Foundations refi ected hi s active 
commitment to Wil son as regards mathematics, stat istics and science. 
Echo ing W ilson, Samuelson's recurrent diagnos is of the contemporary state of 
economics li teratu re cons isted of emphasiz ing the lack of operationally meaningful 
knowledge due to bad methodo logical approaches adopted by economists. In a 
Wil sonian spi rit, Samuelson then offered in termediating solutions, ba lancing and 
reconciling di ffe rent approaches w ith the explic it purpose of establi shing consensus 
on the sound way of study ing the theoretical and/or empiri cal problem at hand . ln thi s 
effort, Sam uelson treated mathemahcs as a language and attempted to develop 
operationally meaningfal theorems: he used hi s analytica l ski ll s and techni ques in 
mathematics and statistics to establi sh correspondences between the conventiona l 
economic notion of equilibrium, at the indiv idual and aggregate levels, and the 
mathematical structu ra l characteristics of optim izat ion problems under constraint and 
of fun ctiona l ana lys is. At the same time, he thought that this sort of mathematics of 
the continuo us, a lready standard in hi s contemporary mathematical econom ics, which 
he used, remained empirically empty. ln thi s vein, he sought to connect hi s work w ith 
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some sort of data. But by adopting Wilson ' s skepticism of classical statistics and 
probability, Samuelson did not embark on standard statistical work of estimation of 
parameters or regressions; he rather attempted to translate formulas defined in the 
continuo us into formulas of discrete magnitudes, following Wilson ' s characterization 
of a stable equilibrium position, which was defined with a discrete time-independent 
inequality. In this way , Samuelson succeeded in comprehensively presenting the 
notion of equilibrium as simultaneously being empirical (therefore intuitive), 
theoretical and mathematical. However, he did not consistently show the formai 
interconnections between the microeconomic and macroeconomic equilibria. 
In Foundations, Samuelson worked willingly to create the new based on the old. His 
modern economics was not a break with extant economics; his modern economics 
was a way of mediating between the new and the old . ln the old new-classical 
economics, mathematics of the continuous, as instantiated in marginal and differential 
calculus, was commonly used . Useful , operational and meaningful knowledge 
required however connecting conventional working hypotheses of economics with 
mathematical structures and data. Of particular relevance in Foundations, Samuelson 
attempted , albeit highly abstract and analytical ways, to connect his mathematical 
economics with data, by means of establishing correspondences between the 
continuous cases as found in marginal and differential calculus and the finite cases 
found in the discrete world of economic phenomena. 
From this Wilsonian perspective, Samuelson ' s Foundations appears to be an 
exploration to find formulas composed by discrete magnitudes, observable 111 
idealized conditions. Under this new light, Foundations can be regarded as an attempt 
to provide an alternative approach to the econometric movement. In such an 
approach, the statistical treatment of economic data was mainly analytical , indeed 
taxonomical ; it implied avoiding probability theory in the construction of central 
concepts, of aggregates and of their dynam ics. 
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Notwithstanding the emphasis on a discrete economic world, Samuelson did not offer 
new foundations for economics based on discrete mathematics ; instead , he 
endeavored, as illustrated by his Le Chatelier Principle and Correspondence 
Principle, to establish correspondences between the di screte and the continuous, 
developing the mathematics of the continuous. 
3.6. References 
Backhouse, Roger. Forthcoming. Maker of Modern Economies: An lntellectual 
Biography of Paul A. Samuelson. Vol. 1: Becoming Samuelson. 2 vols. 
---.. 2012. "Entering Hansen's New World: Paul Samuelson, the Young 
Keynesian, 1938-47." Unpublished Draft. 
--- .. 2014. "Pau l A. Samuelson ' s Move to MIT." History of Political Economy 
46 (supp l 1): 60-77. 
---.. 2015. "Revisiting Samuelson ' s Foundations of Economie Analysis." 
Journal of Economie Literature 53 (2): 326-50. 
Backhouse, Roger, and Harro Maas. 2016. "Taming Maxwell 's Demon: The 
Bowman Committee and the Planning of Science for the Public Good." 
Unpublished Draft. 
Barnett, William Arnold, and Paul A. Samuelson. 2004. "An Interview with Paul A. 
Samuelson." In lnside the Economists' Mind. United States of America: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bridgman, Percy. 1927. The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: Macmillan. 
Corry, Leo. 2004a. David Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics (1898-1918): 
From Grundlagen Der Geometrie to Grundlagen Der Physik. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
140 
---. 2004b. Modern Algebra and the Rise of Mathematical Structures. 2nd ed. 
Base) , Switzerland: Birkhauser Verlag. 
Epstein, Paul. 1936. "Gibbs ' Methods in Quantum Statistics." In Commentary on the 
Scientific Writings of J Willard Gibbs, edited by Frederick Donnan and 
Arthur Haas, 2:521-84. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
---. 1937. Textbook ofThermodynamics. New York: J. Wiley & sons, inc. 
Fenster, Della Dumbaugh, and Karen Parshall. 1994. "A Profile of the American 
Mathematical Research Community: 1891-1906." In The History of Modern 
Mathematics: Images, Jdeas, and Communities, edited by Eberhard Knobloch 
and David Rowe, 3:179-227. Boston: Academic Press. 
Fisher, Irving. 1927. "A Statistical Method for Measuring 'Marginal Utility' and 
Testing the Justice of a Progressive lncome Tax." In Economie Essays in 
Honor of John Bates Clark, edited by Jacob Hollander, 157- 93. New York: 
The Macmillan Company. 
Frisch, Ragnar. 1931. "The Interrelation Between Capital Production and Consumer-
Taking." Journal of Political Economy 39 (5): 646-54. 
---. 1932a. "Capital Production and Consumer-Taking: A Rejoinder." Journal of 
Political Economy 40 (2): 253-55. 
---. 1932b. New Methods of Measuring Marginal Utility, . Tübingen: Mohr. 
---. 1936. "On the Notion of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium." The Review of 
Economie Studies 3 (2): 100-105 . 
Haberler, Gottfried . 1937. Prosperity and Depression: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Cyclical Movements. Geneva: League of Nations. 
Hands, D. Wade. 2006. "Integrability, Rationalizability, and Path-Dependency in the 
History ofDemand Theory." History of Political Economy 38 (Suppl 1): 153-
85. 
141 
Hansen, Alvin Harvey. 1938. Full Recove,y Or Stagnation? New York: W. W. 
Notion. 
Hicks, J. R. 1939. Value and CapÏtal: An Inquùy Ïnto Some Fundamental Princip/es 
of Economie Theory. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Hotelling, Harold. 1932. "Edgeworth ' s Taxation Paradox and the Nature of Demand 
and Supply Functions." Journal of Political Economy 40 (5): 577- 616. 
---. 1935. "Demand Functions with Limited Budgets." Econometrica 3 (1): 66-
78. 
Hunsaker, Jerome, and Saunders Mac Lane. 1973. "Edwin Bidwell Wilson, 1879-
1964, A Biographical Memoir." National Academy of Sciences (US) , 283-
320. 
Keynes, John Maynard . 1936. The General Theory Of Employment, Interest, And 
Money. London: MacMillan & Co. 
Lange, Oskar. 1934. "The Determinateness of the Utility Function." The RevÏew of 
EconomÏc Studies I (3): 218- 25. 
Louça, Francisco. 2007. The Years of High Econometrics: A Short Histo,y of the 
Generation That Reinvented Econonûcs. London and New York: Routledge. 
Maas, Harro. 2014. "Making Things Technical : Samuelson at MJT." History of 
Po!Wcal Economy 46 (suppl 1 ): 272- 94. 
Parshall , Karen . 1984. "Eliakim Hastings Moore and the Founding of a Mathematical 
Community in America, 1892- 1902." Annals of Sdence 41 (4): 313-33. 
Parshall , Karen, and David Rowe. 1994. The Emergence of the American 
Mathematical Research CommunÏty, 1876-1900: JJ Sylvester, Fehx Klein, 
and E.H Moore. United States of America: American Mathematical Society. 
142 
Robinson, Joan . 1933. The Economies of Imperfect Competition. London: MacMillan 
&Co. 
Rukeyser, Muriel. 1941 . Willard Gibbs. New York: Dutton. 
Russett, Cynthia Eagle. 1966. The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social 
Thought. New Haven, Cann.: Yale University Press. 
Samuelson, Paul. 1937a. "A Note on Measurement of Utility." The Review of 
Economie Studies 4 (2): 15 5-61. 
---.. 1937b. "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital." The Quarter/y 
Journal of Economies 51 (3): 469-96. 
---.. 1938a. "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour." Economica 
5 (17): 61-71. 
---.. 1938b. "Welfare Economies and International Trade." The American 
Economie Review 28 (2): 261-66. 
---. 1938c. "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour: An 
Addendum." Economica 5 (I 9): 353-54. 
---. 1938d. "The Empirical Implications of Utility Analysis." Econometrica 6 
(4): 344-56. 
---. 1938e. "The Numerical Representation of Ordered Classifications and the 
Concept ofUtility ." The Review of Economie Studies 6 (1): 65-70. 
---. 1939a. "Interactions between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of 
Acceleration." The Review of Economies and Statistics 21 (2): 75-78. 
---. 1939b. "The Gains from International Trade." The Canadian Journal of 
Economies and Political Scie11ce / Revue Canadienne d 'Economique et de 
Science Pofüique 5 (2): 195-205. 
143 
---. 1939c. "A Synthesis of the Principle of Acceleration and the Multiplier." 
Journal of Political Economy 47 (6): 786-97. 
---. 1940. "The Theory of Pump-Priming Reëxamined." The American Economie 
Review 30 (3): 492-506. 
---. 1941a. "Foundations of Analytical Economies: The Observational 
Significance of Economie Theory." Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University. 
---. 1941 b. "Conditions That the Roots of a Polynomial Be Less Than Unity in 
Absolute Value." The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 12 (3): 360-64. 
---. 1942a. "A Note on Alternative Regressions. " Econometrica 10 (1): 80-83. 
---. 1942b. "The Stability of Equilibrium: Linear and Nonlinear Systems." 
Econometrica 10 (1): 1-25. 
---. 1942c. "A Method of Determining Explicitly the Coefficients of the 
Characteristic Equation." The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 13 ( 4): 424-
29. 
---. 1943a. "Fitting General Gram-Chartier Seri es." The An nais of Mathematical 
Statistics 14 (2): 179-87. 
---. 1943b. "A Simple Method of Interpolation." Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 29 (11): 397-401. 
---. 1943c. "Efficient Computation of the Latent Vectors of a Matrix." 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 29 (11): 393-97. 
---. 1947. Foundations of Economie Analysis. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard 
University Press. 
---. 1998. "How Foundations Came to Be." Journal of Economie Literature 36 
(3): 1375-86. 
144 
---. 2004. "A Portrait of the Master as a Young Man." In Wassily Leontief and 
Input-Output Economies, edited by Erik Dietzenbacher and Lahr. Michael, 3-
8. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Schultz, Henry. 1938. The Theory and Measurement of Demand. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Shoesmith, Beulah. 19 I 6. "Mathematics Clubs m Secondary Schools." School 
Science and Mathematics 16 (2): 106-1 13. 
Tinbergen, Jan. 1935. "Annual Survey: Suggestions on Quantitative Business Cycle 
Theory." Econometrica 3 (3): 241-308. 
Weintraub, Roy. 1991. Stabilizing Dynamics Constructing Economie Knowledge. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Whittaker, E. T., and G. Robinson. 1924. The Calculus Of Observations: A Treatise 
On Numerical Mathematics. London : Blackie And Son Limited. 
Wilson, Edwin. 1901. Vector Analysis: A Text-Book for the Use of Students of 
Mathematics and Physics. United States of America: Yale University Press. 
---. 1903. "The So-Called Foundations of Geometry." Archiv Der Mathematik 
Und Physik 6: 104-22. 
---. 1904. "The Foundations of Mathematics." Bulletin of the American 
Mathematical Society 11 (2): 74-93. 
---. 1905. " On Products in Additive Fields." In Verhandlungen Des Dritten 
lnternationalen Mathmaticker-Kongresses in Heidelberg, 202-16. Leipn iz. 
---. 1911. Advanced Calculus. Boston, New York: Ginn and company. 
---. 1920. "Space, Time, and Gravitation." The Scientific Monthly 10 (3): 217-
35. 
145 
---. 1925. "The Logistic or Autocatalytic Grid." Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 11 (8): 451-56. 
---. 1926. "Statistical lnference." Science 63 (1629): 289-96. 
---. 1927. "Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical lnference." 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 22 (158): 209-12. 
---. 1940. "Methodology in the Natural and the Social Sciences." American 
Journal of Sociology 45 (5): 655-68. 
Wilson, Edwin, and Ruth Puffer. 1933. "Least Squares and Laws of Population 
Growth." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 68 (9): 285-382. 
Wong, Stanley. 1978. Foundations of Paul Samuelson 's Revealed Preference Theory: 
A Study by the Method of Rational Reconstruction. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we focused our attention on Edwin B . Wilson and Paul Samuelson, and 
traced an intellectual genealogy linking the former, an American polymath who was 
committed to Gibbs ' s kind of constrained and intermediate mathematics, with the 
latter, an American mathematical economist who acknowledged being Wilson ' s 
disciple and whose early work was deeply influenced by Wilson ' s Gibbsian attitude 
towards mathematics, statistics and science. 
The thesis went from the general to the specific. lt started with a comprehensive 
analysis of Wilson ' s work and career in America between 1900 and the 1940s; the 
scope was then narrowed and emphasis was strictly laid on Wilson ' s direct role in the 
history of American economics between the 1920s and the 1930s. Finally the focus 
was put on Wilson ' s indirect role in the history of economics through his influence on 
Samuelson ' s early mathematical and statistical thinking, which eventually shaped 
Samuelson ' s thesis and Foundations of Economie Analysis. 
ln the first chapter, Wilson ' s career and work were presented as illustrating a process 
of scientific migration from mathematics towards other fields. Through such a 
process, between 1900 and the 1940s, Wilson worked to connect mathematics with 
various subject matters, including mathematical physics, statistics, economics and 
social science. In such efforts, Wilson was inspired by his unique and original 
Gibbsian ideas about the foundations of mathematics and science, which he 
developed as he rejected the Hilbertian structuralist kind of mathematics; in his 
foundational discussions, Wilson defined (mathematical) rationality and used his 
definition as the only valid invariant, in a strict sense, in science. Tt was invariant 
because mathematics was like a language: everybody could learn its techniques and 
reason following its precepts. Such foundational ideas embodied essential inter-
relations between mathematics and subject matters; they also embodied essential 
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connections between science and society. As Wilson regarded intuition and judgment 
as fundamenta l e lements of his foundational ideas, he let his persona( (national, 
political, social and cultural) biases enter into his epistemology. In this way, historical 
and institutional contexts framing his daily activities did not only provide a genera l 
framework for his professional career; they acted as epistem ic factors conferring 
meaning or lack of it to scientific statements. At the same time, as he defined his 
epistemology connected ly with pedagogy, Wilson determinedly sought to reform 
high education of the various subject matters with which he engaged . His aim was to 
instruct mathematicians and (natural and social) scientists into Gibbs-Wilson's 
attitude towards mathematics and science in order to frame their thought and 
discipline their practices as scientists in such a way that they wou ld adopt the 
Wi lsonian constrained and inter-mediate, " really scientific," approach in their 
professional practices. 
In the second chapter, emphasis was placed on the specific aspect of Wi lson ' s 
professional career that greatly impacted economics, as his influence on the rise of 
mathematical economics in America between the 1920s and 1930s was studied. His 
influence was effective at the organizational and educational fronts; he was central in 
establishing an organized commun ity of American mathematical economists within 
the well-recognized scientific community of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. In the community that Wilson helped to establish , scientists 
and mathematicians interested in social science and economics inter-acted with social 
scientists and economists working with mathematical and statistical techniques. That 
organized community, which included Wilson as an active member, subsequently 
played a central role in the origins of the Econometric Society. Concerned with the 
increasing European structura li st approach, particularly that of Ragnar Frisch, on the 
econometric movement, as well as w ith the political platform of the Democratic Party 
in power during the 1930s, Wilson turned his attention to reform the curricu lum of 
economists (and socia l scientists) at Harvard. ln this way, he succeeded in 
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establishing the first program in advanced mathematical economics at the depa11ment 
of economics at Harvard. His program, largely inspired by Pareto ' s mathematical 
econom1cs, included a course on advanced mathematical economics and another 
course on mathematical statistics. In these courses, Wilson taught Gibbs's 
thermodynamics systems and used the notion of equilibrium of such systems to 
analogically present the consumer equilibrium. He also taught numerical mathematics 
and analytical statistics, which he thought was first necessary for developing a 
taxonomy of the economy when being studied as a system in stable equilibrium. The 
main message of Wilson ' s courses emphasized that a sound scientific attitude 111 
(mathematical) economics required connecting economics with data, if only 111 
idealized conditions. 
Finally, in the third and last chapter, emphasis was placed on Wilson ' s catalytic 
influence on Samuelson ' s thesis and Foundaüons of Economie Analysis. By 
reconstructing such influence, the chapter described the ideas that Samuelson must 
have had in mind when claiming that mathematics was a language and when arguing 
that he offered operationally meaningful theorems of observational and empirical 
usefulness: he used mathematical techniques to establish correspondences between 
the notion of equilibrium, which he took as a convention in economics at the static 
individual and dynamical aggregate levels, and the mathematical structural 
characteristics of optimization problems under constraint and of functional analysis. 
At the same time, he sought to give this sort of mathematics of the continuous 
empirical and observational meaningfulness by connecting his work with some so11 
of data. As he seems to have adopted Wilson ' s skepticism of classical statistics and 
probability, Samuelson did not use statistical tests or regressions; he rather attempted 
to translate the continuous into the discrete. Wilson himself defined the stable 
equilibrium position in consumer theory as a discrete time-independent inequality . 
Samuelson explicitly aimed at establishing consensus among economists regarding 
the notion of stable equilibrium ; conventions were a necessary epistemic Wilsonian 
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condition for science. Using mathematics as a language in a Wilsonian spirit, 
Samuelson presented the notion of equilibrium as intuitive, treated it as a 
conventional theoretical idea and gave it certain mathematical structures . In this way, 
he developed a (taxonomical) framework to study the economy as a system, in which 
the microeconomic and the macroeconomic levels could be analyzed separately white 
being understood, intuitively, as interconnected. However, he did not explicitly 
explain how these levels were formally interconnected. Finally, from this Wilsonian 
perspective, Foundations can be regarded not only as a mathematical exercise, but 
also as a statistical proposition tentatively providing an alternative to the 
contemporary econometric movement, from which Wilson and Samuelson tried to 
keep a distance. 
Limits of this research 
The adopted approach in this doctoral research consisted of exploring the historical 
development of economics and other disciplines in America from the perspective of 
Wilson's career and work, and from the perspective of Samuelson ' s commitment to 
those ideas, or at least from our understanding of Wilson ' s and Samuelson ' s ideas. 
A narrative approach in the history of science, which consists of following and 
reconstructing particular scientists ' professional lives, has the advantage of providing 
the specific and local circumstances and influences that framed and limited the 
thinking of protagonists. lncidentally, intellectual biography as a historiographical 
category in the history of science has an essential limit in that it does not provide 
comprehensive accounts about general movements, which altogether framed 
particular transformations of scientific disciplines and practices, as well as 
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participated, with conflict or not, m negotiations leading to the establishment of 
general discourses and practices. 1 
In this vein, the scope of this thesis is limited by its own approach. The first chapter 
can only purport to be an account about Wilson ' s particular influence in the 
development of scientific interdisciplinarity in America and his definition of 
mathematical rationality, not of the development of interdisciplinarity in America and 
of rationality at large. Likewise, the second chapter can only pretend to offer a new 
perspective, Wilson ' s perspective, about the rise of mathematical economics in 
America; it cannot intend to be an account about the mathematization of economics. 
Similarly, the third chapter can only pretend to offer new insight of Samuelson ' s 
Foundations of Economie Analysis, by reconstructing the Wilsonian framework 
within which Samuelson was working when writing his thesis and the other chapters 
that he subsequently added and which composed the body of the book. This last 
chapter cannot be regarded as a general account tracing al! the influences that framed 
and limited Samuelson ' s early thought. 
This thesis is not an account of how American sciences, particularly econom1cs, 
became mathematized. This thesis is an account of how Wilson , a professional 
mathematician disenchanted with his profession, which he thought was misleadingly 
following the Hilbertian structurali st kind of mathematics, decided to leave his initial 
research community and approach other American scientific communities, 
participating and contributing hence, in various ways, to the process of 
mathematization of some American scientific fields , particularly econom1cs. 
Samuelson ' s commitment to Wilson's mathematics illustrated such influence. 
1 See Hacohen 2007. 
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Open doors 
In his How Economies Became a Mathematical Science (2002), Roy Weintraub uses 
a historiographical category found in the literature of the history of modern 
mathematics. Such a category consists of distinguishing, as the historian of 
mathematics Leo Corry suggests (Corry 2004b ), between the body and the image of 
knowledge. In mathematics, the body of mathematics reflects on questions directly 
related to the discipline of mathematics, namely to the professional practices of 
mathematicians trained in modern departments of mathematics; it is connected to the 
language of mathematics, namely to the ru les that objectively determine the truth or 
falsity of mathematical statements in modern mathematics. The image of 
mathematics, instead, reflects on meta-mathematical questions, involving normative 
and methodological ideas about the body of mathematics, which are contingent to 
cultural , institutional and historical factors. The image of mathematics is therefore 
connected to the language about mathematics. 
Within the body-image framework, professional mathematical practitioners are 
regarded as being concerned with the body of mathematics only; it is also assumed 
that their image of mathematics does not have any epistemic role, as it does not 
provide any kind of element that enters in the set of ru les determining truth or falsity 
of mathematical statements. The image of mathematics, however, as embedded in 
cultural context, is thought of as framing and limiting the practices of 
mathematicians, individually or in community, as well as influencing their choices 
regarding the approach to be adopted , the problems to be solved, the curriculum to be 
established and the kind of connections with other scientific disciplines and with 
society that should be developed. In the body-image framework, professional 
historians of mathematics endeavor to reconstruct the image of mathematics of 
mathematicians in the recent past, individually or in community, not the body of 
mathematics. 
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Whereas the body-image framework bas been useful in the history of economics in 
establishing the present understanding of a large variety of significant historical 
interactions between economics and mathematics, it is of little help for the 
reconstruction of the interwoven histories of mathematics, statistics and econom ics as 
regarded from the perspective of the Wilson-Samuelson connection. Any account in 
the history of economics underlining Samuelson's influence in the process of 
mathematization of economics should therefore be taken with skepticism, if it is 
made within the body-image framework. 
Wilson ' s professional life was the story of a mathematician who left the American 
community of modern mathematicians. Throughout his whole life, however, he kept 
struggling with the right definition of mathematics within different research and 
academic American communities; the sites where he engaged in negotiations with 
modern mathematicians were scientific academies and associations, university 
departments, clubs and groups of intellectual discussion, college and university 
courses as well as the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, which he 
edited for fifty years. Ali of these sites were located outside departments and 
institutions of mathematics. Institutionally and socially, Wilson ' s work and career 
developed outside the circles of professional researchers in mathematics. At the same 
time, his epistemology contrasted with the epistemology of bis mathematician 
colleagues. In Wilson ' s foundational thinking, the body and the image of 
mathematics were interconnected, not separated; for him, intuition, belief, 
visualization and persona! judgment were as important as rigor and logic when 
establishing meaningfulness (truth or falsity) of mathematical and scientific 
statements. Consequently, in the historical reconstruction of his legacy (in 
economics), emphasis has to be laid on the interconnections between the body and the 
image of his mathematics, or in other words, between his language of and about 
mathematics. 
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Wilson's struggles with modern mathematicians for the right definition of 
mathematics and science led him to adopt an intermediary rote between mathematics 
and various subject matters, and to define mathematics as intermed;ate and 
constrained. His significant influence in the rise of mathematical economics during 
the 1920s and the 1930s should be therefore understood from that perspective. That 
being the case, even though Wilson ' s mathematical efforts and ideas around 1930 
were (institutionally, socially and epistemologically) disconnected from , indeed in 
contrast to, what was going on in American modern departments of mathematics, his 
impact in shaping American modern economics was of a mathematical nature: it 
embodied his eternal struggle for the right definition of mathematics and its 
interconnections with science, as well as the establishment of the right practices of 
future mathematicians and scientists, of the right scientific discipline that they should 
adopt. 
Eventually, our thesis opens three new perspectives for the historical study of the 
mathematical turn of economics in America as related to the Wilson-Samuelson 
connection. These perspectives involve theoretical , methodological and 
historiograph ical discussions. 
First, Samuelson ' s work in consumer theory as well as cost and production theory 
have been interpreted as a direct response to what has been called the 1930s Harold 
Hotelling and Henry Schultz impasse (Hands and Mirowski 1998; Mirowski and 
Hands 1998). In these accounts, Hotelling and Schultz are convincingly shown to 
follow a physics metaphor. In their demand theory, they arguably reflect their belief 
in the existence of a structural relationship between prices and quantities in the 
market place that could be translated into mathematical and statistical language: 
"Both passionately believed that seience was transparently mathematical , that it was 
firmly based upon the collection and statistical processing of empirical data , and that 
physics was the embodiment of the success of the scientific method" (Hands and 
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Mirowski 1998, 345). However, it is explained, the phys ics metaphor fa iled when 
Hote lling and Schultz sought unsuccessfu lly to stati stically test their demand theory. 
Samuelson' s consistency postulate, whi ch introduced in the fo refront of the ana lys is 
an empirical emphas is that was not subject to stati stical tests for va lid ity, is then 
presented as providing, w ith Samuelson consciously and pu rposely worki ng in this 
direction, a new (but only temporary) lease to Hotelling ' s and Schul tz ' s (neoclass ical) 
program and their phys ics metaphor. 
Given Wilson' s ideas about the interconnections between the image and the body of 
mathematics, name ly hi s emphasis on the connection between mathematica l 
structu res , conventional working hypotheses-whi ch were never to be taken as 
structures existing in nature- and some sort of data, and fu rther given Samuelson' s 
commitment to these ideas, the Hotelling-Schul tz-Samuelson connection appears to 
be less ev ident than Wade Hands and Philip Mirowk i claim . More precise ly, the ir 
argument about the signifi cant re levance of Hote lling ' s and Schulz ' s work fo r the 
way Samuelson framed certa in theoreti cal problems at the indiv idual level is 
enlightening. The questioning that our research brings to the fo reground relates to 
the ir in terpretati on of Samuelson' s early work as mainly, if not merely, an extension 
of Hote lling ' s and Schultz' (neoclassica l) research program, irnply ing suggestive ly at 
the sarn e tirne Samuelson' s adoption of Hote lling ' s and Schultz' s epi stemic positions. 
Phys ics and some of its rnathematical structures were undeniably a significant source 
of inspi ration fo r a il of thern . However, these structures as well as other e lernents, 
such as conventions fo und in subject rnatters, seem to have played very different ro les 
in the creative practices of each one of these individua ls. White structures 
(mathernatica l or economic) were not as relevant fo r (the young) Samuelson as fo r 
Hote lling and Schultz, conventions in economics were central fo r (th e young) 
Samuelson, probably less for Hotelling and Schultz. 
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From our Wilsonian perspective, the Hotelling-Schultz-Samuelson connection 
appears at least ambiguous, as was Wilson 's relationship with Hotelling. In the early 
1930s, Wilson had promoted Hotelling ' s (and Schultz' s) career; but Hotelling' s 
subsequent work in mathematical economics and in (Fisherian) statistics was 
precisely the kind of mathematics and statistics that Wilson despised. For Wilson , 
mathematical economics did not consist of copying and pasting formulas found in 
pure mathematics and physics into economics, as he probably felt Hotelling did. 
Applicability of these formulas regarding shared conventions and data in the subject 
matter was his watchword. In his courses to economists, he never mentioned 
Hotelling' s work. In this vein, this time regarding statistics, Wilson believed, in his 
words: 
"the recent developments in the field of probabilities due to Fisher, 
Pearson , Hotelling and others were meritorious . What none of these 
persons understands is that probabilities and statistics are different things. 
It is perfectly easy to prove either with the theory of inverse probabilities 
which I have never liked or with the theory of likelihood which I prefer 
that provided (1) the theory of likelihood is to be regarded as a sound 
fundamental axioms and (2) that the universe from which the sample is 
selected is normal , then (3) ce11ain consequences follow. This is a 
mathematical theorem. It can ' t be wrong. But in practice when one comes 
to apply it one may seriously question each of the two axioms at the basis 
of the conclusion. But there is a still further difficulty which is at the heart 
of the difference between stat1st1cs and probabilities and the 
corresponding difference between pure mathematics and science. The 
sample we have generally comes from a universe which even if 
essentially normal is unknown and any particular investigator selecting a 
sample out of that universe even with the greatest intelligence, and many 
exercise none, will probably get a sample which is biased. ln fact, even if 
he gets a great many samples they may ail be somewhat biased because 
he hasn ' t ail the variables or rather the parameters which define the 
universe under contrai indeed generally doesn ' t know what these 
parameters are."2 
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Wilson ' s and Hotelling's ideas about mathematics and statist ics seemed to differ 
significantly. It is therefore reasonable to expect that Samuelson ' s and Hotelling' s 
mathematical economics were not mainly or merely singular. With ail these elements 
in mind, and particularly taking into account Samuelson's Wilsonian understanding 
of operationally meaningful knowledge, Samuelson ' s connection to Hotelling and 
Schultz is left as an open door for future research. This would certainly require a full 
and comprehensive analysis involving, among other things, an analytical and 
technical study of Samuelson ' s work, and a comparison of his work that he felt was 
operationally meaningful to the other that he felt was not. 
Second, Samuelson's famous "operationally meaningful theorems," which he 
presented as being of observational and empirical significance as they could be tested 
in idealized conditions, have often been studied by historians, philosophers, and 
methodologists of economics within the ex-post framework of rational 
reconstructions. ln these accounts, Samuelson ' s ideas about operational and 
meaningful knowledge are analyzed in reference to comprehensive philosophies such 
as operationalism, logical positivism , empiricism, falsificationism , descriptivism or 
behaviorism, or in reference to the methodolog ical positions of other economists who 
themselves explicitly adopted some of these philosophical positions (Hands 2001 ; 
Mangin 2000; Cohen 1995; Hausman 1992; Caldwell 1982; Blaug 1980; Wong 1973, 
1978). ln these accounts, Samuelson ' s ideas about operational , meaningfu l, 
observational and testable knowledge appear philosophically naïve and unintelligible 
because they do not properly fit with these rationalizing references points. Often , if 
not systematically, the works that are used in order to reconstruct Samuelson ' s early 
2 E. Wilson to C. Roos, Sep. 16, 1936 [PEBW, 27]. 
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methodo log ical ideas are comments that Samuelson wrote during the 1960s 
(Archibald, Simon, and Samuelson 1963; Samuelson 1964; Samuelson 1965). 
Those comments were re lated to a controversy over the rea lism of hypotheses 111 
economics; 3 in them, Samuelson invited us to look backwards to hi s thesis and 
Foundations and to interpret them as consistently re lated to some of the mentioned 
comprehensive philosophies. These comments are sure ly enli ghtening for our 
understanding of Samuelson ' s (naïve) philosophical pretentions in the 1960s, and 
probably fo r contextua liz ing in methodo logical terms hi s work in economics in the 
1960s and thereafter. They are, however, misleading regarding hi s earlier work: there 
is no well-documented evidence that around 1940 Samuelson seriously engaged with 
any of these comprehensive philosophies. 
Around 1940, instead, Samuelson was committed to Wil son's ideas about 
mathematics and sc ience. In their turn, Wil son' s fo undational ideas could be qualifi ed 
as philosophically naïve; they do not seem to properly fit with any of the mentioned 
comprehensive philosophies of knowledge serv ing as rat iona liz ing references. Wil son 
had his own original- indeed peculiar, but nonetheless deep, sophisticated and 
complex-set of ideas about the found ati ons of mathemati cs and science. In return , 
hi s commitment to Wil son' s thinking around 1940 placed Samuelson in a peculi ar 
pos ition regardin g hi s epistemic ideas. 
How Samuelson' s epi stemology and practi ces as a mathematica l economist changed, 
or not, and namely how the in teraction between hi s image of and the body of hi s 
mathematical economics evo lved between the 1940s and the 1960s, is a question that 
remains open for future inquiry. 
A poss ible way of exploring thi s evolution is connected to the thi rd door that our 
thesis left open. We have insisted that Samuelson fu lly committed to Wilson' s 
3 See also F ri edm an 1953 ; Nagel 196 1; 1963 ; Machlup 1964; Garb 1965; Massey 1965; Lern er 1965 . 
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American attitude toward mathematics, which contrasted with Hilbert's attitude 
towards mathematics. Incidental ly, John von Neumann, one of the worldwide leading 
professional mathematicians who coauthored with the economist Oskar Morgenstern 
the Theory of Games and Economie Behavior (1944) and who contributed in 
significant ways to connect mathematics and economics, worked in a Hilbertian 
spirit. 
While it cannot be claimed that Samuelson ' s professional career mainly developed as 
he rejected von Neumann ' s mathematical economics, it can be observed that his 
mathematical economics sign ificantly contrasted with von Neumann ' s. Samuelson 
and von Neumann met once in March 1942,4 when the latter was presenting his work 
at the department of economics at Harvard. At that occasion, the young mathematical 
economist and the well-establisbed mathematician engaged in a disagreement about 
the right kind of mathematics to be used as the foundations of modern econom ics. 
Such disagreement embodied Wilson ' s lifelong conflicted relationship with Hilbert' s 
mathematics, which, through the encounter between Samuelson and von Neumann in 
a conference room at Harvard, started gaining relevance in economics. More 
significantly, almost simultaneously, Samuelson 's Foundations, finished in 1945, and 
von Neumann's Theory of Garnes, published in 1944, presented contrasting 
foundations for economics, and each in its own way became hugely influential in the 
subsequent evolution of the field. Each book attached central importance to the fact 
that it was usi ng a kind of mathematics that was both different and new in social 
science. The first was written under the influence of Wilson, the second was written 
in the spirit of the Hilbertian structuralist mathematics. 
In the last analysis, the present research opens the door to a new historiographical 
category in the history of economics. The field still lacks a detailed study of the 
4 J. von Neumann to G. Haberler, 31 Oct. 193 1, Library of Congress. 
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mathematical turn of economics as regarded from the point of view of a conflict 
between different and contrasting mathematical attitudes, as represented by the 
Wilson-Samuelson and Hilbert-von Neumann traditions. Both Samuelson and von 
Neumann participated in significant ways in establishing a particular discourse and 
specific practices, seemingly harmonized , that impo1tantly contributed to shaping the 
mathematical transformation of economics during the 1940s and thereafter. 
As an extension of this doctoral thesis, the next step will consist of studying in detail 
the conflict between Samuelson and von Neumann, as the genealogy of an intellectual 
contlict begun by Wilson ' s rejection of Hilbert 's mathematical style and his adoption 
of Gibbs ' s attitude towards mathematics, and to use it as a point of departure for a 
historical exploration of two contrasting traditions in mathematical economics. 
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